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FOREWORD 
 
 
Homeland security may well be the signature national issue for the United States during the first 
decade of the 21st century.  The tragic events of 9/11 and the dramatic consequences of hurricane 
Katrina focused attention on the need to prevent harm and ensure effective responses when harm 
does occur.  The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) of the Department of Homeland 
Security plays a crucial role in the effort to keep America safe by leading the development of 
technologies and tools that federal, state, and local first responders and others need to prevent 
and respond to human and natural disasters.  S&T’s mandate also requires the Directorate to 
coordinate across the many federal agencies involved in homeland security-related research to 
ensure they are directing their efforts to achieve the best possible outcomes. 
 
Recognizing the significance of S&T’s mission to the safety of the nation, Congress asked the 
National Academy to conduct a comprehensive review of S&T’s structure, processes, and the 
execution of its cross-government leadership role.  The independent Study Panel has 
recommended changes that would substantially improve both the efficiency and effectiveness of 
S&T.  These include developing and implementing an internal S&T strategic plan and 
performance measures that would help maintain a focus on results.  Other recommendations call 
for developing processes and procedures to increase transparency and communication within 
S&T, across government, and with the first responders.  The Panel also recommends that S&T 
take additional steps to fulfill its leadership role and develop a homeland security-related 
research plan for the entire federal government. 
 
As part of this Study, the National Academy also was asked to assess whether a shift in priorities 
to homeland security-related research may have displaced funds for other important research 
areas or resulted in unnecessary duplication of effort.  In seeking to answer this complex 
question, the Study Panel sought input from scientists and administrators in a range of federal 
agencies engaged in homeland security-related research, scientists from outside government, 
science policy experts, and members of the first responder community.  We did not find evidence 
that increases in homeland security-related research funding have resulted in reduced funding for 
other important research areas or in unnecessary duplication of effort.  
 
The Academy thanks the members of the Panel for their excellent work, and to the project team 
for their research and other contributions.  We also thank the management and staff of S&T, and 
the many individuals from other federal agencies and non-government experts who generously 
contributed their time, expertise and perspectives to this important effort.  Their assistance has 
helped produce a report with findings and recommendations that will make a real difference in 
S&T’s future management of the nation’s homeland security-related research program. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) is 
charged with planning, organizing, and guiding the homeland security-related scientific, 
engineering, and technological resources of the nation and leveraging these resources into 
technical tools to protect the homeland.  With a Fiscal Year 2009 budget of $800 million, S&T 
ranks third behind the Departments of Health and Human Services and Defense in spending for 
homeland security-related research. In addition to coordinating work with its federal partners, 
S&T interacts with state, local and international counterparts to ensure that homeland security 
research dollars are spent as effectively as possible.   
 
In response to a congressional mandate and in consultation with S&T, the National Academy of 
Public Administration formed an expert Panel and initiated a review of S&T’s effectiveness and 
efficiency in addressing homeland security needs.  This review included a particular focus on 
identifying any unnecessary duplication of effort, and any opportunity cost arising from an 
emphasis on homeland security-related research.  Under the direction of the Panel, the study 
team reviewed a wide variety of documents related to S&T and homeland security-related 
research in general.  The team also conducted interviews with over 200 individuals, including 
S&T officials and staff, officials from other DHS component agencies, and from other federal 
agencies engaged in homeland security-related research.  Experts outside of government in 
science policy, homeland security-related research, and other scientific fields were also 
interviewed. 
 
RESULTS IN BRIEF 
 
S&T has made strides towards becoming a mature and productive research and development 
organization, particularly during the last three years.  But, its ability to fulfill its mission and 
become a world class research and development organization is limited by the lack of a cohesive 
strategy, the insularity that defines its culture, and the lack of mechanisms necessary to assess its 
performance in a systematic way.  Moreover, S&T has yet to play its mandated leadership role in 
developing a homeland security-related research strategic plan for all national efforts.   
 
S&T’s lack of a strategic plan has contributed to a fragmented and unwieldy structure, one that 
has grown on an ad hoc basis rather than being grounded in carefully planned organizational 
mission and goals.  S&T’s efforts to reach out to state and local first responders and incorporate 
their needs into the research agenda is a case in point.  S&T is now devoting an increased level 
of effort in this area.  However, its overall approach lacks the vision and cohesiveness that would 
allow it to identify and engage these customers—who sit at the core of the nation’s first response 
to threats of all kinds—in a systematic and sustainable way.  
 
S&T’s fragmented structure, with overlapping roles and responsibilities, has also led to internal 
communication breakdowns that can affect performance.  Improved internal communication 
would result in more consistent performance across organizational units, as best practices could 
 x
be more readily shared and adopted, and would also enhance transparency in both processes and 
decisions.  
  
In recent years, S&T has apportioned a major role to DHS component agencies in setting the 
research agenda and has made commendable progress in coordinating and collaborating with 
other research organizations both nationally and globally.  Yet, S&T has failed to engage the 
broader scientific research community in assessing its work as is the practice with many other 
federal research agencies. Scientific peer review is critical to ensuring quality in design and 
execution of research.  Additionally, competition for funding is a major factor in expanding the 
pool of researchers interested in working in certain areas and, consequently, expanding the 
capacity to conduct that research.  Greater transparency to the broader research community is 
needed. Solicitation and peer review of competing proposals, outside expert reviews of portfolios 
of work, and transparency of structure are not the norm at S&T.   
 
S&T, while relatively young in terms of federal government research and development 
organizations, is rapidly approaching the time when specific results will be expected from its 
efforts to deliver technologies and other products that will enhance homeland security.  Thus, the 
need for reliable and valid measures of progress and the tracking of results is vital.  This harkens 
back to the first point about strategic planning.  A strategic plan, developed with input from all 
relevant parties, is the foundation for development of sound benchmarks of progress.  Tracking 
of progress towards goals, peer review, and feedback from those who are the intended recipients 
of S&T’s products are all important elements in assessing the performance of S&T as it moves 
toward maturity. 
 
S&T faces a significant challenge in marshaling the resources of multiple federal agencies to 
work together to develop a homeland security-related strategic plan for all agencies.  Yet, the 
importance of this role should not be underestimated.  The very process of working across 
agencies to develop and align the federal homeland security research enterprise around a 
forward-focused plan is critical to ensuring that future efforts support a common vision and 
goals, and that the metrics by which to measure national progress, and make changes as needed, 
are in place. 
 
While there is always a cost to change, the long-term benefits of adjustments to reduce insularity 
and fragmentation, and increase communication, transparency, and strategic focus far outweigh 
near-term costs.  S&T’s relative newness as an organization, and the advent of a new 
Administration, afford an opportunity to institute the changes that will help maximize its 
potential. 
   
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Organization and Communication at S&T:  S&T has been a DHS Directorate for six years 
and underwent a substantial reorientation and reorganization three years ago.  Its organization is 
highly complex with six technical divisions that work in conjunction with three Portfolio 
Offices—Research, Innovation, and Transition (i.e., basic research to implementation)—to 
maintain a flow of new technologies and other products to DHS component agencies and first 
responders.  This cross-functional arrangement demands continuous communication for optimal 
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performance.  At S&T, there have been breakdowns in communications across the management 
team and staff.  The Panel recommends that S&T management engage staff in a process of 
identifying communications problems and implementing solutions.  Web-based technology 
would be a valuable tool to initiate this process.  (See pages 9 through 15 for a more detailed 
discussion.) 
 
The fact that there are 20 direct reports to the Under Secretary and a proliferation of offices and 
sub-units, exacerbates the communications problems, and can lead to bottlenecks and confusion.  
Overlapping responsibilities, such as those held by the multiple offices that interact with the first 
responder community, cause inefficiencies.  The Panel recommends reconsideration of S&T’s 
structure to ensure a more reasonable number of direct reports, and a more cohesive 
structure for managing first responder interaction. (See pages 12 through 15 for a more 
detailed discussion.) 
 
Customer Focus of Transition Research:  Research in S&T’s Transition Portfolio is intended 
to provide technologies to DHS components and first responders within three years. There is 
widespread agreement within DHS that S&T has made substantial improvement during recent 
years in focusing research on DHS component needs.  Although there is room for improvement, 
S&T’s adoption of the Integrated Product Team (IPT) approach to obtain and prioritize 
component input to the research agenda has generally been praised. The goal is for about half of 
the research budget to be allocated on the basis of IPT input.  The Panel recommends a 
number of refinements to the IPT process, including more standard structures and 
procedures to help ensure its institutionalization, reconsideration of the appropriate 
customer base, mechanisms that will ensure that the highest DHS priorities will be served, 
and greater transparency in decision-making.  (See pages 23 through 37 for a more detailed 
discussion.) 
 
While first responders are also recognized as important customers of S&T technology 
development, mechanisms to include them in the priority setting process have been generally 
ineffective.  While S&T has programs to reach out to first responders, large parts of that 
community are unfamiliar with S&T, and very few are active participants in S&T priority 
setting.  S&T is embarking on several new strategies to engage first responders. The Panel 
recommends refinements in the structures already in place and inclusion of first 
responders in existing IPTs, where appropriate.  Adding the proposed new first responder 
IPT seems unlikely to be effective.  (See pages 39 through 55 for a more detailed discussion.) 
 
Basic Research Portfolio:  About 20 percent of S&T’s research budget funds basic research.  
Less customer-driven than work in the Transition Portfolio, basic research is expected to take 
five to eight years and provide the breakthroughs that will feed future transition projects.  The 
allocation of basic research funds—in total and across divisions—seems to rest on historical 
allocations and may not be relevant today.  Further, many basic research projects are not 
competitively awarded, with potentially negative effects on the efficiency and quality of the 
research.  The Panel recommends that S&T take steps to rationalize decision making about 
the allocation of basic research funding, and that funds be awarded on a competitive basis 
based on scientific peer review except when this is clearly not feasible.  (See pages 57 
through 68 for a more detailed discussion.) 
 xii
 
S&T’s Leadership Role across Government:  S&T’s statutory mandate charges it with a 
leadership role in guiding federal homeland security-related research efforts.  S&T has control 
over less than one third of the federal homeland security-related research budget, and has no 
authority over the other actors in this field.  This places S&T in a weak position to exert the 
leadership needed to carry out its mandate to develop a national homeland security-related 
research Strategic Plan.  Indeed, little or no progress has been made in this area during the last 
six years.  However, officials at other federal agencies report that S&T is doing a good job 
exchanging information and working with them across a range of research subject areas.  S&T 
officials are active participants in many task forces and inter-agency committees, and coordinate 
with other agencies on numerous projects.  This is a significant step towards developing the 
relationships that are needed for S&T to successfully work with agencies across government to 
develop the kind of strategic plan that would provide the vision, direction and goals for 
homeland security-related research for the nation. The process of developing this national 
strategic plan will ensure that future research efforts across all agencies are optimally linked, and 
that metrics to measure progress as a nation in homeland security-related research can be 
developed and tracked.  The Panel recommends that S&T work with the White House Office 
of Science and Technology Policy and the array of federal agencies engaged in homeland 
security-related research to develop a comprehensive national strategic plan for such 
research.  (See pages 17 through 22  for a more detailed discussion.) 
 
Strategic Planning:  S&T’s Strategic Plan was issued in June of 2007.  However, this plan does 
not provide the vision and strategy needed to guide the Directorate.  While the Plan is a useful 
document in describing the “what” of S&T’s programs, it fails to describe the “why.”  The 
process of developing a strategic plan should focus an organization on clear goals and reflect 
how the views and needs of stakeholders have been incorporated.  The goals articulated in such a 
strategic plan become the foundation for developing metrics to assess progress in reaching goals.  
The Panel recommends that S&T follow the guidance provided by the Office of 
Management and Budget and the Government Accountability Office to formulate a 
strategic plan that will effectively guide its work toward specified goals.  (See pages 17 
through 22 for a more detailed discussion.) 
 
Performance Measurement:  S&T utilizes milestones to measure progress, but these may not 
be providing meaningful indicators of progress.  While milestones in S&T’s 2007 Five Year Plan 
are clearer and more measurable than they have been in the past, there appears to be little or no 
consequence for missing milestones.  The Panel recommends that S&T systematically collect 
and analyze information about milestones met and missed, adopt appropriate 
consequences, and provide clear guidance for setting valid initial and subsequent 
milestones. (See pages 83 through 99 for a more detailed discussion.) 
 
Performance measurement, in general, has received little focus in S&T.  Unlike other federal 
research organizations, S&T has not widely used peer review to assess program performance.  
Given the inherent difficulties of evaluating the quality and value of research, especially basic 
research, it is vital that outside peer review be used to ensure that ongoing work meets the 
highest standards.  The Panel recommends that S&T use independent external scientific 
peer review at the division, or appropriate program, level to review basic, innovation, and 
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transition research efforts across a program area to ensure balance and quality.  Other 
methods used by research organizations across government, such as tracking conference 
presentations, citations, and products transitioned, should also be adopted.  (See pages 83 
through 99 for a more detailed discussion.) 
 
Unnecessary Duplication:  Interviews with S&T officials and those of other agencies engaged 
in homeland security-related research did not surface any instances of unnecessary duplication of 
effort in this research area.  Officials noted that there are cases in which research projects appear 
to be similar, but in fact differ because one is focusing on technologies for a combat environment 
and another is focusing on a civilian environment in which civil liberties are of greater concern.  
Further, outside experts consulted in the course of this study did not cite examples of 
unnecessary duplication of effort and indicated that some duplication is purposeful in scientific 
research, as multiple solutions to a problem can lead to an opportunity to pick the best solution 
rather than the only solution. Because of limited funds, officials at S&T and other federal 
agencies said they work hard to leverage each other’s research in order to get the most return for 
the research dollar and try to avoid unnecessary duplication.  However, it is important to note 
that this study identified serious weaknesses in the strategic planning process, both as it occurs 
within S&T, and in S&T’s mandate to lead the development of a homeland security-related 
strategic plan for all federal agencies. Currently, there is no effective and systematic mechanism 
in place to evaluate the relative merits of competing priorities across S&T, or across the federal 
homeland security research enterprise. It would seem likely, therefore, that the risk of 
unnecessary duplication of effort is currently higher than it would be if robust and effective 
strategic planning processes were in place.  (See pages 69 through 81 for a more detailed 
discussion). 
 
Opportunity Costs:  Congress has expressed concern that recent increases in homeland 
security-related research may have resulted in reduced funding for other significant research 
endeavors.  No evidence has been found in the course of this review to indicate that this has 
occurred. During the past five years, three of the ten federal agencies with the largest research 
budgets, have reduced or held constant overall research budgets while spending on homeland 
security research increased.  The reasons for the specific changes are unclear. However, a broad 
range of science policy experts and researchers said they did not believe that there had been a 
displacement of other research because of increases in homeland security-related research.  
Researchers in criminal justice were an exception, noting that a shift to terrorism-related research 
has resulted in less funding for more traditional areas of criminal justice behavioral and 
technology research.  Experts also cautioned that in any event a wide variety of policy decisions 
can affect funding across research areas and cited numerous other likely reasons for fluctuations, 
including shifts in Administration priorities and changes in the federal budget.  Whether 
homeland security-related research will crowd out other significant research in the future is 
unpredictable.  That said, the fact that no evidence of opportunity cost was found in this study 
does not constitute a conclusive determination that opportunity costs do not exist.  The 
methodology employed in examining this question was limited by the scope of the study and the 
availability of data. This question also involves elements of policy judgment. (See pages 101 
through 106 for a more detailed discussion.) 
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LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
All of the Panel’s recommendations in this report are listed below.  The first number in each 
recommendation corresponds to the chapter in which the recommendation appears and where  
the context and further explanation can be found.  The second number identifies the order in 
which the recommendations appear in the chapters.  
 
CHAPTER III:  S&T ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
 
3-1. Take steps to improve communication within the Directorate. 
Staff concerns about insufficient communication across organizational lines, and lack of 
knowledge by some staff of documents relevant to their work, indicates a need for 
improved internal communications. 
 
3-2. Consider the benefits and costs of streamlining the organizational structure to 
reduce the number of direct reports to the Under Secretary to a more reasonable 
number. 
The number of direct reports heightens the likelihood of bottlenecks and delays.  The 
benefits of change, however, should be weighed against the inevitable costs of change in 
an organization that has experienced considerable change in recent years. 
 
3-3. Adopt a more cohesive structure for gathering first responder input. 
The fragmented structure for gathering and considering input from first responders may 
reduce coordination within S&T and increase frustration on the part of first responders. 
 
CHAPTER IV:  MISSION AND STRATEGIC PLAN 
 
4-1. Develop an S&T Strategic Plan.  
A Strategic Plan, prepared in accordance with federal planning guidance, would provide 
the articulation of mission, goals, and strategies that would provide additional focus for 
its work. 
 
4-2. Develop a homeland security-related research strategic plan. 
Work with the White House and other federal agencies to develop a strategic plan that 
focuses federal efforts, helps ensure coordination and collaboration, and avoids 
unnecessary duplication of effort.  
 
CHAPTER V:  TRANSITION PORTFOLIO 
 
5-1. Define customers clearly. 
Defining customers for S&T and each IPT will provide the basis for identifying effective 
mechanisms for customer participation, thereby ensuring that S&T can more effectively 
meet their specific needs.   
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5-2. Increase outputs and accelerate transition. 
Customers are dissatisfied with S&T’s output to date, which is in part due to the large 
number of legacy projects in its portfolio.  In addition, many projects lack transition plans 
and customers do not always understand how they will acquire the technologies being 
developed. 
 
5-3. Establish and meet realistic targets. 
S&T advertises that transition projects will be completed within three years.  However, 
the majority of the projects have been ongoing for at least five years.  There do not 
appear to be disincentives for continuing projects that are unlikely to meet objectives and 
S&T staff complained that incentives for completing projects on time and within budget 
are lacking. 
 
5-4. Institutionalize the IPTs and impose standard structures and procedures. 
Customers and S&T staff alike are concerned that the IPTs are insufficiently 
institutionalized to withstand inevitable changes in leadership. The lack of standard 
structures and procedures, which makes it necessary for each IPT to develop its own 
processes and procedures through trial and error, also frustrates both Customers and S&T 
staff. 
 
5-5. Restructure the IPT process. 
Developing capability gaps in each IPT, in isolation from other IPTs, increases the 
likelihood that Department of Homeland Security-wide priorities are not being met.  In 
addition, IPT budgets are not flexible enough to meet changing Department priorities and 
take advantage of promising opportunities. 
 
5-6. Establish a formal process for collecting feedback from IPT members. 
There is no systematic method for collecting feedback from IPT customers regarding how 
the IPT process could be improved, how well projects have been transitioned, how well 
technologies have been integrated into operations after transition, and how technologies 
are performing in the field. 
 
5-7. Improve transparency. 
Processes, procedures, and decisions are not well-documented, explained, or 
disseminated.  Information on projects is not shared sufficiently within S&T or with 
customers, increasing the potential for unnecessary duplication, missed opportunities to 
leverage related research, slipping milestones, and continuing projects that should be 
terminated. 
 
5-8. Compete projects and use peer review to select research performers. 
Competing projects and peer review of grant awards is standard practice at other federal 
research agencies and will help ensure the highest possible quality of research. 
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CHAPTER VI:  MEETING THE NEEDS OF FIRST RESPONDERS 
 
6-1. Identify IPT customers and develop appropriate mechanisms for customer 
participation. 
Strengthening first responder participation in each of the existing IPTs will improve their 
functioning and negate the need for a new first responder IPT. 
 
6-2. Prioritize, tailor, and increase outreach. 
S&T’s interactions with first responders appear to be disproportionately geared to first 
responders in areas where less critical infrastructure and fewer people are at risk, such as 
small or mid-size cities in less populous states.  Further, these first responders are less 
likely to have the time, training, and technical expertise to understand capability gaps and 
future requirements.  At the same time, awareness of S&T in the first responder 
community is low. 
 
6-3. Leverage existing organizations and outreach mechanisms. 
S&T has not taken full advantage of national associations and existing federal agency 
advisory groups to reach out to first responders through, for example, websites and 
publications.  In addition to reaching their own members, national associations can 
disseminate information quickly and efficiently to state and local associations, greatly 
broadening S&T’s outreach capabilities with little additional effort. 
 
6-4. Give greater priority to testing and evaluation and to standards. 
First responders identified testing and evaluation as well as standards for existing 
equipment as needs that are more urgent than new technologies. 
 
6-5. Make it easier for first responders to participate. 
First responders want to participate, but it is a burden on individuals and their agencies to 
travel to multi-day meetings.   
 
6-6. Continue and strengthen the First Responder Technology Council. 
S&T lacks an internal mechanism for systematically collating and weighing first 
responder input from various interactions and coordinating responses.  The First 
Responder Technology Council could serve this purpose because its members represent 
all the S&T functional areas with responsibility for interacting with first responders. 
 
CHAPTER VII:  BASIC RESEARCH AND INNOVATION  
 
7-1.  Develop and implement clear and transparent processes and criteria for identifying 
basic research and innovation needs, prioritizing projects, and selecting performers.  
There is no clear basis for concluding that the current allocation for basic research is 
appropriate, S&T-wide, among the divisions, or within individual divisions. S&T also 
has only general criteria for selecting basic and innovation research projects and no clear 
process by which to prioritize basic research across divisions or within divisions.  
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7-2.  Ensure S&T builds on current efforts to integrate research across the National 
Laboratories, Centers of Excellence, and others.   
Continued and expanded efforts to involve outside experts effectively in setting agendas, 
such as the efforts of the Office of University Programs and meetings among the aligned 
divisions and National Laboratories, could improve the quality of the basic research 
program.  More integrated research should ensure better knowledge transfer and greater 
efficiency of effort and allow external expert views to be considered in decisions about 
the overall program of research, including the adequacy of the allocation of resources to 
basic and innovation research efforts.  
 
7-3.  Make competitive processes that include external scientific peer review the norm for 
basic research and all other awards as appropriate.  
Scientific peer review is critical to ensuring quality research and development, especially 
for basic research, because assessing likely impact is difficult over the short term.  Merit 
selection through external scientific peer review of proposals is not now the norm in S&T 
for selecting performers and, in most cases, decisions about the content, quality, and 
selection of proposals to fund are made by small groups or individuals. Adding outside 
input from experts in the many fields pertinent to homeland security research will 
increase S&T’s confidence, and that of its clients and appropriators, that the extent and 
nature of its basic research is thoroughly vetted and that the research being conducted is 
of the highest standards of excellence.   
 
CHAPTER VIII:  LEVERAGING INVESTMENTS AND AVOIDING UNNECESSARY  
DUPLICATION THROUGH COORDINATION AND COLLABORATION 
 
8-1. Provide a single, unified explanation of the allocation of responsibilities in S&T for 
interagency coordination at S&T in a readily available public document. 
 
S&T should clearly define component roles and responsibilities for interagency 
coordination and communicate this information internally and externally. One approach 
would be to publicly release a single unified explanation in a revised version of the 
Science and Technology Organization Regulation Manual (STORM). 
 
8-2. Clarify the allocation of responsibility within S&T for interagency coordination 
about the development and transfer of technologies related to first responder needs. 
 
The Interagency and First Responder Programs Division and the Office of Transition 
should work together to define their respective roles and responsibilities for interagency 
coordination relating to first responder technology needs. The resulting definition should 
be included in the unified statement of responsibilities in a revised STORM. 
 
8-3. Improve the internal communication about coordination planning and work to 
ensure responsibility for interagency coordination reflects the strategic plan when it 
is developed.  
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CHAPTER IX:  PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT  
 
9-1.  Ensure that milestones are valid measures of progress, represent reasonable but 
stretch goals, and are tied to appropriate consequences when they are not met. S&T 
has made progress in developing clear and measurable milestones, but there is no 
mechanism to ensure milestones are set at the most appropriate levels.  Additionally, 
milestones are not used as effectively as they could be because there are few or no 
consequences to missing a milestone. S&T could track information on met and unmet 
milestones to inform changes that could better ensure the milestones are valid and used to 
maximum effect. 
 
9-2. Conduct process evaluations of selected critical functions to maximize S&T’s 
efficiency and effectiveness.  Now that the new structure has matured, such evaluations 
can be an important tool to improve S&T’s ability to accomplish its mission.  As 
processes and procedures continue to evolve, such evaluations should also continue. The 
assessment of IPT customers using logic models, recommended elsewhere in this report, 
should provide an important basis for analysis of the IPT process.  But many other 
financial and operational processes should be reviewed.  
 
9-3.  Use independent external, scientific peer review to ensure S&T’s research is well 
managed, appropriately balanced among the three portfolios, and of high quality.   
This review would be most useful initially at the division or, when divisions conduct 
multiple programs focused on significantly different subjects, at the program level. This 
review should include, as appropriate, both scientists and practitioners.  The insular 
nature of S&T’s work is of great concern; it does not offer the scientific credibility that 
other federal research agencies gain through peer review, and that policymakers, 
customers and appropriators expect.   
 
9-4.  Use quantitative indicators of quality—as an adjunct to peer review—to help assess 
the overall quality of S&T’s research.  
Output indicators, such as, the number of peer reviewed journal articles that report on 
S&T research and the number of scientific awards given to S&T researchers, are widely 
recognized in the research field and can be fairly easily documented.  A metric for all 
programs that speaks directly to technologies available for transfer could provide 
important information and powerful incentives for producing timely and useful outputs. 
Such metrics stop short, however, of assessing the usefulness of the technologies.  An 
assessment of customer satisfaction could help.  
 
 
 xx
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CHAPTER I:  STUDY MANDATE, METHODOLOGY, AND  
CONTENT OF THIS REPORT 
 
 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) is 
charged with planning, organizing, and guiding the homeland security-related scientific, 
engineering, and technological resources of the nation and in the development of technological 
tools to protect the homeland.  With a 2009 budget of approximately $800 million, the 
Directorate not only leads the research efforts of other DHS components, but also interacts with 
federal, state, and local governments, and with private sector and international counterparts, to 
ensure that homeland security research dollars are spent effectively. 
 
THE MANDATE AND FOCUS FOR THE REVIEW 
 
The DHS Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, as part of the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of FY 2008 (P.L. 110-161), was signed into law on December 26, 2007.  The 
report of the House Appropriations Committee (H.R.110-181) accompanying the House version 
of the Act (H.R. 2638) directed DHS to contract with the National Academy of Public 
Administration (Academy) to review “the coordination of the government-wide homeland 
security research portfolio and the opportunity costs in other research areas as homeland 
security activities absorb a larger share of limited resources….”  The report further stated that 
this independent review was “necessary to determine whether Federal resources are being 
adequately and efficiently used in DHS and other Federal agencies to address homeland security 
needs, as well as to identify opportunity costs that may result from the increasing prominence of 
homeland security priorities in Federal research priorities outside the Department.” 
 
As a result of direction from Congress, and in consultation with S&T management, the primary 
areas of this Academy review are: 
 
• An assessment of DHS S&T’s research mission and the overall approach used to carry 
out that mission; 
• The approach used by S&T to interact, collaborate, and coordinate with other government 
and non-government entities in such research; 
• The extent and nature of efforts by S&T and other entities to avoid unnecessary 
duplication of homeland security research; 
• The methods used to develop priorities and to develop and apply criteria for determining 
which homeland security-related research to support; 
• The approaches used by S&T to identify and interact with research customers, determine 
and validate their homeland security research needs, evaluate program areas and 
proposed projects against those needs, and measure the extent to which those needs are 
being met; 
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• Trends in the type and amount (i.e. dollars and numbers of projects and program areas) of 
homeland security research being supported and conducted government-wide over the 
past several years; and 
• The extent to which there are opportunity costs associated with the scope and nature of 
homeland security-related research that is being supported. 
 
The Academy initiated this review on June 15, 2008.  An interim report was delivered to S&T in 
December 2008. 
 
STUDY METHODOLOGY 
 
To ensure that the study team acquired a complete picture of the issues and potential sources of 
information, a “design matrix” was developed for each topic area.  The design matrix broke each 
topic into a set of questions to be addressed to be responsive to the mandate.  For each question, 
likely sources of information, types of analysis, likely findings, and possible limitations to 
findings were identified.  This guided the literature and document review, the development of 
lists of interviewees and the interview protocols, as well as the organization and analysis of the 
information collected. 
 
Guided by the design matrix, an extensive review was undertaken of a wide variety of written 
documents concerning S&T and homeland security-related research in general.  Materials 
reviewed included pertinent legislation, official DHS and S&T documents, such as the Strategic 
Plan for both the Department and S&T, S&T descriptions of operations, and a DHS Inspector 
General review of S&T; reviews of S&T by other organizations such as the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS), the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and others; 
Congressional hearing transcripts; and media coverage of S&T from its inception to the present.  
Relevant documents related to other entities engaged in homeland security-related research both 
nationally and globally were also reviewed.  
 
Over 200 semi-structured interviews were conducted during the course of this study. Initially, 
numerous semi-structured interviews were conducted with S&T officials, starting at the highest 
organizational levels in order to develop a broad overview of the Directorate’s mission and 
operations.  The initial interviews were followed by an expanded range of interviews at S&T, to 
include Division Deputies, program managers, and others.  While almost all of the interviews 
were with individuals, several group interviews were convened with personnel who are in similar 
positions but work within different S&T divisions.  As needed, during the course of the study, 
follow-up interviews were held with some of the S&T officials. 
 
Outside S&T, many DHS staff who interact with S&T in the course of identifying gaps in 
capabilities and requirements to prioritize much of S&T’s focus were interviewed.  The goal was 
to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of these interactions, and the overall satisfaction level 
with S&T interactions with other agencies within DHS.  Additionally, representatives of the 
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and the U.S. Coast Guard who are also engaged in research 
within DHS, but outside of S&T were interviewed to assess the extent to which these groups 
coordinate with S&T. 
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Another set of interviews was conducted with officials at many other federal agencies who also 
engage in homeland security-related or other research that might be related in some way to 
S&T’s portfolio.  Many of these interviewees are members of inter-agency committees or task 
forces that include S&T representation.  Others either coordinate or collaborate with S&T on 
specific programs of research.  Others’ contact with S&T was more limited.  All interviews 
included a discussion of the level and quality of interactions between their agency and S&T and 
a specific set of questions designed to identify unnecessary duplication of effort.  For interviews 
with agency officials whose portfolios seem to afford a high potential for duplication of effort, 
questions focused on specific S&T programs to probe more deeply into the issue of unnecessary 
duplication.    
 
Two sets of interviews were held with experts outside the federal government.  These interviews 
involved scientists and science policy experts across academia and science policy-related 
organizations.  The initial set of interviews focused on perceptions of S&T’s role, its execution 
of that role, and how it fits within the community of homeland security-related research 
organizations.  The second set of interviews focused on opportunity costs, specifically, the extent 
to which the focus on homeland security-related research had reduced funding for other 
important research areas. Various means were used to identify appropriate individuals to respond 
to these issues.  First, officials at non-DHS federal agencies were asked about diversion of 
funding and to identify others within their agency who might have a relevant perspective on this 
issue.  Second, the Academy Panel provided contact information for knowledgeable individuals 
within the science community to address this issue.  Additionally, Academy Fellows who are 
engaged in science and public policy issues were selected to both address this question and to 
suggest others who may have insights on this issue.  
 
To gather a broader perspective on several issues within S&T itself, a web-based discussion 
using Web 2.0 technology with all S&T headquarters staff was recommended.  The topics 
chosen were internal S&T communications and potential refinements to the Integrated Product 
Team (IPT) process—the process used to work with other agencies within DHS to set priorities 
for S&T programs.1 The technology would have allowed interaction of participants with each 
other and with the study team to offer comments and suggestions, and to react to the ideas of 
others.  Participants would not identify themselves. Unfortunately, although S&T management 
was supportive of this idea, the Chief Information Officer for S&T identified procedural issues 
that could not be resolved within the time frame of this study. 
 
To augment this substantial effort to gather information from individuals, a wide range of 
documents were collected and analyzed.  In addition to documents noted above that provided the 
foundation for the initial literature review, documentation concerning homeland security-related 
research budgets, not only for DHS, but also for other federal entities engaged in homeland 
security-related research was collected.  S&T staffing data and an extensive array of S&T 
internal documents were also collected and reviewed.   
 
The Academy Panel met with the study team during the early stage of the review to provide 
direction to the team on overall study design and data collection strategies.  The Panel met again 
                                                 
1 The IPT process will be discussed in detail in Chapter V of this report. 
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to provide guidance for the analysis of issues to be included in the Interim Report, which was 
issued to S&T in December 2008.  During its third meeting in March 2009, the Panel provided 
guidance to the study team concerning key findings, recommendations, and the final report 
outline.  At a fourth meeting in April 2009, the Panel provided direction to the study team and 
approved the contents of the draft final report.  Finally, the Panel approved the final report 
following a DHS S&T comment period. 
 
CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT 
 
Nine additional chapters, as well as eleven appendices follow this initial introductory chapter. 
Recommendations to S&T are included in each chapter, as appropriate.  
 
• Chapter II provides historical information about S&T from its beginning in 2003 until 
2006 when there was a major reorganization.  
• Chapter III outlines S&T’s organizational structures and processes.   
• Chapter IV discusses S&T’s mission and Strategic Plan. 
• Chapters V and VI provide information about  S&T’s interaction with customers, with 
the former focused on DHS agencies as customers and the latter on the first responder 
community.   
• Chapter VII describes S&T’s Research and Innovation Portfolios. 
• Chapter VIII discusses steps to avoid wasteful duplication of effort and, more generally, 
S&T coordination and collaboration with other federal agencies. 
• Chapter IX focuses on performance measurement at S&T and similar federal agencies’ 
performance measurement strategies. 
• Chapter X discusses opportunity cost issues. 
 
The appendices, in addition to providing information about the Academy Panel and staff, and a 
list of individuals interviewed for the study, provide additional information concerning S&T to 
augment the report chapters. 
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CHAPTER II:  S&T EARLY HISTORY 
 
 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296), (“the Act”) established the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and created the Directorate for Science and Technology (S&T) within 
the Department.  The Act pulled together 22 different agencies and more than 170,000 
employees into one department attempting to unify activities related to homeland security.   
 
S&T represents a microcosm of the Department itself and was intended to unite disparate 
homeland security-related science and technology functions within a single organization to 
increase cohesion, coordination, and effectiveness.  S&T, headed by an Under Secretary (U/S) 
for Science and Technology, incorporated portions of programs from the Department of Energy, 
Department of Defense, and the Department of Agriculture, as well as some research programs 
within DHS legacy agencies.  It is charged with developing technologies that will counter threats 
as diverse as global disease, natural disasters, suicide bombers, chemical and biological weapons, 
and improvised explosive devices.  Aircraft, ports of entry, nuclear power plants, bridges, the 
water supply, livestock, urban transit, and the internet are among the vast and diverse array of 
entities and infrastructure that must be protected. 
 
The Directorate’s specific focus is on developing technologies that can assist both DHS and the 
state and local first responder2 community to prevent adverse events and respond when they 
cannot be avoided.  The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the Department 
of Defense (DOD) have larger annual homeland security research budgets than DHS and have 
either Presidential Directives or legislative authorization that give them specific responsibilities 
in the homeland security-related research arena.  Other federal departments, such as the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), also conduct 
homeland security-related research.  Among S&T’s statutory roles is coordination of these 
research efforts across the federal government. 
 
S&T START UP 
 
When S&T began operating in March 2003, it recruited and hired scientists, engineers, and other 
experts from a variety of sources, including academia, federal laboratories, and other federal 
agencies.  Many were acquired using the authority provided by the Intergovernmental Personnel 
Act (IPA) to gain expertise quickly, although IPAs return to their “home” institutions after a 
specified period of time.   
 
During S&T’s first full fiscal year of operations, its budget was set at $918 million and the 
number of employee positions was at 140.  As with any new organization, S&T’s first tasks 
included developing a coherent mission and the basic policies and procedures to function.  Some 
                                                 
2 First responders are federal, state, local, and tribal emergency professionals who prevent, defend against, and 
mitigate consequences of terrorist attacks and natural disasters.  First responders include the disciplines of 
emergency management, emergency medical services, fire, hazardous material, law enforcement, bomb squads, 
tactical operations/special weapons assault teams, and search and rescue. 
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business processes were adopted from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) at the DOD.  However, much more was required.3 
 
In April 2003, Charles E. McQueary was sworn in as the first S&T Under Secretary.  In a 
statement to the both the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Homeland 
Security just after his swearing in, U/S McQueary said that he expected S&T to be operational 
by October 1, 2003.  By January 2004, S&T’s staff totaled 212.  However, half of the staff were 
either on assignment from other federal agencies, IPAs, or contractors. Thus, long-term staff 
stability was an issue.   
 
S&T was organized initially into research and development portfolios that were intended to span 
its product line.  Four portfolios addressed specific threats: 
  
—Biological Countermeasures;  
—Chemical Countermeasures;  
—High Explosive Countermeasures; and  
—Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures. 
 
Four additional portfolios cross-cut all of these threats: 
 
   —Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and Assessment;  
—Standards;  
—Emerging Threats; and  
—Rapid Prototyping.   
 
Additional portfolios supported DHS operational units (such as Border and Transportation 
Security, Coast Guard, and Secret Service), the University and Fellows Program, and Counter-
Man Portable Air Defense Systems, which addresses technologies to protect commercial aircraft 
from ground-launched missile attacks.  Of the portfolios, by far the largest in terms of funding 
during S&T’s early years was Biological Countermeasures ($363 million in FY 03 and $285 
million in FY 04).  Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures ($75 million in FY 03 and $126 
million in FY 04) was a distant second.  All other programs were funded at substantially smaller 
levels. 
EARLY ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND CRITICISM 
 
In Congressional testimony in February and March 2004, U/S McQueary touted the progress 
made across all of the portfolios, stating that the operational components of DHS were his 
customers and that substantial efforts had been made to reach out to other federal agencies that 
engaged in related research.  He also indicated that S&T’s priorities came from many sources, 
including multiple national strategy documents, Presidential Directives, the 2003 Report on 
Combating Terrorism prepared by the Office of Management and Budget, current threat 
assessments, and input from DHS components.  
                                                 
3 For a discussion of S&T’s first year of operation, including its organizational structure, budget, and procedures, see 
“Survey of Science and Technology Directorate,” March 2004, Department of Homeland Security, Office of the 
Inspector General, OIG-04-24. 
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Despite these claims, criticisms of S&T during these initial years were widespread.  In June 
2006, the Senate Appropriations Committee expressed its displeasure with S&T, calling the 
Directorate a “rudderless ship without a clear way to get back on course.”  Others—both 
customers within DHS as well as first responders—were critical of its lack of customer focus and 
the pursuit of research solely for research’s sake rather than for the development of specific 
homeland security-related technologies.  Lack of transparency in setting priorities, limited 
success in partnering with other federal agencies engaged in related research, low staff morale, 
inability to obligate resources in a timely manner, and basic accounting problems rounded out 
the litany of complaints.  
 
In the Spring of 2005, concerns about the ability of S&T to operate effectively resulted in the 
formation of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) within DHS to assume activities 
handled by S&T’s Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures portfolio. At about the same time 
as this shift in responsibilities took place, U/S McQueary announced his resignation.  Two 
individuals served as Acting Undersecretary between the resignation of U/S McQueary and the 
appointment of a new U/S in August 2006.  The new U/S, Admiral (Retired) Jay Cohen, ushered 
in a number of organizational and process changes, discussed in Chapter III.  
 8
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CHAPTER III:  S&T ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
 
 
S&T is a relatively small federal organization with a highly complex structure that relies heavily 
on close coordination and interaction among many individual internal entities, that is, it is a 
“matrixed organization.”4  Its current structure was put in place in late 2006 by then Under 
Secretary Jay Cohen, who patterned it after the Office of Naval Research (ONR) which he had 
previously headed.  
 
S&T’S BASIC STRUCTURE 
  
The S&T Directorate consists of six technical divisions that are responsible for proposing 
priorities, and funding, and implementing projects. These divisions are: 
  
  —Chemical and Biological; 
  —Explosives; 
  —Command, Control and Interoperability; 
  —Border and Maritime Security; 
  —Infrastructure and Geophysical; and 
  —Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences. 
 
Three Portfolio Offices coordinate the work of the technical divisions to ensure an appropriate 
balance and coordination between basic and applied S&T research projects:    
 
  —Office of Transition; 
  —Office of Research; and 
  —Office of Innovation. 
 
The first two of these offices have staff “leads” embedded within each of the technical divisions.  
These leads report to the division directors, although they also have responsibilities in relation to 
the Portfolio Offices.  Neither the Transition nor Research Office has resources to fund projects 
directly.  In contrast, the Office of Innovation does not have leads within the divisions, but has its 
own funds to initiate projects.  Innovation Office projects are overseen by program managers 
within the divisions.5   
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Matrixed organizations assign groups of employees specific tasks and give them multiple reporting relationships.  
The intent is to transcend boundaries among organizational components and functions, and integrate activities.  For 
additional information concerning matrixed organizations see Bartlett, C. and Ghosal, S. (1998) “Managing across 
Borders.”  Boston, Harvard Business School Press;  Galbraith, Jay R., Diane Downey and Amy Kates (2002) 
“Designing Dynamic Organizations: A Hands-On Guide for Leaders at All Levels.”  New York: AMACOM, and 
Galbraith, Jay R. (2005) “Designing the Customer-Centric Organization: A Guide to Strategy, Structure, and 
Process.”  San Francisco:  Jossey-Bass, A. Wiley Imprint. 
5 Additional information concerning the roles and responsibilities of the Office of Transition is discussed in Chapter 
V, and of the Offices of Research and Innovation in Chapter VII. 
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Specialized program functions are handled by five additional S&T components: 
 
  —Test and Evaluation and Standards Division; 
  —Special Programs Division;  
  —Interagency and First Responder Programs Division;  
  —International Cooperative Programs Office; and 
  —Operations Analysis Division. 
 
Management support offices include Business Operations and Services, General Counsel, 
Communications, and the Office of the Chief Financial Officer. 
 
Table 3-1 provides a brief description of the program offices discussed above.  FY 2008 funding 
amounts for the technical divisions are also shown.   
 
 
Table 3-1:  S&T Divisions 
 
Topical Divisions for Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation Programs6 
Technical Division Program Area Responsibility FY 2008 Budget in Millions 
Chemical and Biological Chemical and Biological Countermeasure 
R&D; Threat Characterization; 
Operations; Agro-Defense; Biological 
Surveillance; and Response and Recovery 
$208 
Explosives Aviation Security; Mass Transit Security: 
Counter MANPADS 
78 
Infrastructure and 
Geophysical 
Critical Infrastructure Protection; 
Regional, State, and Local Preparedness 
and Response; and Geophysical 
65 
Command, Control and 
Interoperability 
Information Management; Information 
Sharing; Situational Awareness; 
Interoperability and Compatibility; and 
Cyber Security 
57 
Border and Maritime 
Security 
Land Borders; Maritime; and Cargo 
Security 
25 
Human Factors/Behavioral 
Sciences 
Social-Behavioral Terrorist Intent; Human 
Response to Incidents; and Biometrics 
14 
 
                                                 
6 Technical Division and Division/Offices  program area responsibilities are from the Department of Homeland 
Security, Science and Technology Strategic Plan, May 2007.  Budget data are from analyses issued by the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science.  Additional S&T budget information is included in Appendix A of this 
report. 
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Research Coordination Portfolios 
Portfolio Responsibility 
Office of Research University Programs, National Labs, Program Executive Office 
for Counter-IED 
Office of Innovation Basic and Applied Research to Promote Revolutionary Changes 
in Technology 
Office of Transition Expedite Technology Transition and Transfer to Customers 
 
 
Divisions/Offices for Other Critical Missions 
Division/Office Responsibility 
Test and Evaluation and 
Standards Division 
Independent Objective Testing of Technology Developments by 
the Six Divisions and across DHS. Oversees Standards 
Development for DHS. 
Office of Special Programs Coordinates Classified Projects Executed by the Six Divisions 
Operations Analysis 
Division 
Supports Risk Analysis and Manages the Homeland Security 
Institute Studies and Analysis Effort 
Interagency and First 
Responder Programs 
Division 
Facilitates Government-Wide Science and Technology 
Coordination, and Coordinates Exchange of Information with 
State, Local, Tribal, Academic and the Private Sector  
International Cooperative 
Programs Office 
Provides Outreach to U.S. Allies 
 
 
STRUCTURAL COMPLEXITY AND COMMUNICATIONS ISSUES 
 
While interviewees generally agreed that the matrixed structure can promote unity of effort, and 
is more operationally effective than what it replaced, concerns were raised both by S&T 
managers and DHS component staff about communications across division/portfolio/office lines.  
In order for S&T’s matrix management organization to work effectively, technical division staff 
must communicate and cooperate with staff from Transition, Research, and Innovation Offices, 
and these three offices must communicate with each other.   
 
Several managers reported that more direct communication between individual portfolio 
directors and the six division directors would be useful to promote better operations.  Although 
both portfolio directors and division directors attend weekly leadership meetings to share 
information, concerns remain about the effectiveness of one-on-one communication.  In some 
cases, portfolio directors and division directors have not been in agreement on policies and 
procedures, causing confusion among program managers as to how to proceed.  As a result, some 
technical division staff have established their own mechanisms to share information and to 
establish some uniformity in practice across the divisions.  Program managers said that more 
communication and interaction across division lines would enhance learning from one another.   
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Some managers did not know about policy guidance or other written materials prepared by other 
S&T units that were relevant to their responsibilities. For example, several managers with 
responsibilities for coordination with other federal agencies were not familiar with the Homeland 
Security and Technology Coordination Plan prepared by S&T that discusses homeland security-
related research projects across federal agencies. 
 
Interviewees also noted that the effectiveness of matrixed structures is very dependent on 
personalities, and that some S&T officials are better at working in this environment than others.  
One portfolio office manager noted that without a budget he has had to build his influence over 
time by developing personal relationships with technical division staff.  When someone new 
assumes this, or a similar role, he or she also will have to develop those personal relationships 
within the organization. When the individuals in this type of a structure make communications a 
high priority, it works well.  However, the complexity of the structure and its dependence on 
personal interaction can result in dysfunction.   
 
MATRIXED STRUCTURE RESULTS IN MANY DIRECT REPORTS AND 
NUMEROUS SMALL OFFICES  
 
Figure 3-1, is a graphic presentation of offices and reporting lines within S&T.  As shown, there 
are 20 direct reports to the U/S and deputy U/S.  S&T officials note that access to the U/S and 
deputy U/S is important in a matrixed organization.  However, this large number of direct reports 
could result in both decision-making bottlenecks and delays as the direct reports vie with each 
other for access to the decision makers, and decision makers juggle multiple responsibilities 
simultaneously.  S&T Division and Office directors did not raise concerns about access to the 
U/S or deputy U/S as a result of the current structure.  S&T officials note that direct access to top 
management is an important feature of a matrixed structure.  While this is true, the number of 
direct reports should be at a manageable level.  As new leadership is put in place, this structure 
could be unwieldy and slow to respond as a new Under Secretary is working with directors with 
whom he or she has not worked before.   
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Figure 3-1:  Organizational Chart Conveying Lines of Authority 
 
 
Source:  National Academy of Public Administration 
 
 14
 
Figure 3-1 also identifies sub-units of the Offices of Transition, Research, and Innovation 
Portfolios.  A number of these eleven sub-units are extremely small.  For example, the 
Commercialization Office within Transition consists of the Chief Commercialization Officer and 
one administrative staff person, and the Technology Transfer Office is just one individual.  The 
S&T Organizational Regulation Manual (STORM) lists 20 major units within the Directorate, 
and 22 sub-units.  Given the size of the organization—about 750 personnel in headquarters—the 
structure is fragmented.7  Indeed, some S&T staff at different levels within the organization said 
that they did not know what many of these smaller offices do.  In some cases, they were unaware 
that offices within S&T existed and had no idea of their function.   
 
OVERLAPPING RESPONSIBILITIES IN RELATION TO FIRST RESPONDERS  
 
The Interagency Coordination and First Responder Program Division, and the R-Tech unit 
within the Office of Transition, both have major responsibilities for interaction and 
responsiveness to first responder needs.  In addition, some technical divisions work with first 
responders to identify and prioritize their needs.  Representatives of the first responder 
community also participate in the Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory 
Committee (HSSTAC) which is under the direction of the Operations Analysis Division.   
 
This means that multiple separate units within S&T interact in various ways with first 
responders.  In addition, S&T is planning to create a first responder Integrated Product Team 
(IPT) that would involve first responders in identifying capability gaps and requirements across 
all areas of S&T work.8   
 
Thus, from an organizational standpoint, a substantial level of interaction and coordination is 
required to ensure that sufficient attention is paid to the needs of first responders, and that it is 
done efficiently, in this matrixed structure.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The basic S&T organizational structure has been in place for about three years.  Because it is 
comprised of overlapping and interdependent units, the need for high levels of communication is 
paramount.  However, communication problems were evident, both in relation to oral 
communication, and the dissemination of documents.  Communications issues may be 
exacerbated by the large number of direct reports to the U/S and the proliferation of small 
offices.  Issues related to overlapping responsibilities are exemplified by the number of different 
entities within S&T that interact with the first responder community. 
 
                                                 
7 About 250 additional staff members are located in S&T-operated labs.  See Appendix B for more detailed 
information about S&T’s current workforce. 
8 The effectiveness of S&T interaction with the first responder community is discussed in detail in Chapter VI of this 
report. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
3-1. Take steps to improve communication within the Directorate. 
Staff concerns about insufficient communication across organizational lines, and 
incomplete knowledge of documents relevant to their work, indicate a need for more 
focus on improving internal communications.  A matrixed organizational structure 
requires an organizational structure that encourages sharing of information, self-
initiation, and identification and correction of errors.  S&T could first identify areas for 
improvement and collect ideas for change by engaging staff in a web-based dialogue 
using Web 2.0 technology.  This tool could be used, as well, to gather and discuss staff 
ideas about sharing knowledge in general and best practices in particular.  
 
3-2. Consider the benefits and costs of streamlining the organizational structure to 
reduce the number of direct reports to the Under Secretary to a more reasonable 
number. 
While not identified as a problem in S&T at this time, generally the current number of 
direct reports to the Under Secretary would be considered too many.  Each direct report 
adds to the time and attention a manager has to spend in ensuring coordination of 
activities and a clear focus on goals.  While minimizing layers of management is also a 
valuable goal, so too is ensuring that a management structure does not result in 
bottlenecks and delays.  The value of reorganization for the long run should be weighted 
against the inevitable costs of change in an organization that has experienced 
considerable change during the last three years.   
 
3-3. Adopt a more cohesive structure for gathering first responder input. 
The fragmented structure for gathering and considering input from first responders may 
result in lack of coordination within S&T, and frustration on the part of first responders 
as they try to determine how best to affect S&T’s research agenda.  This topic is 
discussed further in Chapter VI. 
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CHAPTER IV:  MISSION AND STRATEGIC PLAN 
 
MISSION STATEMENT 
 
According to the May 2007 Strategic Plan for the Science and Technology Directorate, the 
organization’s mission is: 
 
To improve homeland security by providing to our customers, the operating 
components of DHS and state, local, tribal and territorial emergency responders 
and officials, state-of-the-art technology that helps them accomplish their 
missions. 
 
Although this mission statement is consistent with Title III of Public Law 107-296, that 
established the S&T Directorate within DHS, it understates the range of responsibilities that are 
assigned to the organization in the legislation.  In addition to the mandate to provide customers 
with state-of-the-art technology to help them accomplish their mission, S&T is charged with 
numerous other responsibilities.  These include: advising the Secretary of DHS concerning 
technology issues; developing a national policy and strategic plan for the federal government’s 
civilian efforts to develop countermeasures to threats, including developing definable goals for 
these efforts and measurable objectives to assess goal achievement; and assessing and testing 
homeland security vulnerabilities and possible threats.  Other specific responsibilities cited in the 
legislation include coordinating and collaborating with numerous other federal agencies on 
endeavors to accomplish national homeland-security-related objectives.  According to an S&T 
official, the mission statement did not specifically address S&T’s other responsibilities because 
S&T officials felt that they were subsumed under the goal of ensuring effective provision of 
state-of-the-art technology to DHS components and first responders.   
 
STRATEGIC PLAN 
 
The S&T Strategic Plan was submitted on June 13, 2007 to the Chairmen and Ranking Members 
of both the House Committee on Homeland Security and the Senate and House Appropriations 
Subcommittees on Homeland Security.  The 15-page Strategic Plan provides an overview of the 
organizational structure of S&T and processes for gathering capability-gap information from 
DHS component agencies and first responders.  It also discusses how S&T will interact with 
other research entities, such as university-based Centers of Excellence and the National 
Laboratories,9 to achieve mission goals.  Finally, it describes S&T’s plan for creating a work 
environment that will ensure a “culture of organizational excellence that promotes a common 
identity, innovation, mutual respect, accountability and teamwork to achieve efficiencies, 
effectiveness and operational synergies.”   
 
                                                 
9 Technically, the National Laboratories include those managed by the Department of Energy  and the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration labs.  However, in the context of this report, National Laboratories refers to 
DOE Laboratories. 
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The 138-page Five Year Research and Development (R&D) Plan that accompanied the Strategic 
Plan enumerates the projects that each S&T division has undertaken or plans to undertake and 
the milestones to be achieved through FY 2011.  The second attachment to the Five Year R&D 
Plan is a set of Power Point slides describing the Homeland Innovative Prototypical Solutions 
(HIPS) and High Impact Technology Solutions (HITS) program initiatives. Other Power Point 
slides provide representative examples of Capstone IPT high priority technology areas, arranged 
by S&T division. 
 
Congressional Reaction to the Strategic Plan 
 
The Strategic Plan was not well received by the House Committee on Homeland Security.  The 
Chairman’s opening statement at a Committee hearing on June 27, 2007 acknowledged progress 
at S&T, but expressed two major concerns about the Strategic Plan.10  The first was that the plan 
was not a federal strategic plan but solely a plan for S&T.11  Further the U/S for Science and 
Technology had been directed to develop a national plan for homeland security-related research 
in the 2002 legislation that created DHS, and S&T, so such a plan was five years overdue.   
 
The Chairman’s second concern was that the Strategic Plan fell short of what would be required 
for a strategic plan for S&T itself, i.e., the plan focused on “what” but lacked “why.”  It 
described structure, roles, and responsibilities, but not the vision or strategy that led to them.  He 
further stated that the plan lacked metrics to measure progress towards goals and did not explain 
how priorities are set, either across divisions within S&T, or at the IPT level.  Finally, he faulted 
the plan for not including a roadmap of how basic research transitions to technology 
development. 
 
S&T’s Strategic Plan Compared to Federal Guidelines 
 
Both OMB and GAO have produced guidance for the development and content of strategic 
plans.12  The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 mandated that every major 
federal agency develop a mission statement, set goals, measure performance, and report 
accomplishments.  The practice of requiring strategic plans for components within agencies was 
a natural out-growth of this requirement since component strategic plans are the key to ensuring 
the achievement of agency-wide objectives.   
 
In its Executive Guide, GAO cites the following practices as critical to successful strategic 
planning: 
 
• Stakeholder involvement, including Congress and the Administration, state and local 
governments, third-party providers, interest groups, agency employees, fee-paying 
customers, and the public; 
                                                 
10 House Committee on Homeland Security, A Roadmap for Security?  Examining the Science and Technology 
Directorate’s Strategic Plan, June 27, 2007. 
11 Although referred to at the hearing as the national strategic plan, in fact, the plan is intended to focus on mission, 
goals, objectives, and strategies for federal entities in pursuing homeland security-related research. 
12 See OMB Circular No. A-11, Part 2 and GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government 
Performance and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-119, June 1996. 
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• Assessment of the internal and external environment continuously and systematically to 
anticipate future challenges and make future adjustments so that potential problems do 
not become crises; and 
• Alignment of activities, core processes, and resources to support mission-related 
outcomes. 
 
Stakeholders were not specifically involved in drafting the S&T Strategic Plan.  According to an 
S&T official involved in developing the Plan said that stakeholders from DHS components and 
others did have input into the S&T restructuring in the fall of 2006.  An offsite meeting had been 
held with S&T officials and representatives from other DHS component agencies to discuss 
S&T’s new organizational structure and new methods of interacting with them.  Component 
agencies had also been involved in early Capstone IPT processes and were familiar with this new 
approach to working with S&T.  However, a systematic environmental scan to inform the 
Strategic Plan was not conducted. 
 
An S&T official said that the U/S, then recently appointed, had many contacts in the federal 
science and technology community and that the community was familiar with how he would 
manage S&T and gave their tacit endorsement.  Other means of obtaining input from these 
stakeholders, or from other stakeholders outside of DHS, were not specifically pursued.  The 
new alignment of activities and processes was specifically intended to support mission-related 
outcomes. 
 
The text box to the left lists the six 
required components of a strategic plan as 
presented in GAO’s Executive Guide. 
 
 
Table 4-1 compares the requirements from 
the GAO Executive Guide with S&T’s 
June 2007 Five Year Strategic Plan.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• A comprehensive mission statement; 
• Long-term goals for all major functions and 
operations; 
• Approaches and strategies to achieve the 
goals and objectives and obtain the various 
resources needed; 
• A relationship between long-term 
goals/objectives and annual performance 
goals; 
• An identification of key factors, external to 
the agency and beyond its control, that 
could significantly affect achievement of 
the strategic goals; and 
• A description of how program evaluations 
have been used to establish or revise 
strategic goals, and a schedule of future 
program evaluations. 
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Table 4-1.  Content of the S&T Strategic Plan 
 
GAO Guide Required 
Component Content of S&T Plan 
Mission Statement Although the plan includes a mission statement, it is not 
comprehensive, because portions of S&T’s mandated roles are not 
included. 
Long-Term Goals and 
Objectives 
Long-term goals and objectives are not specifically stated. 
Approaches to Achieve 
Goals and Objectives 
Approaches to organizing, staffing, and conducting S&T’s work are 
discussed in some detail but activities cannot be linked to goals, 
because the long-term goals are not articulated.  
Relationship between 
Long-Term Goals and 
Objectives and Annual 
Performance Goals 
The absence of clearly articulated long-term goals and the lack of 
performance measures makes it impossible to draw these linkages. 
Key External Factors that 
Could Affect Goal 
Achievement 
The plan does not discuss key external factors that could affect goal 
achievement. 
Use of Program 
Evaluations to Establish or 
Revise Strategic Goals; 
Future Evaluation Plans 
The plan indicates that the Director of Research is evaluating 
approaches to measure performance:  customer satisfaction surveys 
to gather feedback from DHS components are to be used as part of a 
measure of outcome-based performance; peer-reviewed papers, 
patents, conferences and workshops attended, and prizes awarded 
are potential measures.  Because S&T is a new organization, prior 
program evaluations that apply do not exist.  Evaluations of similar 
government organizations that may be relevant are not mentioned. 
 
 
As the table indicates, a central issue with S&T’s Strategic Plan is the lack of articulated long-
term goals for major functions and operations.  While the mission statement provides a very 
broad goal statement, it lacks the specificity to provide the structure for a coherent plan and the 
foundation for strategies, annual performance goals, and metrics to assess progress.  The 
milestones listed in the Five Year Plan that was attached to the Strategic Plan were cited by an 
S&T official as the metrics by which S&T would assess progress.  
 
An S&T official indicated that the primary objective of the strategic plan was to explain how the 
pieces of the newly structured S&T fit and were to work together.  He stated that the content of 
the document was more helpful to S&T, DHS components, and to Congress than a document that 
conformed to strategic planning guidelines.  Further, a main reason why OMB and GAO 
guidelines were not adhered to in developing the plan was because they did not believe that DHS 
had adequately developed “operational capability goals” that would be needed for S&T to be in a 
position to develop the type of strategic plan intended by the guidelines.  The official explained 
that more specific information about goals and DHS component agencies’ requirements was 
needed before S&T could align its goals with them. 
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In effect, although the Strategic Plan is a helpful document in explaining how S&T is organized 
and how it will function to provide customers with state-of-the-art technology, it does not adhere 
to the criteria of a strategic plan as generally applied across the federal government.  
Nonetheless, S&T has no current plans to revise the Strategic Plan to bring it into line with OMB 
and GAO guidelines for strategic plans.  An S&T official said that the continued lack of 
operational capability goals for DHS, as well as the change in Administration, are reasons not to 
initiate a new strategic planning effort at this time. 
 
Other R&D Agencies Have Strategic Plans That Adhere to Many Federal Guidelines 
 
A number of federal R&D agencies have Strategic Plans that offer examples of good practice in 
adhering to federal strategic planning guidelines.  Of four plans reviewed—NSF, DARPA, ONR, 
and DOE’s Office of Science—all demonstrate some best practices in planning.13   
 
The DOE Office of Science plan is particularly strong.  In developing the plan, the Office of 
Science cast a wide net across the research community to ensure that a broad array of ideas and 
concerns were integrated into the plan.  This outreach included gathering expert advice from 
Advisory Committees and discussions with a variety of outside experts.  An appendix to the plan 
lists 170 individuals who participated in a workshop devoted to plan development.  The Office of 
Science also reviewed key testimonies, forecasts, and other studies to ensure a broad perspective.  
The Strategic Plans for ONR, NFS, and DARPA also specifically discuss gathering input from 
outside the agency. 
 
The DOE Office of Science plan states the mission and vision of the organization and articulates 
seven goals.  The strategy for the achievement of each goal is presented, as well as indicators of 
success and a strategic timeline.  While using somewhat different language, the NSF, DARPA, 
and ONR plans describe mission, goals, and strategy.  Although differing in level of detail, all 
four of the plans discuss strategies for measuring performance.  The NSF plan offers a good 
example of acknowledging the external factors that could result in the need to adjust the plan.  
Although these plans vary in strength, collectively they show that sound strategic planning for 
federal R&D organizations can be achieved.   
 
Homeland Security-Related Research Strategic Plan Still Needed 
 
The 2007 S&T Strategic Plan is not the homeland security-related research planning document 
that is mandated by the Homeland Security Act of 2002.  An S&T official said that they consider 
a 2007 S&T document that describes coordination activities with other federal agencies as the 
first step in producing such a comprehensive strategic plan.14  He also indicated that the 
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), due to be delivered in December of 2009, 
would be an additional step.   
 
                                                 
13“National Science Foundation Strategic Plan, FY 2003 – 2008,”  National Science Foundation, September 2003.  
“Bridging the Gap, Powered by Ideas,” Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, February 2007. “Naval S&T 
Strategic Plan, Defining the Strategic Direction for Tomorrow,” Office of Naval Operations, January 2007.  “Office 
of Science Strategic Plan,”  Department of Energy, Office of Science, February 2004. 
14 DHS, S&T, Coordination of Homeland Security Science and Technology, December 2007. 
 22
S&T is a relatively small actor within the federal homeland security research community, and 
has no specific authority to direct or influence the research agendas of other agencies.  Thus, 
S&T would have to seek and rely on White House support to obtain the active participation from 
federal agencies that would be required to produce a comprehensive research strategy. 
Alternatively, action could be taken to obtain additional statutory authority from Congress or 
transfer responsibility for development of the homeland security-related research strategic plan, 
that includes consideration of state and local needs, to the White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (OSTP). 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
S&T has made little progress both in relation to developing a functional strategic plan for S&T 
itself, and in developing a homeland security-related research strategic plan to guide federal 
efforts across departments.  Both of these documents are essential to ensuring optimal focus on 
mission, goals and objectives.  Both federal strategic planning guidance, and examples of plans 
from other federal science agencies, are available to direct S&T’s efforts to develop a strategic 
plan.  For S&T to pursue a strategic plan for all federal homeland security-related research, the 
assistance of the White House seems essential.    
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
4-1. Develop an S&T strategic plan. 
S&T should develop a Strategic Plan that articulates mission, goals, and strategies to 
provide additional focus to its work. S&T should consider broadening its mission 
statement to reflect its mandate more completely.  DHS’s 2008 - 2013 Strategic Plan 
offers the department-level perspective that can guide S&T’s planning efforts.  Other 
federal R&D agencies’ strategic plans can be helpful in framing the planning effort.  S&T 
should follow federal guidance related to the process for developing a strategic plan and 
its contents. Stakeholder input is particularly important because of the significant 
linkages of S&T’s work with other research and development entities across the federal 
government and the critical roles its customers fill in the homeland security arena. 
 
4-2. Develop a homeland security-related research strategic plan. 
S&T should work with OSTP and the array of federal departments engaged in homeland 
security-related research to develop a comprehensive strategic research plan.  This plan 
would focus federal efforts, help to ensure coordination and collaboration, and avoid 
unnecessary duplication of effort.  It could also allow for the development of metrics that 
could track progress.  Such a plan should consider the needs of state agencies and local 
first responders through appropriate consultation to meet the nation’s homeland security-
related research needs. 
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CHAPTER V:  TRANSITION PORTFOLIO 
 
 
S&T’s transition portfolio is designed to develop and deliver technologies to customers within 
three years.  Almost half (approximately $361 million) of S&T’s total FY 2009 budget is 
devoted to the transition portfolio, reflecting the priority S&T has placed over the last two years 
on meeting customer needs.   
 
Transition portfolio priorities are set by customers working with S&T staff through the 
Integrated Product Team (IPT) process.  The process includes meetings of Capstone IPTs, which 
bring together DHS component agency and S&T staff to identify and prioritize capability gaps. 15  
DHS component agencies are expected to represent their own needs, as well as the needs of their 
external customers (e.g., first responders, state and local governments, other federal agencies, the 
private sector).  Based on the prioritized capability gaps identified by the Capstone IPTs, S&T 
technical divisions initiate projects to provide solutions to customers.   
 
There is a transition manager in each technical division who is responsible for overseeing the 
IPT process and the transition portfolio in that division.  Transition managers report to technical 
division heads (in some cases transition managers are also technical division deputy directors), 
but also work closely with the Director of Transition.   
 
Transition projects are carried out primarily by industry.  Others are done by the National 
Laboratories, other federal labs, federally funded R&D centers, or universities.  All projects are 
supposed to include a transition plan for either transferring the technology to the appropriate 
DHS component agency or commercializing the technology.16  
 
IDENTIFYING AND PRIORITIZING CUSTOMER NEEDS 
S&T Customers 
 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 does not specifically define S&T’s customers, but it does 
give S&T the responsibility to transfer technologies to other federal agencies, state and local 
governments, and the private sector.  Originally, U/S Cohen determined that the transition 
portfolio would meet the needs of DHS customers, with the understanding that these customers 
would in turn represent the needs of their own customers—state, local, and tribal governments; 
first responders; other federal agencies; and the private sector.  However, over time the transition 
portfolio has increasingly considered the “customers of its customers” to be S&T’s direct 
customers. 
 
                                                 
15 Capability gaps are the difference between current capabilities and the capabilities needed to meet objectives. 
16 It is unclear how many S&T projects have been transitioned.  According to March 26, 2009 testimony by Acting 
U/S Bradley I. Buswell to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on 
Homeland Security, approximately 15-20 products were transitioned to DHS customers or deployed in the field (by 
first responders or the private sector) between March 2008 and March 2009. 
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At a March 2007 hearing the House Committee on Science and Technology Subcommittee on 
Technology and Innovation expressed concern about how well S&T’s priorities met the needs of 
DHS component agencies, other federal agencies, and state and local governments.  In particular, 
the Subcommittee noted complaints from state and local governments and first responders that 
S&T was not responsive to their requests and recommendations.  The Subcommittee viewed the 
establishment of the IPTs as an important step toward ensuring customer needs were met, but 
indicated that more was needed, including establishing a formal mechanism for responding to 
end users.  The Subcommittee did not specify what this mechanism should be. 
 
At the hearing, U/S Cohen defined S&T customers as the 22 DHS component agencies17 and 
their customers (first responders) and said, “The first responders and the communities are not at 
the bottom in my book.  They are at the top, and I exist to fulfill and serve their requirements.”  
Cohen further explained that S&T had instituted a number of changes to improve interactions 
with customers, including: 
 
• Establishing the IPTs, “the centerpiece” of S&T’s transition portfolio; and 
• Issuing a new document, the S&T Organization Requirements Manual (STORM), which 
is designed to communicate to customers what the organization does, how it functions, 
and its capabilities. 
 
The STORM includes position descriptions for the heads of each of the divisions and primary 
offices of S&T.  Although this document is intended to help customers understand and navigate 
S&T, as of April 2009 it had not posted been on S&T’s website. 
 
Establishing the IPTs has successfully shifted S&T’s focus to meeting the needs of DHS 
component agencies.  However, non-DHS customers are included to varying degrees or not at 
all, depending on the particular IPT.  Non-federal first responders are explicitly excluded from 
IPT membership and are rarely invited to meetings.18  Instead, S&T relies on the component 
agencies to represent the needs of first responders, a role the DHS Office of Inspector General 
concluded is impossible.19  In recognition of the inadequacy of relying on DHS component 
agencies to provide first responder input, some technical divisions interact directly with first 
responder communities to identify needs and insert these needs into the IPT process.   
 
Other government agencies and the private sector have been included in the IPT process on an ad 
hoc basis.  The National Guard Bureau and U.S. Northern Command both have designated 
liaisons responsible for attending all IPT meetings and representing their agencies’ perspectives.  
In addition, the private sector has been included in the Incident Management IPT.  
 
                                                 
17 Although all 22 DHS component agencies are S&T customers, S&T’s focus is on meeting the needs of the seven 
“operational” component agencies. 
18 CRS, The DHS Directorate of Science and Technology:  Key Issues for Congress, RL34356, February 1, 2008,  
p. 16. 
19 DHS, OIG, The Science and Technology Directorate’s Processes for Selecting and Managing Research and 
Development Programs, OIG-08-85, August 2008, p. 24.  S&T’s attempts to identify and meet the needs of first 
responders are discussed in detail in Chapter VI. 
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While S&T’s approach to interacting with non-DHS customers has been evolving, there has been 
no systematic analysis of whose needs S&T should be serving or who the customers are for each 
IPT.  Further, there are no standard mechanisms for including non-DHS customers in the IPT 
process. 
Integrated Product Team Process and Structure 
 
In late 2006, S&T established the IPT process to serve DHS components by giving them the 
opportunity to identify and prioritize their capability gaps.  Customers chair the IPTs; are the 
decision-makers; and are integrated into every stage of the process, including product research 
and development, transition, and acquisition.  Technologies produced through the IPT process 
are called “Enabling Homeland Capabilities” and ostensibly can be transitioned within three 
years.  As a function of the federal budget cycle, it takes two years to initiate projects that have 
been identified by the IPTs.  Thus, the 2006 IPT round identified projects for inclusion in S&T’s 
FY 2009 budget.   
 
In conjunction with the initiation of the IPTs, S&T and the component agencies reviewed 167 
ongoing S&T programs, some of which may have included multiple projects.  The goal was to 
determine which projects should be transferred into the new organizational structure, which 
should be modified to better meet customer needs, and which should be terminated.  
Approximately 15 projects were terminated, primarily because they lacked a customer but there 
also may have been other reasons, such as poor performance.  Four projects were modified to 
better meet customer needs.  The remaining projects were transferred to the IPTs, with most 
undergoing at least modest refinements in response to customer input.   
 
One of the criteria for the initial project assessment was the existence of a customer for the 
project.  S&T recognized that even potentially great technologies will not be integrated into 
operations unless customer parameters are considered, including how the technology will be 
used and maintained, as well as its cost. 20   
 
The Capstone IPTs are a mechanism for interaction between and among decision-makers from 
the DHS component agencies and S&T (nonvoting).  Each IPT has one or two customer leads 
from the DHS components with the largest stake in the IPT.  Other component agencies with an 
interest in the IPT are members and have a vote, but the lead customers have the final say.  Any 
component agency can send representatives to IPT meetings, even if it is not a member.   
 
There are 12 Capstone IPTs, each with its own budget.21  Table 5-1 lists the IPTs and the S&T 
division and customer leads for each.  While many of the IPTs are interdependent (e.g., 
Information Sharing, Interoperability, and Incident Management), they operate in virtual 
isolation of each other and have different customer leads. 
 
                                                 
20 DHS, OIG, The Science and Technology Directorate’s Processes, pp. 14-15. 
21 Appendix B provides information concerning the IPTs’ FY 2009 budgets. 
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Table 5-1:  IPTs, S&T Leads, and Customer Leads 
 
Capstone IPT S&T Division Lead Customer Lead(s) 
Border Security Borders and Maritime 
Security 
Customs and Border Protection; 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
Cargo Security Borders and Maritime 
Security 
Customs and Border Protection 
Maritime Security Borders and Maritime 
Security 
U.S. Coast Guard 
Chemical/Biological 
Defense 
Chemical and Biological Office of Infrastructure Protection; Office 
of Health Affairs 
Cyber Security Command, Control, and 
Interoperability 
Office of Cyber Security and 
Communications 
Information 
Sharing/Management 
Command, Control, and 
Interoperability 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis 
Interoperability Command, Control, and 
Interoperability 
Federal Emergency Management Agency; 
Office of Emergency Communications 
Counter-IED Explosives Office for Bombing Prevention; U.S. 
Secret Service 
Transportation Explosives Transportation Security Administration 
People Screening Human Factors/ 
Behavioral Sciences 
Citizen and Immigration Services; 
Screening Coordination and Operations 
Infrastructure Protection Infrastructure and 
Geophysical 
Office of Infrastructure Protection 
Incident Management Infrastructure and 
Geophysical 
Federal Emergency Management Agency 
 
 
Capstone IPTs meet two to four times a year.  Acquisition staff from the component agencies 
usually attend to help ensure the Enabling Homeland Capabilities that are developed will be 
used.   
 
The component agencies submit capability gaps to the Capstone IPT.  Each Capstone typically 
collects dozens of capability gaps from its members.  Capability gaps are supposed to describe 
the outcome or effect needed, be actionable, and not presuppose solutions.  For example, the 
Border Security Capstone IPT could identify tunnel detection as a capability gap and the 
Chemical and Biological Defense IPT could identify forensic analysis as a capability gap.  S&T 
is involved in the identification and prioritization of gaps to varying degrees, depending on the 
IPT. 
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S&T’s role in the IPT process, in addition to providing advice and administrative support, is to 
determine whether technologies already exist to address gaps or if another entity is already 
working on their development.  The capability gaps that remain after this process is complete are 
evaluated against each other and prioritized by the Capstone IPT.   
 
Once the capability gaps are prioritized, S&T develops a Research and Development plan, 
including cost estimates, to address gaps.  The IPTs review the projects in S&T’s plans and 
decide which should go forward, based on how well they address gaps, available funds, and 
estimated costs.22 
 
Under the Capstone IPTs, there are 45 Sub-IPTs that oversee the implementation of one or more 
projects within a program.  For example, First Responder Equipment is a Sub-IPT of the Incident 
Management Capstone IPT and Cargo Conveyance Security is a Sub-IPT of the Cargo Security 
Capstone IPT.  Members of the Sub-IPTs are designated by the Capstone and are primarily 
program managers and subject matter experts (SMEs) from S&T and the component agencies.  
Customer representatives at the Sub-IPT level provide S&T with the operational information it 
needs to execute programs. 
 
Sub-IPTs are responsible for refining project plans, specifications, and schedules.  The Sub-IPTs 
also monitor progress once projects have been launched.  Program managers involved in the 
Sub-IPTs report back to the Capstone on project progress on a regular basis and the Capstones 
provide feedback to the Sub-IPTs and S&T on whether projects experiencing delays or other 
problems should be continued.   
 
Sub-IPTs hold meetings, but officials said that in some cases there is much more communication 
among members via email and telephone than in face-to-face meetings.  Sub-IPT meetings 
involve more competition among component agencies than at the Capstone level because this is 
where specific requirements are set and product trade-offs are made.   
 
There is great variation in structure and process among the IPTs because there was little 
guidance provided on how to operate them when the IPTs were initiated.  Therefore, members of 
each IPT devised their own structure and processes through trial and error.  There are also 
variations resulting from differences in customers and mandates.  Figure 5-1 represents a generic 
version of the IPT process.  Appendix C includes two examples of IPT processes that show the 
complexity of the process and the differences across IPTs. 
 
                                                 
22 DHS, OIG, The Science and Technology Directorate’s Processes, p. 22. 
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Figure 5-1:  Generic IPT Process 
 
     Source:  National Academy of Public Administration, 2009.  
 29
 
S&T is beginning to achieve some consistency in structure and processes in the IPTs.  The 
transition managers from the six technical divisions have developed some standardized practices, 
including a Technology Transition Agreement template, a Capability Gap Prioritization process, 
and a Capability Gap Statement template, and have begun introducing them into the IPT process.  
The transition managers also have drafted a Capability Gap Acceptance Process flow chart and 
plan to continue developing standardized processes and procedures. 
 
DHS components have taken different approaches to working with S&T in the IPT process.  For 
example, the Office of Infrastructure Protection has established an office with a staff of seven 
and the primary role of partnering with S&T.  The Transportation Security Administration has a 
staff person who works full-time participating in and managing participation across the 12 
Capstone IPTs and 45 Sub-IPTs.  Most other component agency staff assigned to the IPTs have 
other duties and their participation is less focused.  In one extreme case, a component had three 
changes in its IPT representation in less than one year.  Component agencies with staff dedicated 
to working with S&T in the IPT process reported greater knowledge of and influence over 
S&T’s activities, and a higher level of satisfaction with S&T.  
 
 Technology Oversight Group 
 
A summary of the results of the IPT process is communicated to the Technical Oversight Group 
(TOG), which is made up of the DHS Deputy Secretary (chair) and the U/Ss of National 
Protection and Programs, Management, and S&T (who is nonvoting).  The DHS Chief Financial 
Officer also attends.  The objectives of the TOG are to oversee the transition portfolio, ensure 
investments are balanced across IPTs, and provide coordination at the Department level.  The 
TOG makes sure that projects align with DHS priorities.   
 
The summary submitted to the TOG is a memorandum jointly signed by the customer lead and 
the relevant technical division head.  The memorandum is sent to the S&T U/S via the Director 
of Transition and includes information on the priorities identified by the IPT and specific 
projects that the division will undertake.  The TOG memo usually includes information on 
capability gaps identified as priorities but not funded, and sometimes includes suggestions on 
how to shift funding to pay for these priorities.  The projects S&T will undertake are not 
finalized until they are reviewed by the TOG, which can make changes.  The finalized list of 
projects goes to the Sub-IPTs.  
 
Although all customers are invited to TOG meetings, some customers indicated frustration that 
the invitations are often issued at the last minute, which prevents them from attending.  In 
addition, the TOG meeting minutes lack detail and context and, until recently, were not routinely 
disseminated to customers.  Therefore, customers often learn of decisions made by the TOG 
from conversations with Office of Transition or technical division staff, and the basis for 
decision-making by the TOG is not well understood by customers.   
 
A new TOG Working Group (TOGWG) has been created to conduct specific analyses requested 
by the TOG and provide advice to the TOG.  The TOGWG was originally made up of GS-15 
level representatives from each of the seven operational component agencies.  The TOGWG 
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recently conducted a Strategic Balance Assessment to make recommendations that will be 
factored into the next IPT round.  At the Assessment meeting, S&T Division Heads provided a 
briefing on IPT projects and TOGWG members were asked to prioritize and rank projects across 
IPTs based on their individual assessment of operational impact.  In other words, all TOGWG 
members rated all projects, regardless of their relevance to the member.   
 
This experience was unsatisfactory according to interviewees from the component agencies and 
S&T.  While the TOG made the decision to institutionalize the TOGWG, the plan is to expand 
participation to include representatives from DHS directorates and component agencies beyond 
the seven operational components.  It is unclear what types of analyses the TOGWG would 
perform, but it would not conduct additional strategic assessments of the transition portfolio.  
Plans call for future Strategic Balance Assessments to be conducted by academics and other 
outside organizations, and results are intended to be provided to the TOG to help it make 
decisions about investment balances.  It is important to ensure that whoever conducts 
assessments of the transition portfolio in the future is provided with some basic information and 
arguments regarding the tradeoffs under consideration in advance of the meeting. 
 
 Technology Transition Agreements 
 
Once requirements are final, S&T attempts to enter into a Technology Transition Agreement 
(TTA) with the customer.  The TTA is a good-faith, non-binding written agreement confirming 
that the project S&T is embarking on meets customer needs.  A primary purpose of the TTAs is 
to ensure that customers are serious about the projects that S&T is planning to initiate or 
continue.  TTAs can be modified upon mutual agreement, and can be terminated by any party at 
any time.  There are different levels of TTAs, beginning with a “basic” version that includes a 
description of the product, key technical and cost parameters, and the signatures of the customer 
and S&T.  As project plans progress and customers and S&T agree on specifications and other 
details, a “final” TTA is developed and signed.   
 
The final TTA builds on the basic TTA and also describes the capability gap that the S&T 
deliverable will meet; the deliverable; the technical requirements/parameters; and the project 
plan, including schedule, funding, and transition approach (e.g., acquisition, commercialization, 
etc.).  The customer, depending on circumstances, agrees to either integrate the technology into 
its acquisition program by a certain date, or to advocate the use of the product by end users by a 
certain time.  Once a TTA is developed, a program manager takes over.  However, S&T has been 
experiencing difficulties in getting TTAs signed and the majority of transition projects have been 
assigned to program managers and initiated without a signed TTA in place. 
 
Findings 
 
Strengths of the IPT Process 
 
The IPT structure has successfully improved S&T’s relationship with its customers.  With only 
one or two exceptions, interviews with DHS customers revealed views of the IPT process 
ranging from guarded optimism to staunch enthusiasm.  Even those who are still less than fully 
satisfied admit that the IPTs are a significant improvement over how S&T did business in the 
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past.  Several aspects of the IPT process that have improved customer satisfaction include the 
following: 
 
The IPT process is customer-driven.  Stakeholders lead the IPT process, helping to ensure that 
S&T understands and is responsive to customer needs and increasing the likelihood that the 
technologies produced by S&T will be integrated into customer operations.  Most customers 
believe that S&T is making a good-faith effort to identify and meet customer needs.  Customers 
characterize S&T staff as accessible and responsive to customer concerns.  In addition, 
customers report a better understanding of what S&T can do for them, helping to build a 
constituency of support for S&T’s work. 
 
The process can be flexible and responsive.  There is a two-year lag between the IPT 
requirements process and the initiation of projects.  Nonetheless, customers are confident that the 
IPT structure is flexible enough to accommodate any changes needed to respond to new threats 
or other circumstances. 
 
The IPTs are becoming more “user-friendly.”  Customers appreciate the standardization that the 
transition managers are imposing on the IPT structure and process and want more of it.  For 
example, one customer said that the capability gap template helps make submissions more 
specific and actionable.  Another customer expressed a hope that standardized processes will 
reduce the amount of time customers spend on the IPTs. 
 
The IPTs encourage information-exchange among the component agencies.  One ancillary 
benefit of the IPTs has been their facilitation of stronger communication and coordination among 
DHS agencies.  Component agencies now have a better understanding of other components’ 
concerns, perspectives, and activities. 
 
Weaknesses of the IPT Process  
 
While the benefits of the IPTs are substantial, the process also has drawbacks. 
 
The IPTs are not adequately institutionalized.  Customers say that the IPTs are insufficiently 
institutionalized to withstand changes in leadership.  This is a concern because they believe the 
IPT process increases the likelihood they will get technologies they need, and because they do 
not want the time and effort they have invested in the IPTs to be wasted.  One indication that the 
IPTs may be vulnerable is the postponement of the January 2009 TOG meeting until the 
appointment of a new U/S. 
 
The IPT process is customer-driven.  There are benefits to having customers lead the process, but 
also drawbacks.  Operational component representatives may not be aware of opportunities 
inherent in innovation, gaps in knowledge, or opportunities that cut across divisions.  Customers 
also may have unrealistic expectations of what can be delivered and how quickly, because they 
do not fully understand the current state of the technology.   
 
Roles and responsibilities of participants are undefined.  The lack of clear definitions of roles has 
caused confusion among customers and frustration among S&T staff.  Sometimes customers 
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want to dictate the solution instead of working with S&T to clarify parameters and letting S&T 
identify appropriate solutions.  At the same time, S&T is often overly involved in the capability 
gap prioritization process.  In extreme cases, customers view S&T as the facilitators, 
coordinators, and overseers of the IPT process and are merely reactive to S&T presentations. 
 
Technology Transition Agreements are ineffective.  Ideally, all projects would have a signed 
TTA to demonstrate customer support for the project before project initiation or continuation.  
Despite softening of TTA language to make it clear that they are “good faith” agreements that 
articulate intentions, not obligations, component agencies are reluctant to sign them.  Only 49 out 
of 114 FY 2009 transition projects23 have signed TTAs.  Five of the 12 IPTs do not have TTAs 
signed for any of their projects.  S&T has been pressured by DHS leadership to have TTAs 
signed.  S&T officials report that the TOG is responsible for ensuring that customers sign TTAs.  
The Deputy Secretary receives reports on the status of TTAs and routinely addresses TTA status 
with customers.  However, customers do not appear to perceive that there is pressure from DHS 
leadership for them to sign TTAs—customers instead view the pressure as coming from S&T 
and routinely avoid signing the TTAs.  In addition, since the IPT budgets are fixed and will be 
spent whether or not the customers sign TTAs, there is no incentive for customers to sign them. 
 
Customers do not fully understand the TOG and TOGWG processes.  The TOG is not 
sufficiently transparent.  Customers do not understand the TOG’s mission or criteria for 
decision-making.  Furthermore, TOG meeting minutes simply note that decisions were made, but 
not the rationale for the decisions.  Customers are also confused about the purpose and results of 
the TOGWG Strategic Balance Assessment, primarily because they do not believe participants 
had the expertise necessary to evaluate and balance S&T’s transition portfolio. 
 
There is no standard mechanism for collecting input from non-DHS customers.  There is a wide 
variety of customers for the different IPTs, including state and local governments, other federal 
agencies, the private sector (which owns and operates much of the country’s critical 
infrastructure), the Homeland Security Council, and first responders.  IPT membership is 
generally restricted to DHS component agencies, although some IPTs have made exceptions and 
added representatives of other federal agencies or first responders.  There is no standard 
mechanism for getting input from non-DHS customers and balancing their different needs.  The 
extent to which these customers are invited to IPT meetings or their input is sought through other 
mechanisms is dependent on the particular IPT chair and S&T leads. 
 
Processes and procedures are not adequately standardized.  The establishment of the IPTs has 
created a structure and process for regular involvement of DHS customers in setting S&T’s 
transition research agenda, but the structure is not founded on a stable platform of policies and 
procedures.  This causes confusion among customers and S&T staff, and means that each IPT 
has to develop its own processes and procedures through trial and error.  Ideally, a standardized 
process that includes a formal analysis of current and target capabilities24 would be used to 
identify capability gaps.  There is no evidence that the IPTs have conducted such analyses and 
                                                 
23 This total number of FY 2009 transition projects was provided by S&T on March 25, 2009.  However, supporting 
documents that detail project funding by Capstone indicate that a total of 151 transition projects are funded in FY 
2009. 
24 Target capabilities are the operational capabilities necessary to achieve mission-critical objectives.   
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there is no standard procedure for prioritizing gaps.  In at least some of the IPTs, members 
negotiated among themselves so that everyone got some of their needs met, resulting in decisions 
that were not necessarily optimal. 
 
Customers lack incentive for investing the time and effort necessary to make the IPTs maximally 
effective.  Most DHS component agencies did not have S&T budgets before their merger and 
relied on the purchase of off-the-shelf technologies.  Because S&T has successfully transferred 
few technologies to customers over the last five years, there is little incentive for DHS customers 
to invest the staff time necessary to participate effectively in the time-consuming IPT process.   
 
TRANSITION PORTFOLIO ISSUES 
 
S&T’s focus on transforming the transition portfolio over the last two years has resulted in 
significant improvements in how projects are identified, prioritized, and selected.  The customer-
driven process now in place will help ensure that the technologies S&T develops will be utilized 
by customers.  The composition of the portfolio is also gradually being transformed, as legacy 
projects are replaced with projects resulting from the IPT process.  In FY 2008 24 percent of the 
83 projects in the transition portfolio were new.  In FY 2009, the percentage of new projects in 
the portfolio had risen to 56 percent (out of a total of 114).25   
 
However, the changes that have been implemented are fairly new and it remains to be seen how 
successful they will be over time.  In addition, as discussed above, the processes and procedures 
that have been established are immature and lack institutionalization and standardization.  A 
number of issues remain to be addressed for the transition portfolio to succeed.   
 
The IPT process may not be addressing DHS-wide priorities.  A major flaw of S&T’s IPT 
structure is that there is no mechanism to compare priorities and reallocate funds across IPTs to 
ensure that the most important projects are funded.  Thus, there is a risk that the project at the 
bottom of the funded list in one IPT may be less important overall than a project at the top of the 
unfunded list in another IPT.  While some target capabilities are defined in Homeland Security 
Presidential Directives or DHS documents, there is no DHS-wide consensus on target 
capabilities—each customer submits capability gaps based on its own understanding of target 
capabilities.26  Further, while one of the objectives of the TOG is to address the strategic balance 
between Capstone IPTs, the TOG meeting minutes do not indicate that this issue is addressed by 
the TOG.  In any case, the budgets of the IPTs are relatively fixed and to date the TOG has not 
reallocated funds among the IPTs.   
 
Outputs.  Some customers complained that they have not received a single product from S&T in 
five years and want to know how S&T has been spending its money.  Other customers could 
                                                 
25 These FY 2009 numbers were provided by S&T on March 25, 2009.  However, the supporting documents, which 
list funded projects for each IPT, indicate that there were 96 new starts out of a total of 151 projects in the transition 
portfolio in FY 2009. 
26 Homeland Security Institute, Comprehensive Integrated Product Team Gap Analysis, May 31, 2007, p. 19. 
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name only one or two technologies they have received from S&T in the last five years.  
Transition projects are supposed to be completed within three years.27  
 
Legacy projects.  There are still many projects in the transition portfolio that were initiated 
before the IPTs were established in 2006.  While the number of these legacy projects has 
dropped significantly, and will continue to drop as the IPTs mature, there are problems with 
some of those remaining in the portfolio.  A systematic review of these projects to assess their 
viability has not been conducted and there appears to be a reluctance to terminate them.  In 
addition, there are indications that S&T is still shopping for customers for some of the remaining 
legacy projects.   
 
Transition plans.  Many projects lack clear transition plans.  This is troubling because 
transferring technologies to customers is the purpose of the transition portfolio.  This situation 
may improve with the increased use of the TTAs and the establishment of the Commercialization 
Office.   
 
Transparency.  The benefits of transparent processes are that they provide everyone, including 
customers, with the opportunity to understand the rationale for decisions made and help 
overcome perceptions of bias.  S&T may be making rational, unbiased decisions, but, without 
documentation, this is impossible to verify.  There is also a lack of transparency within S&T.  
There is no mechanism for tracking and cross-referencing projects.  The only information S&T 
leadership now has on ongoing projects is presented in the semi-annual reviews, which S&T is 
planning to scale back to once per year.  S&T officials believe these reviews are useful in 
connecting with customers and providing transparency.  However, these are limited in time and 
do not allow for detailed presentation of data or substantive discussion.  Also, IPTs with larger 
portfolios do not present all projects.  The reviews are held over several days, which makes it 
difficult to compare projects across IPTs.  A new project data collection and analysis data base 
currently being pilot tested, the Project Execution System, is intended to allow for cross-
referencing of projects to avoid wasteful duplication and identify opportunities for leveraging.  
The intention is to make the database available to S&T leadership and DHS IPT customers, 
which would greatly improve transparency.28 
 
Communication and management.  The challenges of a matrixed organization, discussed in 
Chapter III, have also caused problems in the transition portfolio.  S&T staff report 
communication breakdowns between the Office of Transition, transition managers, and division 
heads.  Communication between the customers and the TOG, which occurs primarily through the 
Office of Transition, is also reported to be flawed.  These communication issues, combined with 
the complex organizational structure of S&T, have resulted in inadequate overarching 
management of the IPTs.  For example, there does not appear to be a formal mechanism for 
information-sharing and coordination among the IPTs.  Cross-fertilization between the IPTs 
would help avoid unnecessary duplication, create synergies, and contribute the ability of the IPTs 
                                                 
27 It is unclear how many S&T projects have been transitioned.  According to March 26, 2009 testimony by Acting 
U/S Bradley I. Buswell to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on 
Homeland Security, approximately 15-20 technologies were transitioned to DHS customers or deployed in the field.   
28 See Chapter IX for more information on the Project Execution System. 
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to deliver necessary technologies.  Also, as discussed above, the structure and processes of the 
IPTs are inadequately standardized.   
 
Competition and Peer Review.  It is unclear to what extent transition projects are competed.  
However, in interviews where this issue was raised, the response was typically that the division 
staff knows who the best performers are for projects.  Furthermore, project proposals are not 
peer-reviewed.   
 
Evaluation.  There is no mechanism for obtaining feedback from customers to measure outcome-
based performance.  Despite the reference in S&T’s strategic plan to satisfaction surveys 
designed to gather feedback from DHS component agencies for this purpose, no surveys have 
been conducted.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
S&T’s definition of its customers and the relative emphasis placed on meeting needs of different 
customers has changed over time and remains unclear.  Similarly, S&T has not gone through a 
formal process to identify customers external to DHS for each of the IPTs. 
 
The number of legacy projects in the transition portfolio has been decreasing.  However, there 
has been no systematic assessment of legacy projects to determine which should be terminated.  
DHS customers are not satisfied with S&T output to date, in part because legacy projects do not 
necessarily meet their needs, and the projects identified through the IPTs that should are just 
beginning to be implemented.  Also, the goal of completing transition projects within three years 
creates false expectations on the part of customers and sets S&T up for failure or the impression 
of failure. 
 
The IPTs are inadequately institutionalized and processes and procedures are not adequately 
standardized or transparent.  The IPTs are treated as distinct entities when there is substantial 
overlap.  Coordination among the IPTs to identify potential duplication and opportunities for 
leveraging is lacking.  Since the IPTs operate in isolation of each other, there is no comparison of 
requirements across IPTs to ensure that capability gaps of highest priority to DHS as a whole are 
being addressed.   
 
A related issue is that IPT budget allocations do not necessarily reflect DHS-wide priorities or 
allow for taking advantage of the most promising opportunities.  There are no formal processes 
in place for collecting feedback from IPT customers on how to improve the process or how 
effectively technologies have transitioned. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5-1. Define customers clearly. 
Logic models should be used by S&T to identify its customers, as well as customers for 
each IPT—including other agencies and first responders.  Logic model results can 
provide the basis for developing a process for incorporating input from customers other 
than DHS component agencies in the IPTs.  (Logic models are discussed in Appendix D.) 
 
5-2. Increase outputs and accelerate transition. 
S&T should arrange for an external review of legacy projects and terminate those that are 
performing weakly or offer little hope of transition, thus making room for new projects.  
Incentives, such as tying successful transition within a certain timeframe to personnel 
evaluations, should be developed for terminating projects that are unlikely to be 
successful and for completing projects on time and within budget.  The distinction 
between long-term programs and projects with specific outputs and delivery dates should 
be improved, and transition plans should be developed at the beginning of projects.   
 
5-3. Establish and meet realistic targets. 
S&T should change the definition of transition to encompass technologies that can be 
developed and transferred “within three to five years” rather than the current “three 
years.”  Based on S&T’s experience and the experience of other federal agencies engaged 
in science and technology, this is a more realistic timeframe for developing and 
deploying technologies.  Using the definition “within three years” gives customers false 
expectations and sets S&T up for failure.  However, this longer time frame should not be 
used as an excuse to lengthen projects.  The goal for the portfolio should be a 20 percent 
turnover in projects, at a minimum, each year. 
 
5-4. Institutionalize the IPTs and impose standard structures and procedures. 
S&T should work with stakeholders to develop an IPT charter that delineates roles and 
responsibilities of participants, and establishes common terminology and standard 
operating procedures.  There should be a DHS management directive sanctioning the 
IPTs, requiring customer signatures on TTAs before projects can begin, and directing 
DHS customers to devote at least one full time employee to the IPT process. 
 
5-5. Restructure the IPT process. 
The IPT process should be restructured to ensure that the highest-priority DHS-wide 
needs are being met.  A mechanism should be developed for establishing DHS-wide 
target capabilities based on department priorities and threat assessments.  This could be 
achieved through the TOG if membership is expanded to include the heads of the 
operational components.  The divisions and the IPTs should identify capability gaps 
based on an analysis of current and target capabilities and develop proposed projects for 
filling gaps.  These projects should be compared against each other and the target 
capabilities to determine which projects fall above and below a single S&T funding cut 
line.  In addition to ensuring the best projects for meeting DHS needs are being funded, 
this process would also facilitate reallocating funds in response to changing threats and 
department priorities, as well as to the most promising projects.  S&T should educate 
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customers on the importance and purpose of the TTAs (e.g., they are not binding 
agreements).  The TOG should be responsible for ensuring that reluctant customers sign 
TTAs and determining whether ongoing projects without signed TTAs should be 
continued.  Also, communication and coordination among IPTs should be improved. 
 
5-6. Establish a formal process for collecting feedback from IPT members. 
S&T should institute a formal process for collecting feedback from customers regarding 
areas for further improvement to the IPT structure and process.  IPT customers should 
rate the progress of ongoing projects on an annual basis and assess how successfully 
technologies resulting from completed projects have been transitioned at the end of 
projects.  Assessments should be provided to S&T in a standard format.   
 
5-7. Improve transparency. 
The STORM should be posted on DHS’s website.  Processes, procedures, outputs, and 
performer selection, should be documented.  Make the IPT decision-making process 
transparent.  TOG meeting minutes should include a rationale for each decision made and 
be disseminated to customers.  A project tracking system should be made accessible to 
customers and upper management.  The semi-annual reviews should be eliminated.  
Standard written reports on each project should be disseminated to S&T leadership and 
customers on a semi-annual basis. 
 
5-8. Compete projects and use peer review to select research performers. 
Competing projects and peer review of grant awards is standard practice at other federal 
research agencies and should be the norm at S&T, not the exception.  Not only will this 
ensure the highest possible quality of the research, but it will help build a community of 
research performers interested in and able to do the work.   
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CHAPTER VI:  MEETING THE NEEDS OF FIRST RESPONDERS 
 
 
Over time, S&T has come to recognize first responders as an important external customer.  First 
responders are federal, state, local, and tribal emergency professionals who prevent, defend 
against, and mitigate consequences of terrorist attacks and natural disasters.  First responders 
include the disciplines of emergency management, emergency medical services, fire, hazardous 
material, law enforcement, bomb squads, tactical operations/special weapons assault teams, and 
search and rescue. 
 
S&T conducts outreach to first responders through S&T-sponsored stakeholder conferences, 
participation in national association conferences, an electronic newsletter, websites, focus and 
user working groups, and one-on-one outreach to state and local first responders.  The goals of 
outreach are to raise awareness of S&T’s activities in support of first responders, collect input 
from first responders on capability gaps and S&T activities, and field-test technologies.   
 
As discussed in Chapter V, IPT members represent the needs of first responders to varying 
degrees.  The extent to which IPTs address first responder needs depends on a variety of factors, 
including:  the extent to which first responder input is relevant to the particular IPT; the DHS 
customer leads’ willingness and ability to interact with first responders and consider their input 
when setting priorities; and the initiative of the S&T division lead in pursuing first responder 
input.   
 
In addition to meeting first responder needs through the IPTs, S&T’s First Responder 
Technologies Program (R-Tech) has a budget of $4.5 million to develop technologies in response 
to first responder capability gap submissions.  S&T also has created a new Commercialization 
Office that is intended to influence industry in developing and marketing first responder 
technologies.   
 
Resources to meet first responder needs are limited; therefore, S&T relies as much as possible on 
identifying or developing technologies that have dual uses.  For example, if an IPT identifies a 
need that is potentially useful to first responders, S&T will attempt to ensure that the 
specifications allow for use by both federal customers and state and local first responders.  In 
addition, Section 1401 of the 2003 Defense Authorization Act provides S&T with a mechanism 
to adapt relevant DOD technologies to meet the needs of first responders.  An interagency group 
consisting of DOD, S&T, and the Department of Justice meets quarterly to discuss first 
responder capability gaps and identify DOD technologies that could potentially meet those gaps.  
The goal is to identify technologies that can be transferred as-is or with minor modifications. 
 
First responders who have participated in S&T focus groups or user working groups, or have 
been contacted by S&T to provide input in other ways indicate satisfaction that S&T is sincerely 
interested in their input and is making an effort to incorporate their suggestions.  However, it is a 
burden for first responders to participate in lengthy meetings or events that involve travel, and 
smaller first responder organizations incur overtime expenses when employees have to work 
extra hours to cover the shifts of those who are out of town to participate in S&T meetings.  
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More efficient and effective methods are needed to facilitate S&T’s communication with first 
responders.   
 
Despite S&T outreach efforts, many first responders are not aware of S&T or how S&T could 
support first responders.  Even in large cities, first responders report having no contact with 
S&T. 29  In addition, emergency medical services first responders and emergency managers have 
even less contact with S&T than other first responder disciplines.30  
 
Many first responders may not understand S&T’s relevance to their work.  S&T is developing 
technologies that would be useful to first responders in both natural and terrorist events, but 
S&T’s mission statement and other written documents may leave the impression that the primary 
focus is on terrorism events.  To be successful in reaching out to first responders, S&T’s 
language should match its activities.   
 
Further, many first responders do not understand the concepts of current capability gaps or future 
requirements that should drive technology investments, due to lack of time and training.  The 
vast majority of first responder agencies are small and staffed by part-time volunteers—80 
percent of law enforcement agencies have 25 or fewer officers and 85 percent of fire departments 
are volunteer.  Members of small organizations and part-time volunteers are typically too busy 
dealing with day-to-day emergencies and learning how to use and maintain the equipment they 
already have to consider future requirements.31 
 
S&T collects input from first responders through a variety of avenues.  This is appropriate, given 
that first responders are a large, diverse, and geographically dispersed group.  However, this 
approach requires that S&T develop a process for integrating, weighing, and prioritizing input 
from the many different representatives of the first responder community.  Such a process is not 
in place.  This fragmented approach to interacting with first responders illustrates a lack of 
cohesive strategy in first responder outreach. 
 
Figure 6-1 illustrates the channels for first responder input to S&T.  The roles of the First 
Responder Technology Council and other key entities depicted in the figure are discussed further 
in this chapter. 
                                                 
29 Interviews with first responders; Homeland Security Science and Technology Council, IEDs:  Coming to 
America, February 29, 2008, p. 13. 
30 Interviews with first responders and S&T staff. 
31 Interviews with first responders; IEDs:  Coming to America, supra, n.1. 
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Figure 6-1:  First Responder Channels to S&T 
 
 
 
 
_________________________ 
* The new First Responder Technology Council provides an internal S&T forum for information-sharing on first responder 
needs and coordination of responses to identified needs, such as research, development, and delivery of technologies. 
** Multiple S&T programs do or are intended to get input from First Responder Associations and S&T Stakeholder 
Conferences such as R-Tech, the Interagency and First Responder Programs Division, and the planned First Responder IPT.  
 
Source: National Academy of Public Administration, 2009.  
 
  
 
 * 
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**
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FIRST RESPONDER TECHNOLOGIES PROGRAM (R-TECH) 
 
S&T’s R-Tech program has evolved from 
the Technology Clearinghouse program, 
which was established by the Homeland 
Security Act to promote technological 
innovation by serving as an interface with 
other federal agencies, state and local 
governments, and the private sector.  
Specific activities the Clearinghouse was 
directed to undertake include:  
disseminating information on relevant 
technologies; issuing announcements for 
“unique and innovative” technologies; 
establishing a process to screen and evaluate 
submitted proposals; providing guidance 
and technical assistance in the use of 
technologies; and providing information on 
how to submit proposals.   
 
S&T has transformed and expanded the original idea of the Clearinghouse into R-Tech, which 
resides in the Office of Transition.  R-Tech consists of four programs designed to meet the needs 
of federal, state, local, and tribal first responders:  Tech Clearinghouse; TechSolutions; Tech 
Talk; and Field Assessment of Technologies.  Two of these programs—Tech Talk and 
Operational Test and Evaluation—are very new and still in the pilot stage. 
 
In addition to these four programs, R-Tech launched a monthly newsletter geared to first 
responders in April 2008.  The newsletter is emailed to subscribers, distributed through the Inter 
Agency Board for Equipment Standardization and Interoperability (IAB)32 and Responder 
Knowledge Base33 websites, and handed out in hard copy to meeting and conference 
participants.  Most first responders interviewed were not yet aware of the newsletter. 
 
As described below, R-Tech relies heavily on the internet to communicate with first responders.  
First responders interviewed say that the first responder community has adequate access to the 
necessary technologies and is very internet-savvy.  Therefore, S&T’s reliance on the internet is 
not a barrier to first responder participation.  In fact, first responders who currently interact with 
S&T want S&T to utilize video conferencing and the internet more and minimize in-person 
meetings that require travel.   
 
R-Tech depends on a User Working Group made up of first responders to provide input to the 
program.  The group meets four times per year and provides feedback on things like accessibility 
                                                 
32 The IAB consists of first responders from a variety of emergency management fields and federal agency staff.  
The purpose of the IAB is to provide advice to the federal government on first responder standards and technology 
needs. 
33 Responder Knowledge Base provides information on first responder equipment to help state and local agencies 
make informed purchasing decisions. 
R-Tech’s Programs 
 
Tech Clearinghouse is a website that provides 
information on all federal programs and resources 
relevant to first responders. 
 
TechSolutions funds projects to meet first 
responder technology needs. 
 
Tech Talk is a pilot program that gives first 
responders the ability to communicate with each 
other via a secure website. 
 
Field Assessment of Technologies is a new 
program that rates products for first responders and 
conducts field tests of equipment in partnership 
with first responders. 
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and ease of use.  For example, the group provided input during the development phase of the 
Tech Clearinghouse website.  There are currently 56 members, including S&T staff.  First 
responders from urban high-risk locations are under-represented and first responders from small 
cities in less populous states are over-represented.34 
 
R-Tech also forms focus groups, as needed.  For example, when a group of first responders 
identified a communications technology need, R-Tech organized a two-day focus group 
composed of Subject Matter Experts to validate the need. 
 
R-Tech’s Programs 
 
 Tech Clearinghouse 
 
The Tech Clearinghouse website (www.firstresponder.gov) was launched in January 2008 after 
several years of development.35  The website contains information on all federal resources 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 
Department of Justice, etc.) available to first responders.  These include product performance test 
and evaluation results, which help first responders make informed decisions about equipment 
acquisitions.  The website also includes information on grants, events, training, and so forth.  
First responders also may provide feedback to R-Tech via this website.   
 
First responders indicate lack of awareness of the Tech Clearinghouse website, although it has 
existed for almost one-and-a-half years, and most of those who have visited the site reported they 
did not find it particularly useful.  The few first responders who were positive about the site 
admitted that they have visited it only once or twice.  It appears that the information is too static 
and first responders do not have the time to visit websites very frequently.36 
 
 TechSolutions 
 
The S&T TechSolutions program initiates and funds projects to meet the technology needs of 
first responders.  The goal of TechSolutions is to provide technologies to first responders that 
meet most of their operational requirements in 12 to 15 months and with a research investment of 
less than $1 million—although these criteria are described by R-Tech staff as guidelines.  
TechSolutions intends to meet these requirements by relying on rapid prototyping or the 
identification of existing technologies that meet stated needs.  However, many projects exceed 
the timeline due to unforeseen delays and their budgets may exceed $1 million.   
 
R-Tech funds TechSolutions projects and co-manages them with the S&T technical divisions.  
Technical divisions and the Office of Innovation have co-funded TechSolutions projects with 
dual uses.  If the technology is not advanced enough to meet a submitted capability gap, 
                                                 
34 There is strong representation from New York City, but the only California city represented is San Diego and 
there is no Washington, DC metropolitan area representation.  The majority of members are from smaller cities in 
less populous states like South Carolina, Idaho, Kentucky, and Nebraska. 
35 Some interviewees voiced concern about the length of time (at least four years) and the amount of money spent 
developing this website. 
36 Interviews with first responders. 
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TechSolutions will attempt to have it incorporated into the basic research portfolio or the IPT 
process. 
 
TechSolutions provides a mechanism for first responders to submit capability gaps directly to 
S&T.  Until recently, this was done via an email address posted on the DHS website.  A brief 
paragraph on the TechSolutions page of the website invited first responders to submit capability 
gaps and provided brief instructions:  i.e., submissions should describe capability gaps that affect 
multiple first responder departments or sectors or ideas that would help first responders do their 
job more quickly, safely, and efficiently.  No additional information to help first responders 
formulate a submission was provided. 
 
To date, the number of submissions to TechSolutions from first responders has been 
disappointing.  As of December 2008, TechSolutions had received 330 submissions, the vast 
majority of which were information requests.  This is at least partially due to lack of awareness 
about the program among first responders and the fact that the system for submissions was 
difficult to use.   
 
The submission process recently became more user-friendly.  In February 2009, the 
TechSolutions website was launched through the Tech Clearinghouse website.  First responders 
can log in and submit a capability gap using an online form.  However, there is no definition of 
what a capability gap is, or list of frequently asked questions, or examples of submissions, and 
the form is still very general.  Most first responders in the field do not have a good understanding 
of what a capability gap is.  They are not experts in technology or trained to think in terms of 
future capabilities and requirements.  It is therefore unlikely that the new TechSolutions website 
will result in a significant increase in capability gap submissions from first responders.  Also, 
while these new functions are available through the Tech Clearinghouse website, they cannot be 
accessed from the TechSolutions page on DHS’s website, where the only submission option is 
the old email link.   
 
Proposals received through TechSolutions are intended to be initiated within 45 days.  Subject 
Matter Experts (SMEs), who are first responders from throughout the country, evaluate the merit 
and need of the proposals.  SMEs are provided with a Due Diligence Form to assess capability 
gap submissions based on a number of criteria, including whether a solution already exists, the 
submission has merit, and the solutions would be broadly applicable.  SMEs are asked to rate the 
impact of the technology on a scale of “None” to “Very High” and to provide additional 
comments.  Submissions that are deemed worthy of pursuit are then reviewed by S&T technical 
division staff, DHS component agencies, National Laboratory staff, or relevant industry 
personnel to identify potential solutions and develop requirements and a cost estimate.  The DHS 
OIG concluded that the TechSolutions review process is repeatable, mostly documented, and 
based on clear criteria.37 
 
TechSolutions intends to partner with first responders from the beginning to the end of the 
process.  First responders who submit capability gaps through TechSolutions receive a copy of 
the review process and timeline.  In response to feedback, R-Tech also has developed an 
automated system, accessible through the TechSolutions website, which first responders can use 
                                                 
37 2008 OIG Report, The Science and Technology Directorate’s Processes, p. 25. 
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to track the progress of their submissions.  When appropriate, submitters will be given the 
opportunity to test the product.   
 
TechSolutions has initiated 13 projects.  Three are considered complete, although two of these 
have not yet been transitioned.  The FireGround Compass, a product that enables firefighters to 
maintain their reference point and re-establish their orientation within buildings, has transitioned 
and is now commercially available.  Only two of the 13 projects originated from website 
submissions, although all were identified by first responders.  Other sources of customer needs 
include the International Association of Firefighters, Border Patrol, U.S. Coast Guard, the IAB, 
and IPTs. 
 
TechSolutions addresses product cost by surveying first responders to determine appropriate 
prices and making specification trade-offs to meet those price points.  Affordability is a concern 
to first responders, but they do not view it as a barrier because federal grants are typically 
available.  First responders are more interested in having access to the tools they need (whatever 
the cost) and ensuring that the equipment they spend money on can be integrated into existing 
systems, is interoperable, and will perform as advertised. 
 
Another barrier identified by first responders is that there is a small subset of first responders 
with the technical expertise and national perspective necessary to identify capability gaps.38  
Even if first responders identify a gap, they may have to go through the chain-of-command in 
their organization because they would be submitting gaps as a representative of their 
organization, not as a private individual, and this may impede ideas from getting to S&T. 
 
Field Assessment of Technologies 
 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 gives S&T the responsibility to assess the performance of 
all technologies for first responders, including those developed by the commercial market.  This 
responsibility was recently shifted from FEMA to the S&T Testing & Evaluation and Standards 
Division, which received $5 million in the FY 2009 budget for testing and evaluation of 
commercially available first responder equipment.  Results are posted on the Responder 
Knowledge Base website, which is linked to the Tech Clearinghouse website, and there are plans 
to further disseminate results through the R-Tech newsletter and articles in professional journals.  
R-Tech works closely with the Testing & Evaluation and Standards Division to provide input on 
testing and evaluation activities relevant to first responders. 
 
R-Tech, with input from the Testing & Evaluation and Standards Division, also has launched a 
pilot Field Assessment of Technologies Program that is intended to partner with first responder 
agencies to field test TechSolutions products.  This effort is intended to give first responders the 
opportunity to evaluate product performance themselves, and allow S&T to quantify the costs 
and benefits of a particular technology against current capabilities.  If there is an existing 
standard related to the product being tested, the Field Assessment of Technologies Program is 
required to rate the product against that standard. 
 
                                                 
38 Interviews with first responders and federal agency staff. 
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There have been two pilot projects.  The FireGround Compass was tested by three Kentucky 
firefighters.  QuietPro, a military technology intended to improve communications in noisy 
environments, has also been tested to determine the technology’s potential applicability to the 
fire service.  Results have been shared in press releases and published articles.  R-Tech is 
working to add an area to the Tech Clearinghouse website where R-Tech plans to post Field 
Assessment of Technologies program results in the future.   
 
First responders interviewed believe testing and evaluation and the development of standards are 
important niches for S&T to fill.  First responders do not view technology as an inhibitor, and, 
while developing new technologies is important, integrating existing technologies is viewed by 
them as a higher priority.  Almost every first responder indicated that interoperability and 
standards for existing technologies are their most urgent needs.  First responders want more 
standards and a more efficient and faster process for developing standards.  Many first 
responders believe that this should be the primary focus of S&T activities to meet first responder 
needs. 
 
 Tech Talk 
 
Tech Talk is a pilot program that gives first responders the ability to share information and 
collaborate with each other on specific topics through a secure interactive website.  Each topic is 
referred to as a “community of practice.”  The four ongoing Tech Talk communities of practice 
are:  Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness; EMS Curriculum Development 
Committee; Requirements and Standards; and Emergency Response Planning.  Approximately 
100 people are participating in each pilot community of practice.  Users can post to the main 
discussion or create smaller controlled spaces with more limited access.  For example, states 
within a particular geographic region may want to have their own discussion on a particular 
topic.  Tech Talk also provides an opportunity for state and local agencies to interact with DHS 
SMEs.   
 
Although the pilots have been deemed successful, Tech Talk has not been expanded because R-
Tech is changing platforms to provide features pilot participants have indicated they would like 
the program to have.  R-Tech has identified the platform, which is being modified.   
 
First responders interviewed were not aware of Tech Talk.  However, when Tech Talk was 
described to them, almost all were very enthusiastic and said that first responders in their 
discipline would use and benefit from it.   
  
R-Tech’s New Outreach Plan Builds on Lessons Learned  
 
Recognizing the need to improve outreach, R-Tech has developed a new outreach plan that 
builds on lessons learned to date.  Many tactics R-Tech is planning to pursue were suggested by 
first responders interviewed as efficient and effective mechanisms for improving S&T’s outreach 
to first responders.  Elements of the plan include: 
 
• Increasing engagement with first responder associations and their relevant committees, 
such as the Technology Council of the International Association of Fire Chiefs; 
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• Co-authoring articles with high profile first responders and placing them in trade 
publications;   
• Developing handouts tailored to different audiences for distribution at training institutes 
utilized by first responders; and 
• Increasing emphasis on state and regional events because R-Tech has learned that it is 
difficult to have meaningful interactions with first responders at large national association 
conferences, especially since many first responders never attend such meetings. 
 
INTERAGENCY AND FIRST RESPONDER PROGRAMS DIVISION (IAD)  
 
The Interagency and First Responder Programs Division Director reports directly to the U/S.  
IAD was originally set up to coordinate with other federal agencies and state, local, and tribal 
governments.  The responsibility to interact directly with first responders was added to IAD’s 
mission within the last year.  The rationale for the mission expansion is that interacting with 
emergency management staff in a state necessarily involves firefighters, policemen, etc.   
 
The structure and processes for IAD’s first responder outreach are still evolving.  IAD views its 
role as providing information to first responders on S&T’s activities and to help them navigate 
S&T’s processes.  IAD does not view its role as collecting capability gaps or other input from 
first responders (this is the responsibility of TechSolutions).  However, IAD staff document 
interactions with first responders and what they learn in trip reports, and this information is 
transmitted to the relevant technical division.  In addition, each IAD staff person is responsible 
for coordinating with specific technical divisions.   
 
IAD divides its state and local work among five staff members, who each cover two of FEMA’s 
ten geographical regions.  This approach is designed to strengthen S&T’s relationship with 
FEMA, a customer, while giving IAD the ability to leverage FEMA’s relationships with state 
and local agencies.   
 
In addition to the five staff described above, IAD is adding new hires to focus on first responder 
outreach.  The Director of First Responder Coordination (currently a vacant position) is 
responsible for IAD’s first responder outreach efforts.  IAD recently hired a retired police officer 
to conduct outreach to first responders on the West Coast and an individual with National Guard 
experience to conduct outreach on the East Coast.  There are plans to hire two additional first 
responder liaisons and establish a first responder outreach branch within IAD.  It is unclear how 
this outreach branch will interact and coordinate with R-Tech and the IPTs, especially since 
these other activities are under the purview of the Office of Transition, while IAD is not. 
 
IAD is considering reaching first responders through DHS Urban Areas Security Initiatives 
(UASIs),39 which is a logical approach for several reasons.  UASIs have been designated by DHS 
as being high risk areas based on a combination of data.  UASI designation requires different 
disciplines and jurisdictions to work together.  UASI members also have an understanding of 
                                                 
39 The UASI program focuses on enhancing regional preparedness in the 62 major metropolitan areas designated as 
highest risk by DHS.   
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capability gaps because this is part of the investment justification they must submit to DHS.  
Some first responders agreed this is a useful way to prioritize outreach, but cautioned against 
focusing exclusively on UASIs because they vary in organization and level of coordination, can 
be very political, and tend to be dominated by one agency.   
 
INTEGRATED PRODUCT TEAMS (IPTs) AND FIRST RESPONDER NEEDS 
 
Although the needs of the first responder community are supposed to be represented by DHS 
component agencies in the IPTs, all IPTs are encouraged to interact directly with first responders 
to get their input on capability gaps, and they do to varying degrees.  However, there are no rules 
or established processes for integrating input from first responders in the IPT process, or 
validating requirements generated by the IPTs.  In fact, non-federal first responders are 
technically excluded from IPT membership.  Therefore, the level of participation and the weight 
given to first responder input is a function of individual IPT leaders. 
 
For some IPTs, such as Interoperability or Infrastructure Protection, first responders play a 
critical role and there are formal mechanisms for getting first responder input.  The other IPTs 
get input from first responders in different ways and to varying degrees.  For example, one of the 
customer leads for the Counter-IED IPT is the Office for Bombing Prevention, which works 
closely with bomb squads and represents their needs on the IPT.  In addition, members of the 
National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board attend Capstone IPT meetings, submit 
capability gaps, and attend relevant Sub-IPT meetings.  The other customer lead of the IPT, the 
U.S. Secret Service, also has an incentive to ensure first responder needs are met because the 
Secret Service relies on local bomb squads when a bomb is discovered at an event.  S&T staff, 
customer leads, and bomb squad representatives all agreed that first responder requirements are 
being inserted effectively into the Counter-IED Capstone IPT. 
 
The Interoperability IPT Considers Direct Input from First Responders 
 
The S&T lead for the Interoperability IPT is the Command, Control and Interoperability Division 
(CID), and the customer leads are the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Office of 
Emergency Communications.  CID describes the Interoperability IPT as practitioner-driven.   
 
CID staff report that it is critically important to ensure that federal solutions meet local needs, 
especially in the case of interoperability.  They also explain that the prescribed IPT process is not 
the best structure to identify and prioritize capability gaps, because only one set of customers is 
represented.  CID has solved the problem by relying on the SAFECOM40 Emergency Response 
Council to identify capability gaps.  The Council is made up of more than 100 representatives of 
national and international first responder organizations (e.g., International Association of Chiefs 
of Police, International Association of Fire Chiefs, and National Association of Emergency 
Medical Services), and federal, state, local, and tribal government organizations (e.g., the 
National Governors Association and the U.S. Conference of Mayors).  The Council meets twice 
per year.  CID convenes two additional meetings per year, as well as monthly conference calls, 
                                                 
40 SAFECOM is a DHS communications program run jointly by Office for Emergency Communications and S&T 
that provides support on interoperability issues to federal, state, local, and tribal emergency response agencies. 
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with the Council’s Executive Committee.  In addition, CID has convened stakeholder 
conferences on interoperability, where the majority of the participants are first responders.  CID 
staff present information collected from the first responders to the Capstone IPT.   
 
In addition to the Council, CID utilizes the IAB and other practitioner organizations to populate 
working groups that “operate in a manner functionally equivalent to Project IPTs.”41  These 
working groups help define requirements and participate in test and evaluation and typically 
consist of 50-60 first responders from around the country with specific types of expertise.   
 
CID’s direct interaction with first responders to collect capability gaps initially generated some 
conflict with the DHS component customers of the IPT, primarily because it caused confusion 
about roles and authorities.  The component agencies have been mandated to represent first 
responder needs.  As one noted, the first responder community is such a large and diverse group 
that perceptions of needs will vary depending on the segment of the community being consulted.  
Over time, however, the component agency customers have come to appreciate first responder 
input and believe there is general agreement among DHS and first responder customers of this 
IPT on the capability gaps they want S&T to address. 
Infrastructure Protection IPT’s Systematic Collection of First Responder Capability Gaps  
 
The Office of Infrastructure Protection is the customer lead of the Interoperability IPT and is 
responsible for representing the needs of critical infrastructure sectors.  The Office of 
Infrastructure Protection has worked with the Infrastructure and Geophysical Division, the S&T 
lead, to develop a formal mechanism for collecting and prioritizing capability gaps from all 
critical infrastructure sectors, including emergency services.  S&T is involved in this process 
from the beginning in order to help the sectors understand what a “good” capability gap is and 
which specific criteria are used by the Office of Infrastructure Protection and S&T to prioritize 
gaps.  The process used by the Infrastructure Protection IPT is described in more detail in 
Appendix C. 
 
The Emergency Services Sector has been designated as a critical infrastructure sector by DHS.  
As do the other critical infrastructure sectors, the Emergency Services Sector has a “sector 
coordinating council” that interacts with DHS on a variety of issues, including identifying 
technological capability gaps.  The coordinating council includes members of national 
associations representing nine functions:  law enforcement; bomb and explosive ordinance 
demolition; special weapons and tactics and tactical operations; firefighters; emergency medical 
services; search and rescue; urban search and rescue; emergency management; and hazardous 
materials response.   
 
PROPOSED FIRST RESPONDER IPT 
 
S&T recognizes that outreach to first responders is an immense task and that it must do a better 
job getting input on capability gaps.  In response to criticism from Congress and complaints from 
first responders, S&T is making plans to establish a new first responder IPT.  The S&T lead will 
                                                 
41 Interoperability Capstone IPT Status Review Power Point, January 14, 2009. 
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be the Interagency and First Responder Programs Division.  Other members of the Capstone will 
be FEMA Grants (because most first responder departments use these grants to purchase 
equipment), R-Tech, the Commercialization Office, Testing & Evaluation and Standards, and 
relevant DHS component agencies. 
 
First responders will not be members of the Capstone IPT, but there will be a working group of 
31 first responders under the Capstone IPT that will submit requirements to the IPT.  The 
composition of the working group will be two-thirds practitioners and one-third representatives 
of first responder associations.  Working group members will represent all relevant disciplines at 
the state, local, and tribal levels, as well as DHS staff. 
 
DHS component agencies will represent the first responders on the Capstone.  For example, 
emergency medical technicians will be represented by the Office of Health Affairs and 
firefighters will be represented by FEMA.  The Capstone member representing a particular 
discipline will be responsible for presenting capability gaps relevant to that discipline to the 
Capstone. 
 
The first responder IPT will not have its own budget.42  S&T will query other IPTs, other federal 
agencies, and the international community to determine whether ongoing projects could be 
leveraged to meet a capability gap.  If the gap cannot be filled with existing projects, the First 
Responder IPT will work with the Commercialization Office to determine if the market is large 
enough for the requirement to be met by industry.  If not, R-Tech may initiate a project to fill the 
gap. 
 
While details are sparse, the vision provided by S&T presents a number of potential problems.  
 
• There do not appear to be plans for a formal mechanism whereby the First Responder IPT 
will be able to feed capability gaps into existing IPTs and obtain feedback.  It is also 
unclear how the IPTs already collecting capability gaps directly from first responders will 
weigh these against capability gaps from the First Responder IPT. 
• The first responder community is so diverse that reaching consensus about priority 
capability gaps across the different disciplines to be involved in the IPT is likely to be 
difficult.   
• It is unclear how this IPT will be integrated with other first responder activities already 
carried out by S&T.  For example, there has been no mention of including first 
responders already working with R-Tech or HSSTAC members in the First Responder 
IPT.   
• The S&T lead for the First Responder IPT will be the Interagency and First Responder 
Division Director.  This may be problematic because the requirements are likely to be 
met by R-Tech, the Commercialization Office, or other IPTs, which all fall within the 
purview of the Transition Portfolio.  IAD is not part of the Transition Portfolio. 
                                                 
42 The FY 2010 President’s Budget Request includes $12 million for S&T to develop and design technologies to 
address capability gaps identified by federal, state, local, and tribal first responders in the first responder IPT. 
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HOMELAND SECURITY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
(HSSTAC) 
 
The HSSTAC is another way that S&T receives input from the first responder community.  The 
HSSTAC is an advisory committee and includes first responders as members.  The first 
responders on the HSSTAC are relied upon by other HSSTAC members to provide first 
responder viewpoints and identify other first responders to brief the HSSTAC.  In addition, the 
HSSTAC has made field visits as a group to meet with first responders and get a better 
understanding of the conditions under which they work.   
 
The HSSTAC’s size and composition is congressionally mandated.  It is supposed to have 20 
members43 that represent first responders; citizen groups; and luminaries in related fields, such as 
research and engineering.  The members serve three-year terms.  The HSSTAC, which is 
coordinated by the Operations Analysis Division, provides advice to S&T, including identifying 
potential research projects.  The HSSTAC was deactivated in late 2006 because of a lapse in 
Congressional authorization, but is now active again.  Congressional authorization lapsed again 
at the end of 2008, but the HSSTAC continues to function as a discretionary advisory committee. 
 
Three HSSTAC members come from the first responder community:  a fire chief; a sheriff; and 
an emergency medical technician.  As long as these members have a national perspective and 
broad backgrounds, this representation may be adequate.  S&T staff and HSSTAC members also 
indicated that it might be useful to add a fourth first responder to the HSSTAC to represent bomb 
squads. 
 
In preparation for a February 2008 report on IEDs, the HSSTAC interviewed first responders in 
the United States and abroad.  The HSSTAC found that, in general, information about S&T and 
its current and planned programs was not disseminated effectively and first responders had 
limited awareness of S&T and how it could support first responders.  The HSSTAC has made a 
number of recommendations to S&T regarding improving first responder outreach that deserve 
consideration, including: 
  
• Involving first responders in planning for training exercises; 
• Developing on-line training for first responders, who cannot always attend in-person 
training; 
• Incorporating first responders in the entire research and development process to improve 
chances that technologies developed will be useful; 
• Creating or funding a single testing and evaluation organization to meet the needs of first 
responders; 
• Investigating existing solutions to the technology gaps most often identified by first 
responders in the United States and elsewhere, including individual explosive detection at 
a distance and reliable communications in and out of buildings, tunnels, and other 
structures; and 
                                                 
43 Currently there are 19 members of the HSSTAC. 
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• Developing metrics to evaluate the usefulness of first responder participation in S&T 
programs.44 
 
FIRST RESPONDER TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL 
 
The First Responder Technology Council is intended to provide a forum for internal S&T 
information-sharing on first responder needs and coordinate responses, including projects, 
research, development, and delivery of technologies.  The Council is very new.  It initially met in 
March 2009, and as of the end of May 2009 has met one additional time.  The plan is for the 
Council to meet monthly and be chaired by the Director of First Responder Coordination 
(currently vacant) in the Interagency and First Responder Programs Division.  The membership 
of the Council reflects the different offices and divisions within S&T that interact with, or 
execute programs to, meet the needs of first responders, including:  the six S&T technical 
division heads; the Director of R-Tech; the Commercialization Officer; the Director for 
Operations and Analysis; the Director or Deputy Director of Test & Evaluation; and 
representatives of Corporate Communications and the Office of National Labs.  The Council 
may form committees or working groups that could meet more frequently than monthly. 
 
The First Responder Technology Council is too new to evaluate its effectiveness.  However, its 
charter suggests that the Council can provide the systematic mechanism for collecting and 
integrating input from first responders the Academy recommended it its interim report.  Creating 
linkages between the S&T divisions interacting with first responders will help S&T prioritize its 
work in relation to first responders and coordinate responses to first responder needs. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
S&T has multiple avenues available to interact with first responders, yet S&T’s effectiveness in 
making its presence known and engaging with first responders has been limited.  As discussed in 
Chapter IV, the lack of a strategic plan has resulted in a fragmented approach to interacting with 
first responders.  The lack of a comprehensive S&T mission statement that encompasses an all 
hazards approach also could be impeding constructive interaction with first responders who 
generally respond to natural disasters.  Even though S&T is addressing all hazards, and R-Tech 
recently revised its mission statement to include all hazards, this approach is not adequately 
reflected in S&T’s mission statement or other written documents. 
 
First responders who have become involved in various committees, focus groups, or advisory 
panels indicate that their interactions with S&T have been productive.  However, participation in 
these groups is not representative of the nation’s first responder population, demonstrating a lack 
of strategy for first responder outreach.     
 
Few first responders are using S&T’s web-based communications.  Their lack of knowledge 
about S&T’s websites and the absence of user-friendly means to input capability gaps seem to be 
                                                 
44 HSSTAC, IEDs:  Coming to America, pp. 34-36. 
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hampering interaction.  Just two IPT projects have been generated from first responder input 
through TechSolutions.  
 
S&T has recently added new first responder activities and is planning to initiate a first responder 
IPT.  Coordinating these activities internally will be challenging, especially because various 
activities are located within different S&T divisions.  Although the new First Responder 
Technology Council is intended to foster sharing of information and ideas and coordinate 
decision making within S&T, whether it can be effective given competing demands remains to 
be seen.   
 
It is particularly unclear how the planned first responder IPT will enhance first responder input to 
the capability gap process given that it will be led by internal DHS management, has no 
resources of its own, and will have to compete for resources with other entities that have their 
own priorities.  It would be far more reasonable and effective to incorporate relevant first 
responders into the already existing IPTs so they can work in conjunction with DHS component 
agencies in setting priorities for S&T.  S&T officials believe that first responders could not 
meaningfully participate in the existing IPTs because the related expense and the fact that IPTs 
convene and deliberate at times suitable to the IPT customer.  However, these issues would 
appear to apply to the first responder IPT as well. 
 
Increasing the complexity within S&T as a means of meeting first responder needs is not the 
right path.  Strengthening existing methods of outreach and following the lead of the IPTs that 
already collect substantial first responder input would be far more efficient and effective. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Instead of creating new mechanisms, such as the First Responder IPT and the IAD First 
Responder Outreach Branch, to get first responder input, existing mechanisms should be 
strengthened.  As recommended below, this should include:  improving outreach; facilitating first 
responder input through the IPTs and R-Tech; and ensuring the First Responder Technology 
Council functions as intended.  IAD should continue to report back to the First Responder 
Technology Council on information gathered through state and local outreach, but should not 
establish a separate first responder outreach branch. 
 
6-1. Identify IPT customers and develop appropriate mechanisms for customer 
participation. 
Logic models (discussed in more detail in Appendix D) should be used to identify first 
responder customers for each IPT and the most effective means for their participation.  
Existing models for first responder participation, such as the Interoperability, Counter-
IED, or Infrastructure Protection IPTs should be evaluated for this purpose, and a policy 
for first responder participation in IPTs should be developed.  Metrics should be 
developed to measure the efficacy of first responder participation.  
 
6-2. Prioritize, tailor, and increase outreach. 
Outreach should be prioritized to target first responders in areas with the higher levels of 
threat and vulnerability for manmade or natural disasters.  Interaction with first 
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responders in areas with less critical infrastructure and lower populations should be 
sought to the extent possible, but the balance should shift further toward higher risk 
regions.  At the same time, more should be done to ensure that all relevant disciplines are 
consulted, including emergency medical technicians and emergency managers.  
Recognizing that different segments of the first responder community have different 
skills and expertise to offer, outreach should be tailored accordingly.  First responders in 
the field can be useful in vetting proposed technologies, providing input on 
specifications, and participating in testing and evaluation.  First responder officials in 
large cities, at the state level, or in national organizations, are more likely to think in 
terms of capability gaps on a national level and have the technical expertise to identify 
and prioritize gaps and requirements.  This does not mean that S&T should exclude rural 
participants, since there are some differences in capability gaps between the urban and 
rural areas.  On-line training on how to identify and describe capability gaps should be 
provided and the R-Tech outreach plan should be fully implemented and augmented.   
 
6-3. Leverage existing organizations and outreach mechanisms. 
S&T should increase its utilization of existing organizations and mechanisms for 
outreach to first responders, including national associations, such as the International 
Association of Fire Fighters, the International Association of Emergency Managers, and 
the International Association of Chiefs of Police.  National associations can easily and 
quickly disseminate information to state associations, which collectively have larger 
memberships than the national associations.  Examples of other existing organizations 
and mechanism include the Emergency Services Sector Coordinating Council and the 
National Institute of Justice’s National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology 
Center Regional Advisory Group.  Most of these groups have websites, publications, 
committees, and meetings that S&T should take advantage of in a targeted way.   
 
6-4. Give greater priority to testing and evaluation and standards. 
More emphasis should be placed on testing and evaluation and standards development.  
Most first responders believe the technologies they need already exist but are challenged 
by interoperability issues and lack of evaluation of existing technologies to determine 
whether they will perform as promised. 
 
6-5. Make it easier for first responders to participate. 
Increase the use of video conferencing, Web 2.0, and other technologies to reduce the 
burden on first responders and their organizations of participating in S&T activities, and 
to allow for greater input from more first responders.  Additional information, such as 
frequently asked questions, definitions, and sample capability gap submission forms, 
should be provided to make it easier for first responders to submit capability gaps.  
Finally, the DHS website should link to www.firstresponders.gov and the TechSolutions 
website.   
 
6-6. Continue and strengthen the First Responder Technology Council. 
The First Responder Technology Council should be structured to provide a systematic 
and organized way to weigh, prioritize, and integrate input from different representatives 
of the first responder community, as well as to coordinate responses.  The Council can 
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provide this function and also help S&T develop coordinated outreach plans, based on 
lessons learned.  Working groups should be formed to devise processes for how the 
Council will perform these functions.  The First Responder Technology Council should 
retain its current members and continue to plan to meet at least once per month.   
 56
 
This Page Left Intentionally Blank. 
 57
CHAPTER VII:  BASIC RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 
 
 
Basic research constitutes an important portion of S&T’s overall work and is critical to its ability 
to carry out its mission over the long run.  S&T’s Strategic Plan emphasizes the importance of 
balancing investments among basic research, transition, and innovation to produce a continuous 
pipeline of technology to customers.  Basic research, as defined by S&T, is long-term—S&T 
generally expects projects to last five to eight years, or more—and is intended to produce 
information that is needed for the eventual success of future “transition” research and 
development aimed at meeting customer needs.45  S&T also dedicates a relatively small amount 
of funding to an Innovation Portfolio of projects expected to be high risk, but potentially “game 
changing.” 
 
BASIC RESEARCH PORTFOLIO 
 
Basic research constitutes about 23 percent, $173 million, of S&T’s budget.  Almost three 
quarters of that funding is programmed and overseen by the six technical divisions.  Most of the 
remainder is under the Office of Research, which has direct responsibility for managing the DHS 
Centers of Excellence—through the Office of University Programs—and coordinating DHS 
work by the National Laboratories—through the Office of National Laboratories.  Over half of 
S&T’s basic research is conducted by universities (primarily the Centers of Excellence) or the 
National Laboratories.   
 
Setting the Research Agenda 
 
There are no clear criteria or processes for identifying requirements and prioritizing basic 
research across or within S&T divisions.  Further, many of the representatives of the DHS 
component agency customers indicated that they did not know what basic research was ongoing 
or planned, and some feared S&T was not funding enough basic research.  The DHS Inspector 
General raised similar concerns about basic research project selection, reporting that the lack of a 
process or criteria for project selection allows the perception of conflict of interest and does not 
guarantee the most appropriate research is being done.46  
 
The technical divisions are responsible for all aspects of their basic research, including 
prioritizing needs, selecting programs and projects to fund, selecting performers, and managing 
the projects.47 A research lead in each technical division has responsibility for overseeing the 
division’s basic research work, while individual programs and projects are managed day-to-day 
by program managers.  The division research leads are part of the technical division, report to the 
division director, and serve as liaisons between the divisions and the Office of Research.     
 
                                                 
45 As described in Appendix B, the S&T definition of research appears to correspond with the definitions used by 
the Office of Management and Budget and the National Science Foundation. 
46 DHS, OIG, the Science and Technology Directorate’s Processes, pp. 1 and 13.   
47 Ibid p. 20. 
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As presented by S&T officials in the FY 2009 Budget Brief, basic research should accomplish 
one or more of the following:  
 
• Address unique homeland security responsibilities (e.g., psychology of terrorism); 
• Address areas identified in IPTs that do not have transition or innovation solutions; 
• Support S&T partnership with other government agencies, industry, and other countries; 
• Fulfill mandates from DHS or Congress; or 
• Take advantage of a technology discovery or surprise.   
 
However, it is not clear how or when these very general criteria are applied or how priorities are 
set across or within divisions when selecting basic research projects to pursue.  
 
Allocation of Funding for Basic Research 
 
The general level of S&T funding for basic research has increased somewhat in recent years to a 
level of about 23 percent of the total research and development budget in 2009.  This exceeds the 
goal of 20 percent established by U/S Cohen.  That goal was set based on his judgment and was 
seen as a level of funding DHS components would accept for work not directly related to 
meeting current capability gaps.  There is significant variation among the divisions with regard 
to the portion of total funding devoted to basic research.  The proportion ranges from 2.2 percent 
in the Borders and Maritime Division, to 38 percent for the Human Factors Division.48  In 
addition, 100 percent of the work in the Counter-IED Program Executive Office, which oversees 
and funds projects from three divisions, is basic research.  The allocation of funds for basic 
research, both among and within divisions, has remained basically the same since the initial 
allocation was made at the time of the 2006 reorganization.49  
 
Identification and Prioritization of Requirements  
 
Basic research is less “customer driven” than transition research and development.  Officials 
explain that, unlike transition, where customers have a solid understanding of near term needs, 
customers are not likely to be able to articulate long-term future needs, to have knowledge of 
emerging research, or to recognize the potential benefits of specific types of research.  But the 
IPT process appears to have informed the basic research portfolio to a limited extent.  According 
to the DHS Inspector General, some basic research projects have been modified to better meet 
the needs articulated by the IPTs.50  The division research leads interviewed unanimously 
reported that they look to requirements identified by customers in the IPTs—requirements that 
are not appropriate for the transition portfolio because of the time needed or the existing level of 
development of the technology—as potential areas for basic research.  The division research 
leads also expressed concern, however, that even if an IPT identifies a capability gap that 
                                                 
48 As explained in Appendix B, the Infrastructure/Geophysical Division’s basic research budget includes significant 
funding for two Congressionally directed research centers.  If that funding is included, that Division would allocate 
the highest amount, 53 percent, to basic research. 
49 Interviews with S&T officials. 
50 DHS, OIG, the Science and Technology Directorate’s Processes, p. 26. 
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requires basic research, funding for basic research is not necessarily increased to allow that 
research to be done. 
 
The division research leads described many other sources of ideas for potential projects and for 
obtaining information relevant to prioritizing them, but they did not articulate clear criteria or 
processes for doing so.  Sources include, for example, the Centers of Excellence; emerging 
issues from universities; other federal agencies, such as the National Science Foundation; various 
offices within DHS and S&T; the National Laboratories; the private sector; and unsolicited 
proposals.  Some division research leads noted that they look for opportunities to leverage what 
other research organizations are doing.  One research lead said that a broad research agenda had 
been published for his subject area before the 2006 reorganization and he follows that to the 
extent he has the opportunity to fund new work.  The DHS Inspector General pointed to a clear 
need for S&T to develop and document a repeatable process with objective criteria for 
prioritizing and selecting basic research projects.51  There is currently no external peer review of 
the research portfolio or the projects in it.52  
 
S&T has recognized the need to improve the process for identifying and prioritizing basic 
research. An official in the Office of Research indicated that, although the divisions continue to 
apply individual processes and criteria, the Director of Research is developing a basic research 
strategic plan—in part to identify best practices—and is working to encourage appropriate 
consistency among divisions.  The Director has also commissioned a short term effort by the 
National Defense University, in part to help refine approaches to prioritization and selection.  
 
The Director of Research also has established a Science and Technology Research Council 
composed of the Deputy Director for Research, representatives of the Office of National 
Laboratories and the Office of University Programs, the Program Executive for Counter-IED, 
and the technical division heads and research leads.  The Council provides a forum for the 
interchange of ideas among research representatives from the member offices.  The division 
research leads developed detailed basic research focus areas and vetted them through this 
Council.  The focus areas are being processed for publication, with the intent to have them 
available for the May 2009 Stakeholders Conference.53  
 
Selecting Performers for Basic Research 
 
In 2009, as shown in Figure 7.1, over one-half of S&T’s basic research was conducted by 
universities (31 percent) and the National Laboratories (26 percent).  The remaining performers 
included: other federal laboratories (10 percent); industry (31 percent); Federally Funded  
 
                                                 
51 DHS, OIG, the Science and Technology Directorate’s Processes, p. 26. 
52 As discussed in Chapter IX, other research agencies use external peer review to assess the appropriateness, 
performance, and impact of their research.  
53 Among the other topics discussed by the Council are terrorism risk workshops, DOE Office of Science programs, 
and differentiating basic research from transition.  
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Research and Development Centers (1 percent); and non-profits (1 percent).  With the exception 
of funding for the Centers of Excellence, discussed below, the technical divisions drive this 
funding distribution.54 
 
Figure 7-1:  S&T Basic Research Performers 
 
Source: Graphic provided by S&T, March 2009 
 
The extent to which the divisions select performers through a competitive process, instead of 
directing funding to a particular performer for a particular purpose, is unclear.  However, 
discussions with division research leads and others in S&T indicate that much of the work is not 
competed.  The Director of Research estimated that 20 percent of the basic research portfolio is 
competed through Broad Area Announcements (in addition to the Center of Excellence 
selections discussed below).  Officials repeatedly said that they know “who can do the work they 
need,” and that very often there are only a few performers who can meet their needs.  One 
limitation to competition often mentioned is the relatively few facilities that can handle the 
classified research DHS needs.  Division research leads stated that they do sometimes use 
competitive processes, especially when they are initiating a new program area of work or when 
private performers are most likely to be the best choice.  They stated that, given the limited 
funding for new research projects each year and the limited number of performers capable of 
doing the work, an extensive competitive review process for basic research would not be 
worthwhile.  
 
Most ongoing basic research projects are “legacy” projects that began before the 2006 
reorganization.  Officials explained that, because of the length of time required for basic 
research, there has been limited opportunity to award new basic research projects in recent years, 
though some new projects have been started.  No research programs have been terminated since 
the reorganization. Officials explained, however, that they manage “programs” of work, which 
include a variety of specific “project” efforts.  Thus, individual basic research projects may have 
been terminated and others begun in support of the overall program. 
 
                                                 
54 According to data provided by S&T, the proportion of research conducted by universities and National 
Laboratories remained essentially the same between 2008 and 2009. However, the proportion performed by industry 
increased from 13 percent in 2008 to the 31 percent shown here, while all other categories declined.  A program 
official said that the 2009 industry data probably are incorrect and may be the result of a change in categorization of 
accounts. 
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S&T did not provide information about how many new projects began after the reorganization, 
or about how many basic research projects have been completed and whether they had 
effectively fed into the transition portfolio.  
 
Other federal research agencies use scientific peer review to evaluate research proposals.  It is 
standard operating procedure to compete and peer review grant awards at the National Science 
Foundation.  The Foundation has a large pool of experts in various fields who review proposals 
for over 90 percent of the research awards it makes.  (See highlights of the 2008 process in box 
below.)  Likewise, the National Institute of Justice’s Office of Research and Evaluation uses a 
competitive process, with reviewers outside the Institute, for almost all the research it funds. In 
both cases the scientific peer reviewers evaluate the proposals based on merit along specific 
criteria and make recommendations to the selecting officials in the agency. 
 
Program Executive Office for Counter-IED 
 
The Program Executive Office for Counter-IED is 
somewhat unique within S&T because it works to 
set priorities across divisions.  It was created to 
oversee the Counter-IED portfolio, which spans 
three technical divisions—Explosives, Human 
Factors/Behavioral Science, and Infrastructure 
and Geophysical.  All this work is in the basic 
research portfolio and the Office is housed in the 
Office of the Director of Research.  Total funding 
for this program increased from $15 million in 
fiscal year 2008 to $35 million in fiscal year 2009.  
These funds are specifically designated by 
Congress for counter-IED work.  
 
The Counter-IED program director receives input 
from a number of sources to focus the program.  
From outside S&T, insights come from 
interactions with the subcommittee on domestic 
IEDs within a committee of the National Science 
and Technology Council.  The director is one of 
three “tri-chairs” of this subcommittee.   
 
Within S&T, proposals come from the three technical divisions that carry out the projects.  An 
internal Counter-IED IPT was created after officials were unsuccessful in gaining consensus 
about project priorities on their own.  The membership includes representatives from the three 
divisions supporting the counter-IED effort, the three portfolio directors, and the Deputy U/S.  
The IPT adjudicates disputes among the divisions, and program officials say it has improved 
communication and transparency and reduced the influence of personalities in the process.  Once 
the Program decides to fund a project, the division research leads and program managers in the 
division are responsible for the effort, including selecting performers and monitoring progress, 
keeping the Counter-IED Program Executive Office informed.   
HIGHLIGHTS 
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION’S 
2008 MERIT REVIEW PROCESS 
 
MERIT REVIEW CRITERIA 
o WHAT IS THE INTELLECTUAL 
MERIT OF THE PROPOSED 
ACTIVITY? 
o WHAT ARE THE BROADER 
IMPACTS OF THE PROPOSED 
ACTIVITY? 
o ADDITIONAL AREA-SPECIFIC 
CRITERIA MAY BE ADDED. 
PROPOSALS 
o 44,400  PROPOSALS 
o 11,162 AWARDS 
REVIEWERS 
o SCIENTISTS, ENGINEERS AND 
EDUCATORS THROUGHOUT THE 
WORLD 
o 248,000 AD-HOC REVIEWERS 
o 50,000 SERVED ON REVIEW 
PANELS 
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According to a Counter-IED Program official, there are five aspects of the Counter-IED 
strategy—deter, predict, detect, defeat, and mitigate.  The bulk of the funding is focused on 
detection (in the Explosives Division).  However, officials said that S&T wants to focus more on 
deterrence and prediction, but expects the change will be slow, being accomplished as ongoing 
projects end and new projects are begun.  
 
Centers of Excellence 
 
DHS currently funds 12 university-based Centers of Excellence. Awards for operating these 
Centers constitute about 21 percent of S&T’s total funding for basic research.  The Centers also 
receive other funding for specific activities through the divisions.55  
 
The Centers bring together leading experts and researchers to conduct multidisciplinary research 
and education for homeland security solutions.  The Centers are authorized by Congress and 
chosen by S&T through a competitive external scientific peer review selection process.  Each 
Center is led by a university in collaboration with partners from other educational institutions, 
agencies, laboratories, think tanks, and the private sector.  
 
 
The Centers work to leverage funding from many sources to further research needed in support 
of homeland security.  In 2007, the Centers leveraged over $20 million from other sources.56  
 
Five of the existing Centers were first awarded in 2008, in response to gaps identified in the 
extent to which the existing Centers were addressing the needs of the six technical divisions.57  
Eleven selection criteria were published in the funding opportunity announcements for the new 
Centers, among them, scientific quality, mission-related significance, and geographical 
distribution. (See box at right for full list of criteria.)  As described by S&T officials, the process 
used in 2008 to select the Centers had three phases.  
 
• An external panel of experts reviewed proposals for scientific merit.   
• The highest rated proposals were then reviewed internally by S&T staff.   
• Applicants for a relatively few proposals rated highest by the staff received site visits by  
S&T and DHS component agency staff.   
                                                 
55 Overall, universities conduct about 31 percent of S&T’s basic research.  Over 80 percent of the funding comes 
from the Office of University Programs as awards for Centers of Excellence and for educational programs, such as 
stipends for Homeland Security Fellows and grants to Minority Serving Institutions.  Most of the remainder is 
awarded by the divisions in accord with their individual needs.  There is extensive literature related to arrangements 
similar to Centers of Excellence.  For example see Bozeman, B. and Boardman, C. (2003) Managing the new 
Multipurpose, Multidiscipline University Research Centers: Institutional Innovation and Academic Research.  
Washington, D.C. IBM Endowment of the Business of Government. 
56 Briefing by Office of University Programs. 
57 The number of Centers continues to change.  For example, in early 2009, two existing centers, the Discrete 
Science Centers and the Regional Visualization Centers were replaced with a new Command, Control and 
Interoperability Centers of Excellence, bringing the total to 12.  Other changes are also expected as S&T continues 
to align the Centers with division needs.  
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Internal deliberations resulted in final 
selections.  The process began in February 
2007 with a Broad Area Announcement and 
ended with awards in the summer of 2008.   
 
The Centers of Excellence are aligned with 
the six divisions in terms of research 
subject matter. After Centers are selected, 
the overall scope of work is negotiated and 
the award is made.  The specific projects 
undertaken are decided by the Center, 
although S&T research officials said that 
they are in contact with the Centers and 
may consult with them about planned work.  
They also pointed out that the Centers are 
reviewed every two to three years and the 
likelihood of continuation is reduced if their 
overall body of work is not supportive of 
the divisions’ priorities.58   
 
The Office of University Programs has 
recognized the need to coordinate Center 
efforts with other researchers to share ideas 
and prevent unnecessary duplication.  It has 
sponsored several conferences and 
workshops to bring together staff from the 
Centers, as well as other researchers.  In 
2008, the Office sponsored a University Network Summit on Research involving 500 
participants from the academic and federal research communities; another such summit is being 
planned for 2009.  It has also sponsored other subject-specific meetings and workshops, such as 
one on risk communication.  The Office of University Programs is also developing an electronic 
data base of all ongoing University Program research projects.  
 
The National Laboratories 
 
S&T’s Office of National Laboratories works with the National Laboratories, and other federal 
laboratories, to provide DHS with science, technology, and engineering expertise to support its 
research needs.  About 26 percent of the basic research budget goes to the National Laboratories.  
Excluding funds awarded for Centers of Excellence and education programs such as fellowships, 
34 percent of S&T basic research funding is awarded to the National Laboratories.  As with the 
Centers of Excellence, DHS expects that working through the National Laboratories will 
leverage funding, allowing S&T to fund work that builds on research underway or planned by 
the National Laboratories to further S&T’s research mission.  Though overall numbers were not 
available, division research leads said they had been successful in doing so. 
                                                 
58 See Chapter IX for more information on the review of Centers of Excellence. 
DHS CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE 
SOURCE SELECTION CRITERIA FOR 2008 
AWARDS 
 
1. TECHNICAL MERIT AND QUALITY 
2. MISSION-RELATED SIGNIFICANCE 
3. GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF 
CENTERS AND PARTNERS 
4. QUALIFICATIONS OF PRINCIPAL 
INVESTIGATORS AND OTHER 
PERSONNEL 
5. ADEQUACY OF FACILITIES AND 
EQUIPMENT 
6. ABILITY OF LEAD INSTITUTION TO 
MANAGE THE CENTER AND ADEQUACY 
OF MANAGEMENT PLAN 
7. EVIDENCE THAT APPLICANT IS FAMILIAR 
WITH RESEARCH AND RESOURCES OF 
OTHER RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS 
8. ABILITY OF APPLICANT TO ESTABLISH 
AN ENDURING AND COMPREHENSIVE 
PLAN OF STUDY 
9. ADEQUACY OF STRATEGY TO 
TRANSITION RESEARCH RESULTS TO 
END USERS 
10. ABILITY AND COMMITMENT TO PARTNER 
WITH MINORITY SERVING INSTITUTIONS 
11. APPROPRIATENESS AND ADEQUACY OF 
THE PROPOSED BUDGET 
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The Homeland Security Act of 2002 authorizes DHS to draw on the expertise of all government 
laboratories—with an emphasis on DOE’s National Laboratories—in support of achieving its 
mission.59  The Act specifically directs DHS and DOE to enter into cooperative agreements 
regarding DHS’s use of the National Laboratories, authorizes the National Laboratories to accept 
work from DHS on an equal basis with DOE work, and directs DOE to charge DHS the DOE 
rate for administrative and personnel costs at the Laboratories.  The Act also established the S&T 
Office for National Laboratories to coordinate S&T use of the National Laboratories.60    
 
The extent to which the National Laboratories are awarded funding through competition is 
unclear.  However, division research leads and others in S&T indicate that funding often is 
directed to a specific laboratory without competition.  Citing the legislative provision giving 
DHS equal footing at the Laboratories with DOE, some officials said that they believe Congress 
intended DHS to use the National Laboratories whenever possible.  They pointed to key benefits 
of working through the National Laboratories, including the Laboratories’ recognized expertise; 
their ability to handle very sensitive classified information and materials; their ability to perform 
the supercomputing often required; and their significantly higher budgets for basic research, 
upon which S&T can build.  They also pointed out that, once funding is given to one of the 
Laboratories, that facility sometimes forms a consortium of what the officials saw as the few 
capable performers in a given area or otherwise involve them in the research without the need for 
S&T to make individual awards.  The division research leads also qualified these comments, 
however, noting that at times the National Laboratories compete for S&T funding, submitting 
white papers or proposals, in some cases even though no formal S&T announcement has 
occurred.  
 
S&T officials are seeking opportunities to leverage funding by building on the work of the 
Laboratory-Directed Research and Development funding available to DOE labs. At the same 
time, DOE officials are interested in working more closely with S&T to understand and to affect 
S&T’s research agenda.  Both are interested in leveraging funding and making the most effective 
and efficient use of their funds while meeting the missions of both agencies.  In 2008, S&T 
began aligning the National Laboratories with its six technical divisions.61 
 
INNOVATION PORTFOLIO  
 
Currently, about four percent of S&T funds are allocated to the Innovation Portfolio, which 
explores “game changer/leap ahead results.”  Though these projects may produce potentially 
high payoffs, they also are high risk. Program officials said they believe funding must be fenced 
off for this type of high-risk research because both the S&T customers and Congress are “risk 
averse.”  The level of funding allocated is an S&T decision, based, at least in part, on a judgment 
                                                 
59 6 U.S.C. 189. 
60 Without this provision, DOE laboratories would be able to accept work from DHS only if it did not interfere with 
DOE’s mission.  See GAO, DHS Needs a Strategy to Use DOE’s Laboratories for Research on Nuclear, Biological, 
and Chemical Detection and Response Technologies, May 2004, GAO-04-653, p. 7.   
61 See Chapter VIII for more information on the alignment of National Laboratories and S&T divisions.  
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about the extent to which DHS customers will accept funding to be directed to research not 
focused on meeting their near-term (transition) needs.   
 
Congress established the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) in 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002.  The Act mandates that, among other things, the Director of 
HSARPA fund homeland security research to: 1.) support both basic and applied research that 
promotes revolutionary changes in technologies; 2.) advance development, testing, and evolution 
of critical technologies; and 3.) accelerate prototyping and deployment of technologies that 
address homeland security vulnerability.62   
 
Projects are expected to deliver either prototypes—within two to five years—or proof-of-concept 
level demonstrations—within one to three years.  In creating the new S&T organization in 2006, 
the U/S included HSARPA in the Innovation Portfolio.  However, the review of ongoing projects 
conducted at that time determined that none of the on-going HSAPRA projects were 
“revolutionary,” so they were assigned to the Transition or Basic Research Portfolios.63  
 
Like basic research, innovation projects are run out of the technical divisions, but unlike basic 
research, they are funded by Innovation/HSARPA. Also, there are no division leads for 
innovation programs.  Program managers responsible for innovation projects report both to the 
Director, Innovation/HSARPA, and to their technical division director.  Some program managers 
are division staff and some are staff of Innovation/HSARPA.64  As shown in Figure 7-2, almost 
three quarters of the performers of innovation projects are from private industry.  
 
 
Figure 7-2:  S&T Innovation/HSARPA Performers 
 
   Source:  Graphic provided by S&T, March 2009 
 
                                                 
62 6 U.S.C. 187 (b) (3). 
63  DHS, OIG, The Science and Technology Directorate’s Processes, p. 15.  The report further states that this left the 
Innovation/HSARPA Portfolio with Small Business Innovative Research Program and the Small Business 
Technology Transfer Program projects, which are not discussed in this chapter and are not included in the four 
percent figure cited for the Innovation Portfolio. 
64 Ibid p. 10. 
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S&T described several sources of guidance and of project recommendations for innovation 
project funding.  They include: 1.) DHS Secretary goals and priorities; 2.) guidance from the 
Office of Management and Budget and the White House Office of Science and Technology 
Policy; 3.) U/S goals;  4.) Congressional drivers;  5.) IPT-identified needs; 6.) DHS component 
input regarding capability gaps; 7.) other agencies, and 8.) proposals submitted in response to 
Broad Area Announcements.  
 
Program officials explained that priorities are established once all potential projects are 
reviewed, primarily by the Director and Deputy Director of Innovations/HSARPA.65  These 
reviews are to ensure that potential projects are credible, mission relevant, and have a risk profile 
appropriate to the Innovation Portfolio. Proposed projects are assessed for cost, schedule, 
programmatic risk—factors such as the organization and practices of the performer—and 
technical risk.  As described by a program official, the recommendations are then vetted through 
the U/S chain of command and final decisions are made by the U/S.  Once projects are selected, 
a program plan is developed and briefed to the Technology Oversight Group.   
 
In August 2008, the DHS Inspector General criticized S&T for a lack of clear processes and 
criteria for selecting projects and performers in this portfolio, in part because selection of the 
initial projects and performers made by the U/S was subject to the appearance of conflict of 
interest.  The report also recommended that project selection responsibility be transferred to the 
Director/HSARPA.66 Commenting on the draft report, S&T described the process it had 
established, specifying that: 1.) the recommendations of the Director of Innovations/HSARPA 
are briefed to the Corporate Board, which can make recommendations for changes; and 2.) the 
Deputy U/S and U/S are then briefed and the U/S then takes proposals to the Technology 
Oversight Group for approval, prioritization, and funding as part of the DHS budget 
development process.67  Nevertheless, the final Inspector General report continued to recommend 
an action plan to clearly document not only the process but also the criteria for identifying, 
prioritizing, and selecting prototype and demonstration projects, and transfer of project selection 
responsibility to the Director of Innovations/HSARPA.68 
 
The high risk nature of these projects requires an ability to identify unproductive projects and to 
terminate them.  Innovation/HSARPA terminated 5 of 18 active projects in 2008.  One S&T 
official said this is the only office that actively terminates projects that are not producing results.   
 
In order to achieve a necessary level of realism, customers must be actively involved in 
prototype demonstrations.  Program officials point to this involvement as evidence that, if 
successfully demonstrated, the prototypes have a realistic possibility of being transitioned.  Over 
the two year history of the Innovation Portfolio one project has transitioned.  This is a forensic 
camera that has been transitioned to the Transportation Security Administration for further 
development. 
                                                 
65 A three member panel, which includes the Deputy for Innovations/HSARPA, reviews all proposals received in 
response to a Broad Area Announcement for mission relevance and credibility before they are included among 
projects to be prioritized. 
66 DHS, OIG, the Science and Technology Directorate’s Processes, p. 28 and 33. 
67 Ibid. p. 35 and 41. 
68 Ibid. p. 35. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The allocation of funding to basic research—in total, across, and within divisions—appears to 
rest primarily on the historical allocation made at the time of the 2006 reorganization.  That 
allocation may have made sense then but may not be appropriate in the future.  There may be no 
permanent “right” level of funding for basic research.  However, it is difficult to confidently 
conclude that the current allocation for basic research S&T-wide, among the divisions, or within 
the individual divisions is appropriate.  Further, S&T has only general criteria for selecting basic 
and innovation research projects and no process by which to prioritize basic research across 
divisions or within divisions.  The experience of the Counter-IED Program—facing difficulties 
setting priorities across divisions—demonstrates the validity of these concerns.  The DHS 
Inspector General raised these issues in August 2008, and recommended that S&T develop clear 
criteria and a repeatable process for selecting basic research and innovation projects. 
 
The insular nature of S&T’s approach to designing and carrying out its research agenda is a 
major concern.  External scientific peer review of proposed S&T basic research is needed. 
Scientific peer review is critical to ensure quality research.  Evaluating the impact of basic 
research is not possible over the short term, so ensuring quality in design and execution of the 
work is critical.  Additionally, competition for funding is a major factor in expanding the pool of 
researchers interested in working in certain areas—in this case homeland security—and 
consequently, expanding the capacity for that research.  But solicitation and peer review of 
competing proposals is not the norm in S&T for selecting performers.  In most cases, decisions 
about the content, quality, and selection of performers are made by small groups or individuals.  
 
Some of the reasons cited for directing work to specific National Laboratories demonstrate the 
insularity of S&T officials’ thinking.  They emphasize the unique abilities of the National 
Laboratories to perform supercomputing and to undertake classified projects.  However, a 
significant, and growing, number of universities have the capacity to carry out both 
supercomputing and classified work.  
 
S&T officials responsible for basic research recognize the need to interact with the wide 
community of researchers doing work relevant to homeland security.  They sponsor and attend 
meetings of various kinds and are developing additional approaches to coordination, such as the 
effort to align S&T divisions with Centers of Excellence and National Laboratories.  These 
alignments have the potential to support more productive relationships, increase S&T’s success 
in leveraging National Laboratory and university work related to homeland security, and increase 
efficiencies.  However, the realignments, along with S&T’s practice of designating a laboratory 
to do the work, may further reduce competition, thereby creating greater insularity that could fail 
to optimize the identification of new ideas and reduce the likelihood of building new capacity for 
homeland security research. 
 
Adding outside input from experts in the many fields pertinent to homeland security research 
will increase S&T’s confidence, and that of its clients and appropriators, that the extent and 
nature of its basic research is thoroughly vetted and that the research being conducted is of the 
highest standards of excellence.   
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7-1.   Develop and implement clear and transparent processes and criteria for identifying 
basic research and innovation needs, prioritizing projects, and selecting performers.  
The work of the recently created Research Council and the results of the effort by the 
National Defense University, if they result in establishment of solid criteria and are 
effective in articulating and carrying out priorities across divisions, may improve S&T’s 
prioritization practices.  However, the insular nature of S&T’s basic research effort 
should be addressed as well.   
 
The U/S can use a variety of approaches to assess and change the total allocation of 
funding to basic research, as well as allocations among divisions.  A sound strategic plan 
would help to guide funding.  The U/S could hold out a portion of funding in the budget 
process to allow higher S&T priorities to be addressed.  A panel of experts could be 
brought together to review the allocations and make recommendations.  
 
7-2. Ensure S&T builds on current efforts to integrate research across the National 
Laboratories, Centers of Excellence, and others.    
Continued and expanded efforts to involve outside scientific experts in setting agendas, 
such as the efforts of the Office of University Programs and meetings among the aligned 
divisions and National Laboratories, could improve the quality of the basic research 
program.  More integrated research should ensure better knowledge transfer and greater 
efficiency of effort and allow external expert views to be considered in decisions about 
the overall program of research, including the adequacy of resource allocations to basic 
and innovation research efforts.  
 
7-3.  Make competitive processes that include external scientific peer review the norm for 
basic research and all other awards as appropriate.  
In addition to processes used by other agencies, such as the National Science Foundation 
and the National Institute of Justice, the process of scientific peer review used in 
selecting the Centers of Excellence could serve as a model to guide future S&T efforts. 
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CHAPTER VIII:  LEVERAGING INVESTMENTS AND AVOIDING 
UNNECESSARY DUPLICATION THROUGH COORDINATION AND 
COLLABORATION 
 
 
The DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) operates in the context of a federal 
homeland security mission that is broad and demanding.  Mission responsibilities, funding 
authority, and other resources are spread across multiple entities within DHS and across the 
federal government.  Also, other countries possess important expertise relevant to accomplishing 
the mission.  It is critical that S&T coordinate its activities externally and seek out opportunities 
for collaboration to identify research gaps, leverage existing research efforts, and avoid 
unnecessary duplication of effort. 
 
This chapter describes and evaluates how the S&T Directorate and its components coordinate 
and collaborate with other DHS R&D components, other federal agencies, and foreign 
governments.  Coordination, for the purposes of this review, includes such things as working 
with other agencies to define each other’s roles and responsibilities, identifying areas for possible 
collaboration, and adapting policies and procedures to enable collaboration.  It may involve 
formal tools and mechanisms, such as Memoranda of Understanding, international agreements, 
and interagency working groups, as well as informal interactions among professional colleagues.  
Collaboration is often used interchangeably with coordination, but is used here to indicate joint 
activity, such as joint funding and conduct of projects.  
 
COORDINATION AND COLLABORATION BETWEEN S&T AND OTHER DHS R&D 
COMPONENTS 
 
The Homeland Security Act gives S&T the responsibility for “coordinating and integrating all 
research, development, demonstration, testing and evaluation activities” within DHS. In addition 
to R&D supported by S&T, nuclear/radiological R&D is supported by the Domestic Nuclear 
Detection Office (DNDO).69  Also, the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Secret Service retain small 
R&D budgets to support work specific to their respective missions.   
 
To help ensure coordination between S&T and DNDO on nuclear/radiological R&D, Congress 
passed the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006.70  This law directs DNDO to 
coordinate with S&T on research related to both agencies’ missions and for the agencies to 
submit a joint annual report to Congress on nuclear and radiological technology strategies and 
plans.  The second annual report was submitted in October 2008.  It does not include a 
substantive discussion of coordination between DNDO and S&T.  It only notes that a chapter on 
radiological and nuclear threats will be included in a revision of S&T’s Coordination of 
                                                 
69 Responsibility for radiological/nuclear countermeasures research was transferred from S&T to DNDO in 2005. 
Radiological/nuclear countermeasures research accounted for 25 percent of total DHS R&D in FY 2008. See 
Appendix B for more details. 
70 PL 109-347 
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Homeland Security Science and Technology,71 planned for release in FY 2010, and that this 
chapter will “align with the Department’s technology roadmap for nuclear and radiological 
detection.” 
    
DNDO officials said that they coordinate very little with S&T on R&D.  The two agencies 
operate in very different technical fields and draw on different expertise.  However, S&T and 
DNDO appear to be working closely in two areas of mutual interest: (1) developing the 
integrated Chemical/Biological/Radiological/Nuclear assessment; and (2) setting standards to 
enable data interchange among first responders responsible for different types of detection.  
 
S&T funding for homeland security R&D has allowed the Secret Service to focus its limited 
R&D resources on its core mission as well as participate in shaping research in technical areas 
relevant to the requirements of the Secret Service and other federal agencies.  The U.S. Coast 
Guard enjoys a good working relationship with S&T as a customer participating in the Capstone 
IPT process. 
 
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION AND COLLABORATION  
 
Interagency coordination is always difficult given the different missions, priorities, legislative 
mandates, presidential directives, and constituency/customer demands to which individual 
agencies must respond.72  Over nine other federal agencies/entities support homeland security 
related R&D.73 While assigned a lead role in coordinating R&D in some areas,74 S&T has no 
direct authority over other agency R&D decision-making and must rely on their willingness to 
cooperate to fulfill this task.  The ability of S&T to play an effective coordinative role is further 
complicated by the fact that it has only the third largest homeland security R&D budget in the 
federal government.75  Thus, S&T has a broad responsibility for coordination with limited 
authority and resources to exert leverage on the actions of its fellow agencies. 
 
To accomplish the difficult task of interagency coordination, S&T personnel have drawn on 
personal and professional ties as well as formal mechanisms to identify opportunities for 
                                                 
71 Coordination of Homeland Security Science and Technology was initially delivered to Congress in December 
2007 and revised in January 2008. It was submitted in partial fulfillment of Section 302 of the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002, which calls for S&T to develop a strategic plan for coordinating homeland security R&D across the 
Federal government.  
72 See, for example, Jennifer Sue Bond, et al., OSTP 2.0 Critical Upgrade:  Enhanced Capacity for White House 
Science and Technology Policymaking:  Recommendations for the Next President, (Washington, DC:  The 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), June 2008, p. 18. 
73 The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) identified nine other federal agencies 
funding at least $1million in homeland security related R&D. Together with DHS, these agencies  account for  over 
99 percent of total federal homeland-security related R&D in FY 2008. Also, DOJ’s National Institute of Justice 
reports funding a small amount of homeland security related R&D. 
74 For instance, DHS is directed to take the lead coordinating role in by Presidential Homeland Security Directives 
and federal statutes in certain areas of chemical and biological defense. DHS mission responsibilities and the role of 
S&T in these areas is discussed in this chapter’s section on interagency coordination and collaboration. 
75 AAAS data show that the three largest funders of federal homeland security related research in FY 2008 are the 
Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Homeland Security, 
in that order. See Appendix B for a more detailed analysis. 
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collaboration and enable coordination. S&T participates in a range of formal coordination 
entities and activities, including interagency committees and working groups, sponsorship of 
interagency meetings and conferences, and joint strategy development.76  To illustrate, Appendix 
E provides a listing of the formal interagency entities in which a sample of S&T components 
participate.   
 
S&T’s role in these different groups varies considerably depending on the field of activity.  In 
some fields, S&T has taken a lead role in coordination reflecting an officially designated 
leadership role or particular expertise. In other cases, S&T simply participates in order to follow 
developments and identify opportunities. 
 
While S&T coordinates with many federal agencies, much of its interaction is centered on: (1) 
the Department of Defense, the second largest funder of homeland security-related R&D after 
Health and Human Services (HHS); (2) HHS and other agencies related to S&T’s responsibilities 
for chemical and biological defense; and (3) the Department of Energy, which through its 
National Laboratories is the second largest performer of S&T R&D after industry. 
 
Department of Defense  
 
S&T interaction with DOD is broad-based.  The extent of interaction between S&T and DOD 
reflects the range of technical fields in which both agencies are active and intersections between 
their homeland defense and homeland security missions. 
 
Much of the S&T leadership, including the heads of the Interagency and First Responder 
Division and the Portfolio offices—Research, Innovation, and Transition—came to S&T from 
the military R&D community.  They have been able to exploit their professional relationships 
and familiarity with the military R&D community to identify targets of opportunity and enable 
collaborations.  
 
Also, S&T leadership has been able to take advantage of some formal coordinating mechanisms. 
One such coordination mechanism is the Capability Development Working Group (CDWG).  
The CDWG is a forum at the DOD and DHS Undersecretary level that is concerned primarily 
with acquisition, but also addresses science and technology issues.  Members are the DOD U/S 
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, the DHS U/S for Management, and the DHS U/S for 
S&T.  The CDWG meets quarterly to discuss areas of mutual interest and opportunities for 
strengthening coordination and collaboration.  A broad range of officials are invited to the 
quarterly meetings, including leadership from Defense Research and Engineering, the United 
States Northern Command (NORTHCOM), and DHS agencies such as the U.S. Coast Guard, 
Customs and Border Protection, and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, depending on the 
issues at hand.  The CDWG is supported by a staff group that briefs leadership on issues to be 
considered at CDWG meetings.  
 
                                                 
76 CRS, The DHS Directorate of Science and Technology, p. 32. 
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S&T also participates in a number of working level coordination entities.  One of these groups is 
the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG),77 which covers a range of technical areas and is 
charged in part with addressing the technology needs of state and local first responders.  TSWG 
is an interagency forum funded by DOD and the State Department that develops “dual use” 
technologies78 based on requirements solicited from federal agencies and state and local first 
responder organizations. S&T participates primarily in two technical groups: (1) Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures; and (2) Explosives Detection.  
 
The 1401 Program, established under Section 1401 of the 2003 Defense Authorization Act,79 is 
focused primarily on identifying and transferring technologies in DOD laboratories that meet the 
requirements of other federal agencies and state and local first responders.  S&T works with the 
1401 Program to communicate customer requirements, identify technologies of possible interest, 
and enable technology transfer.  S&T also participates in working level coordination groups 
organized around particular technical areas such as Counter-IED. 
 
S&T works closely with DOD to identify opportunities for collaboration in technical areas where 
S&T’s homeland security mission intersects with the homeland defense mission of DOD.  A 
particular focus of this interaction is NORTHCOM, which is engaged in a range of technical 
fields related to its homeland defense mission.  NORTHCOM and S&T have briefed each other 
on their respective portfolios, and S&T will participate in NORTHCOM’s annual field testing of 
early stage technologies in June.  
 
At least five of the six technical divisions, the Office of Innovation, and the Special Programs 
Division are participating as a partial funder in collaborative R&D projects with DOD agencies.  
Collaborative R&D projects with DOD agencies account for at least half of total collaborative 
projects by each of these S&T components.  Also, S&T components are involved in 
collaboration with DOD agencies where DOD or S&T share expertise and other capabilities, but 
no funding is exchanged.  For instance, the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command is 
providing S&T with technical expertise and contracting support for cargo security IPT projects. 
 
HHS and other Federal Agencies with Responsibilities for Chemical and Biological Defense 
 
Chemical and biological defense related R&D is the largest focus of S&T R&D spending, 
accounting for 25 percent in FY 2009.80  The organization of S&T biological and chemical R&D 
activities and its coordination with federal agencies reflects direction from four Homeland 
Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs)81 and federal statutes that define the roles and 
                                                 
77 TSWG is part of the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities. 
78 This term refers to technologies with both military and civilian applications. 
79 The Act (P.L. 107–314) mandated that the Secretary of Defense designate a senior official to oversee the transfer 
of DOD’s technology to federal, state, and local first responders. Congress was concerned that DOD’s investment 
was not being adequately leveraged by others, especially first responders.  
80 See Appendix B. 
81 The four HSPDs are: (1) HSPD 9: The Defense of United States Agriculture and Food; (2) HSPD 10: Biodefense 
for the 21st Century; (3) HSPD 18: Medical Countermeasures against Weapons of Mass Destruction; and (4) HSPD 
22: Chemical Defense (Classified). A full listing of HSPDs, including abstracts and full text of the unclassified 
directives is provided on the DHS website at http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/editorial_0607.shtm.  
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responsibilities of DHS with respect to defense against biological, chemical, radiological, and 
nuclear threats, including naturally emerging infectious diseases and pandemic threats.  
 
Interagency coordination is discussed with regard to selected S&T responsibilities: 
 
• Assessing biological and chemical threats to inform the development of countermeasures 
by HHS. 
 
The Project Bioshield Act of 2004 gave DHS the lead in determining material threats to 
public health and national security.82  The Material Threat Determinations do not address 
prioritization, which is done by DHS in the form of risk assessments by S&T.  These risk 
assessments are tools for other agencies to use in prioritizing threats and, in the case of 
HHS, to inform decisions about vaccine and other countermeasures development.  The 
three HSPDs that direct DHS to conduct risk assessments are:  (1) HSPD-10, which 
mandates a biological threat risk assessment every two years (the first was completed in 
2006); (2) HSPD-18, which directs DHS to conduct an integrated assessment of 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear threats; and (3) HSPD-22, which directs 
DHS to conduct a chemical threat risk assessment. 
 
An important area of coordination between DHS and HHS is participation in the risk 
assessment process.  A particular focus of coordination is communication between the 
National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) and HHS’s 
Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA). BARDA is 
charged with developing medical countermeasures and must be able to communicate its 
requirements effectively as a customer of NBACC.   
 
S&T also coordinates with the National Institutes of Health (NIH) on biodefense research 
in a number of other ways.  For example, the Enhanced Threat Agent Working Group 
examines issues and identifies gaps in scientific knowledge for NBACC.  An important 
issue is defining and assigning classified research that NIH does not do as a matter of 
policy. 
 
• Developing monitoring and detection technologies and operational guidance to decision-
makers.  
 
S&T coordinates primarily with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in 
the development of detection technologies and operational guidance for decision-makers 
on how to evaluate and act on detection information.  Also, S&T has coordinated with 
CDC in the development of a National Laboratory response network.  This includes the 
development of common capabilities and operating procedures. 
 
• Developing technologies and operational guidance for decision-makers to enable 
effective decontamination and recovery following attacks. 
 
                                                 
82 P.L. 108-276. 
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S&T coordinates with EPA, the overall lead in this area, and DOD in planning and 
developing operational guidance and training decision-makers and first responders. 
 
• Coordination of animal disease R&D 
 
Under HSPD 9, DHS has the lead responsibility for coordination in the field of 
Agriculture Defense. S&T coordinates primarily with the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
in this mission area and directs the Joint Agriculture Defense Organization (formulated 
by the National Science and Technology Council), which is responsible for coordinating 
research in this mission area.  
 
S&T has collaborated with the U.S. Department of Agriculture in the development of 
requirements for the design of a new research facility, the National Bio-Agriculture Facility. 
S&T’s Office of National Labs is responsible for the design and construction of research 
facilities and also was involved in developing the NBACC discussed above. 
 
The Chemical and Biological Division is a partial funder of ten collaborative R&D projects with 
other agencies: five with DOD agencies and one with DNDO through its Chem/Bio R&D 
branch; and four projects with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, NSF, and NIH through its 
Agricultural Defense branch. 
 
Department of Energy 
 
DOE national laboratories are major performers of R&D funded by DHS S&T. In FY 2009, they 
account for 20 percent of S&T’s Transition portfolio spending and 26 percent of its Research 
portfolio spending.83  S&T’s efforts to coordinate with DOE are focused primarily on the 
efficient and effective utilization of DOE national laboratories.  
 
The Office of National Labs (ONL) is responsible for coordination regarding S&T’s use of the 
National Laboratories and other federal government laboratories.  ONL is working with DOE on 
two coordination initiatives.  Both involve discussions between S&T and DOE at the Under 
Secretary level.  The first initiative aims to “align” DOE National Laboratories with S&T 
technical divisions based on matches between the mission requirements of the divisions and the 
technical capabilities of the various National Laboratories.  Toward this end, an agreement was 
reached that allowed each Laboratory to pick up to three technical focus areas that best reflect its 
capabilities.  ONL then hosted meetings of staff from the technical divisions and the self-selected 
National Laboratories organized around the technical focus areas of the individual technical 
divisions.  The intent of these “aligned laboratory meetings” is for individual technical divisions 
to learn more about what the National Laboratories have to offer and for the Laboratories to learn 
more about the technical divisions’ needs that can inform project development and performer 
selection.  Aligned laboratory meetings have been hosted by ONL for each of the six technical 
divisions.  The initial success of aligned laboratory meetings in facilitating discussion led ONL 
also to include staff from S&T-funded Centers of Excellence associated with individual technical 
divisions.  
 
                                                 
83 See Appendix B. 
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The second initiative is to develop a mutually acceptable arrangement whereby S&T may work 
with individual National Laboratories to identify opportunities for collaboration on research 
projects funded through Laboratory-Directed R&D (LDRD) budgets.  Each Laboratory is 
authorized by law to set aside up to eight percent of its budget in a discretionary fund for 
supporting basic research. R&D at the Laboratories is funded by DOE and other agency 
customers reflecting a variety of programmatic objectives.  The Laboratories prize the LDRD 
budget, which allows them to support innovative research and build future lab capabilities. DOE 
officials encouraged S&T officials to look more broadly for opportunities to leverage DOE 
investments in basic research, including the large basic research portfolio funded by DOE’s 
Office of Science. 
 
An important mechanism for coordinating S&T interaction with DOE is the Business Forum, an 
interagency group hosted by DOE’s Office of Counterterrorism in the National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA).  NNSA has jurisdiction for coordinating between DHS and DOE on a 
broad range of issues, including access to the National Laboratories.84  This group meets “as 
needed,” to solve specific problems or identify better ways of doing business.  Invitees include: 
DOE (represented by the Office of Science), NNSA, S&T, as well as other DHS agencies, 
depending on the issue at hand. S&T is represented by the Director of the Office of National 
Labs.  
 
Some issues handled by this group include: (1) developing standard requirements for DHS 
contracting with the National Laboratories; and (2) resolving a dispute over liability assumed by 
DHS in contracting for work at the National Laboratories. 
 
S&T’s Office of Innovation and the Command, Control, and Interoperability Division (together 
with the Infrastructure and Geophysical Division) are each funding collaborative projects with 
DOE at the National Laboratories.  The projects relate to security and reliability of the national 
electrical grid.  
 
Coordination and Collaboration with Other Federal Agencies 
 
S&T coordinates with a number of other federal agencies in various technical areas.  Although 
not a large funder of homeland security related research, the Justice Department’s National 
Institute of Justice (NIJ) is an important partner in the development of technologies for first 
responders.  NIJ coordinates with S&T through the internal DOD 1401 Program Working Group 
and the Technical Support Working Group discussed above, as well as the Interagency Council 
for Applied Homeland Security Technology.85  NIJ also participates in S&T’s Integrated Product 
Teams doing work related to first responders. 
                                                 
84 Responsibility for coordination across DOE National Laboratories is placed within NNSA, because three of the 
Laboratories, which are devoted primarily to nuclear weapons research, must operate under NNSA authority by law. 
85 The Interagency Council for Applied Homeland Security Technology (ICAHST) is an unofficial body. The 
ICAHST “consists of US Government sponsors of homeland security and counterterrorism information technology 
research from the Department of Homeland Security, the Defense Department, the Intelligence Community, various 
Law Enforcement Agencies, and Federal Civil Agencies. The ICAHST provides its membership with a government-
wide forum to discuss critical homeland security and counterterrorism issues related to information technology, 
convey the technology research and development needs of their respective communities, and describe current 
research and development initiatives, pilot experiments and proposed courses of action for future research 
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S&T participates in a number of interagency groups concerned with biometrics and plays a lead 
coordinating role in this area, in particular as it relates to people screening.  A representative of 
S&T’s Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division co-chairs the RDT&E86  Coordination 
working group of the National Science and Technology Council’s Technology Subcommittee on 
Biometrics and Identity Management. 87 
 
Another example of interagency coordination is provided by S&T’s participation in the 
interagency working group concerned with the development of Multi-Phase Array Radar 
technology, which is intended to develop a next-generation radar system that can address 
multiple agency requirements related to detection and tracking of weather events, commercial 
aviation, and aerial threats.  Participating agencies include the National Oceanic Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and DOD agencies. 
 
S&T technical divisions and the Office of Innovation are funding more than ten collaborative 
R&D projects, in addition to those related to S&T’s interaction with DOD, DOE, and HHS and 
other agencies concerning chemical and biological defense. Partner agencies include NSF, 
NASA, NIST, NOAA, FAA, and several intelligence agencies.  Collaborations range from a 
biometrics project with the Intelligence Advanced Projects Research Agency88 to a broader 
collaboration with NSF to administer and support a joint program for basic research on computer 
analysis of data sets and visualization of data.  
 
Allocation of Responsibility within S&T for Interagency Coordination 
 
Interagency coordination is the responsibility of various parts of S&T, depending on the level 
and focus of the coordination.  Individual technical divisions are engaged in significant 
interagency coordination in their respective spheres, but the Interagency and First Responder 
Programs Division (IAD) and other divisions handle coordination with agencies and programs 
engaged in technical activities that relate to multiple technical divisions or that demand special 
arrangements. 
 
Primary responsibility for coordination of interagency liaison at the corporate level of S&T is 
vested in the IAD.  However, other divisions have significant assigned roles and responsibilities.  
The Office of National Labs is responsible for coordinating with DOE to ensure full and 
effective utilization of the National Laboratories by DHS.  The Special Programs Division 
                                                                                                                                                             
investments. By participating in the ICAHST, coalition sponsors obtain and share valuable information that will help 
focus their homeland security research programs, identify potential interagency collaboration opportunities, identify 
high-leverage, high-value research targets of opportunity, and minimize duplication of research.” (Charter, June 20, 
2007) The chair of the ICAHST rotates among Council members. An NIJ representative currently chairs the 
ICAHST. 
86 Research, Development, Testing , and Evaluation. 
87 The National Science and Technology Council was established by Executive Order on November 23, 1993. This 
Cabinet-level Council is the principal means within the executive branch to coordinate science and technology 
policy across the diverse entities that make up the Federal research and development enterprise. Information on 
NSTC committees can be found on the internet at http://www.ostp.gov/cs/nstc/committees. 
88 The Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency is an R&D agency within the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence. 
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coordinates with other federal agencies for those government initiatives and programs identified as 
especially sensitive, classified, or deserving of extraordinary security protection. 
 
IAD coordination efforts focus primarily on work with DOD agencies, including Combatant 
Commands, especially NORTHCOM, and with state and local first responder agencies.  The 
Office of Transition, which is responsible for addressing first responder technology 
requirements, also plays a coordinating role with two DOD entities—the Technical Support 
Working Group and the DOD 1401 Working Group—whose missions include addressing first 
responder technology needs.  
 
The allocation of responsibility within S&T for interagency coordination and its rationale are not 
obvious from looking at publicly available materials.  And, interviews with the principals did not 
always provide a clear-cut explanation.  Assigned responsibilities of IAD, the Office of 
Transition, and the Special Programs Division are stated in the Science and Technology 
Organization Regulation Manual (STORM), but this document has not been released publicly 
and its statements of responsibility do not fully reflect practice and are scattered among the 
descriptions of each office’s responsibilities.  
 
The allocation of responsibility between IAD and the Office of Transition for coordinating with 
the DOD entities charged with the development and transfer of technology to meet first 
responder needs is not entirely clear.  The recent expansion of IAD’s role in reaching out to the 
first responder community could complicate S&T’s coordination with DOD in this area if the 
respective roles of IAD and the Office of Transition are not clearly defined.  
 
Interagency coordination at the corporate level of S&T lacks a strategic orientation. Coordination 
appears to be ad hoc, in response to opportunities as they arise.  This reflects in part the scale of 
the coordination task and limited staff. Also, S&T has not yet developed a strategic plan for 
coordinating with federal agencies.  However, as noted earlier in this chapter, S&T has 
developed and is revising a planning document, the Coordination of Homeland Security Science 
and Technology (“Coordination Plan”).  Although, it is not the national strategic plan called for 
in the Homeland Security Act, it could be considered a first step in that direction.89  S&T 
officials responsible for interagency coordination were unaware of the Coordination Plan. 
 
Avoiding Unnecessary Duplication and Leveraging Investments 
 
An important objective of coordination is to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, especially 
given S&T’s relatively small budget.  However, it is not appropriate to eliminate all areas of 
overlap.  For example, DOD and DHS may be working on similar technologies, but with 
differing requirements for military and civilian applications.  In addition, multiple efforts can 
improve innovation, as long as it is being carried out with an awareness of what others are doing 
and with a clear rationale.90 
 
                                                 
89 The document’s foreword describes it as “a descriptive baseline for homeland security research and development 
measures across the Federal government. 
90 These rationales include the replication of research to validate results or the pursuit of alternative approaches to 
see which is superior. 
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The Academy team probed the issue of unnecessary duplication in all interviews with officials at 
other federal agencies, and with outside experts.  Other federal agency officials as well as 
independent experts interviewed generally reported that S&T is doing a good job of identifying 
and coordinating with the relevant entities in the different technical areas in which S&T supports 
R&D.  None identified instances of unnecessary duplication of effort. 
 
Also, internal DHS agency customers generally are satisfied with S&T’s efforts to coordinate 
with other agencies, avoid duplication of effort, and keep components informed of related R&D, 
as well as conferences, seminars, and product demos.  In fact, some customers said S&T was 
uniquely situated and qualified to perform this function and that S&T had been very proactive in 
avoiding duplication and making sure their projects were complementary with other work being 
done.  
 
Whatever frustrations agency officials may express, they agree that interaction with S&T has 
become easier and more productive since the reorganization of S&T in 2006-2007.  A common 
reason given was that it was more clear who at S&T they needed to work with. 
 
S&T technical divisions and the Office of Innovation are participating in almost 40 collaborative 
projects with other federal agencies in FY 2009, thus leveraging their investments.  All of 
Innovation’s R&D spending goes to collaborative interagency projects.91 
 
Many federal agency officials identified collaborative R&D projects as an important result of 
coordination with S&T. Without exception, these officials indicated that the collaboration was 
going well.  However, none of the projects were complete at the time, and interviewees could not 
point to concrete outputs.  Some officials said that good experience in collaborating with S&T 
had led to broader cooperation, on additional projects and other activities.  
 
 
INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION AND COLLABORATION  
 
In recent years, there has been a trend across the federal government to work more closely with 
international partners.  The International Cooperative Programs Office (ICPO) was established 
by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.92  The Act 
assigned the following responsibilities to the ICPO:  developing mechanisms for international 
cooperation on R&D; setting priorities for international cooperation; identifying international 
partners; and engaging in activities to address identified priorities.  In carrying out this mission, 
the office is to coordinate with the Department of State, DOD, DOE, and other relevant agencies 
or interagency entities.   
 
ICPO sponsors and participates in annual international conferences that help “set the global 
agenda,” facilitate scientist and engineer exchange programs, and develop cooperative programs 
between S&T technical divisions and partner countries for conducting joint projects or “in 
                                                 
91 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 specifically gives the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (HSARPA) the authority to enter into joint projects with agencies conducting related research.   
92 P.L. 110-53 
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response to a crisis.”93  Information exchange is further facilitated by participation in dozens of 
workshops and meetings, travel to foreign countries, and S&T’s international liaisons, of which 
there are now two—one covering Europe and one covering Pacific-Asia. 
 
A major objective of ICPO is to identify science and technology in foreign countries that 
supports the work of S&T’s six technical divisions and three portfolios.  It is important to draw 
on the expertise of countries that have more experience than the U.S. in particular areas (e.g., 
Israel and the United Kingdom regarding IEDs).   
 
Substantive collaboration between the United States and a foreign government generally requires 
a bilateral agreement.  Bilateral agreements facilitate information exchange and cooperative 
activities by providing for appropriate security arrangements and intellectual property protections 
to be undertaken by both parties.  Also, by providing a framework for information exchange, 
these agreements help avoid unnecessary duplication of effort.  Bilateral agreements are intended 
for use by all federal agencies, not just DHS. Therefore, they are vetted by all relevant federal 
agencies before receiving approval. 
 
Since 2004, ICPO has entered into international agreements with eight countries:  Australia; 
Canada; Israel; Mexico; Singapore; Sweden; the United Kingdom; and France.  Another is being 
negotiated with Germany.  The agreements, which are very similar, have the broad purpose of 
facilitating information exchange and cooperative activities.  They also list the types of joint 
activities in which the countries will engage (e.g., threat assessments, testing and evaluation, and 
exchange of best practices) and categories of potential joint projects (including research projects, 
task forces, product demonstrations, etc.).  Typically, these foreign partners do not have agencies 
equivalent to DHS, but usually have agencies with similar missions to S&T or other DHS 
components, such as FEMA.  In addition to bilateral agreements with individual governments, 
ICPO is negotiating an agreement with the European Union to facilitate access to information 
about homeland security related research being funded by the European Union.94  
 
ICPO awards grants, primarily for basic research, at universities.  Funded projects must be 
conducted by a partnership between U.S. and foreign institutions and may include non-university 
partners.  Proposals are solicited by grant announcements, which are posted on the internet at 
www.grants.gov.  ICPO is now in its third round of grant competitions.   
 
Table 8-1 summarizes the awards ICPO made in FY 2008.  S&T plans to fund six to eight 
additional international projects in FY 2009. The ICPO FY 2009 budget for grants is $1.2 
million. 
                                                 
93 DHS, S&T, Science and Technology for a Safer Nation, March 2008, p. 16. 
94 This research program has a budget of 1 billion Euros (approximately $1.3 billion as of April 29, 2009). 
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Table 8-1:  ICPO Awards in FY 2008 
 
Project Title Primary Institution 
International 
Component S&T Division 
Intelligent Food Defense Systems 
for International Supply Chains:  
The Case of Mexican Fresh Product 
in the United States. 
Arizona State 
University 
Caades/CIDH, CIAD 
Unidad Cullacán, and 
Tecnológico de Monterrey, 
Mexico 
Chem/Bio 
Visual Analytics Applied to 
Automated Multimedia Content 
Analysis 
University of North 
Carolina at 
Charlotte 
University of Konstanz, 
Germany 
Command, Control, and 
Interoperability 
Novel Explosives Sensor Using 
Signal-Amplifying Molecularly 
Imprinted Conducting Polymer 
University of 
Connecticut 
Nanyang Technological 
University, Singapore 
Explosives 
The Impact of Israeli 
Counterterrorism Interventions on 
Rate and Intensity of Terrorist 
Activity:  Hazard Modeling and 
Time Series Approaches 
University of 
Maryland COE 
(START) 
Institute for 
Counterterrorism, Herzliya, 
Israel 
Human 
Factors/Behavioral 
Sciences 
Developing a New Glass Window 
Panel for Security Against Projectile 
and Small Explosion Threats at 
Close Proximity 
University of 
Missouri 
Monash University, 
Australia 
Infrastructure and 
Geophysical 
 
The ICPO also provides limited funding for collaborative projects, such as workshops. It has an 
FY 2009 budget of $300,000 for collaborative projects. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Academy team probed the issue of unnecessary duplication in all interviews with officials at 
other federal agencies, and with outside experts.  Interviewees generally are satisfied that S&T is 
doing a good job of identifying and exploiting opportunities to leverage investments, and 
identified no instances of unnecessary duplication of effort.  However, the team identified some 
opportunities for improvement related to the allocation of responsibility within S&T for 
interagency coordination. 
 
The allocation of responsibility within S&T for interagency coordination and its rationale are not 
obvious from looking at publicly available materials.  Assigned responsibilities of IAD, the 
Office of Transition, and the Special Programs Division are in the Science and Technology 
Organization Regulation Manual (STORM), but this document has not been released publicly 
and its statements of responsibility do not fully reflect practice and are scattered among the 
descriptions of each office’s responsibilities.  
 
The allocation of responsibility between IAD and the Office of Transition for coordinating with 
the DOD entities charged with the development and transfer of technology to meet first 
responder needs is not entirely clear.  The recent expansion of IAD’s role in reaching out to the 
first responder community could complicate S&T’s coordination with DOD in this area if the 
respective roles of IAD and the Office of Transition are not clearly defined.  
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Interagency coordination at the corporate level of S&T lacks a strategic orientation. Coordination 
appears to be ad hoc, in response to opportunities as they arise.  This reflects in part the scale of 
the coordination task and limited staff.  While S&T does not yet have a strategic plan for 
coordinating with other federal agencies, it has developed an interagency coordination planning 
document for Congress. S&T officials responsible for interagency coordination were unaware of 
this document.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8-1. Provide a single, unified explanation of the allocation of responsibilities in S&T for 
interagency coordination at S&T in a readily available public document. 
S&T should clearly define component roles and responsibilities for interagency 
coordination and communicate this information internally and externally.  One approach 
would be to publicly release a single unified explanation in a revised version of the 
STORM. 
 
8-2. Clarify the allocation of responsibility within S&T for interagency coordination 
about the development and transfer of technologies related to first responder needs. 
IAD and the Office of Transition should work together to define their respective roles and 
responsibilities for interagency coordination relating to first responder technology needs.  
The resulting definition should be included in the unified statement of responsibilities in 
a revised STORM. 
 
8-3. Improve the internal communication about coordination planning and work to 
ensure responsibility for interagency coordination reflects the strategic plan when it 
is developed.  
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CHAPTER IX:  PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
 
 
Program monitoring and evaluation are both important performance measurement strategies to 
ensure program efficiency and effectiveness.  The former is intended to track program progress 
to ensure that they do not go off course and to hold contractors or others accountable for 
achieving goals.  Program expenditures are also monitored to ensure spending is appropriate and 
timely.95  Thus program monitoring is an ongoing process that spans the timeframes of entire 
projects and is not a one-time undertaking.   
 
Program evaluations can be either process or impact assessments.  Process evaluations focus on 
whether and how a program is delivering what it was expected to deliver and whether there are 
more efficient ways of making progress.  Impact evaluations determine whether the project has 
achieved the desired result.  Thus, impact evaluations focus on what happens after a program is 
completed and whether it has had the planned effect. 
 
PROJECT MONITORING 
 
Program managers across the six S&T divisions vary somewhat in how they monitor the projects 
within their programs, although all engage in a combination of site visits, phone and e-mail 
contact, and review of written progress reports to assess progress.  Each project also has project-
level milestones that program managers track.96 Program managers periodically report to IPTs on 
project and program status. In addition, every six months the U/S S&T conducts program review 
meetings with each IPT to discuss selected projects. 
 
As described by officials in the Chemical/Biological Division, program managers attend an on-
site kick-off meeting with R&D performers (contractors or grantees) when the contract or grant 
is awarded.  They may revisit at intervals over the course of the project.  The frequency of visits 
depends on project complexity, level of experience with the performer, and availability of travel 
funds, among other factors.  A major purpose of the initial meeting, according the Division 
officials, is to ensure an understanding of requirements for regular progress reporting to S&T.   
 
On a monthly basis, Chemical/Biological Division project managers review short summary 
reports that are submitted by performers.  These reports include a discussion of progress, 
problems encountered, and intended activities for the following month.  This performer input, 
along with information from phone and e-mail contacts, is used by project managers to compile 
Monthly Reports and Quarterly Reports for the division.  Project managers also participate in 
“critical design reviews” that are intended as a final review for all project decisions and to assess 
their appropriateness.   
 
Two Chemical/Biological and two Explosives projects were selected for review to determine 
whether project monitoring had occurred as described by S&T. The projects were selected from 
                                                 
95 Financial monitoring is discussed in Appendix F.   
96 Project managers are likely to have multiple projects within a program with a single set of overall goals.  Some 
project managers have monitoring responsibilities for multiple programs that can each have multiple projects.   
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a list of Chemical/Biological and Explosives projects that had been on-going for at least a year, 
did not contain classified content, and were not known to have other anomalies that would render 
them unrepresentative of Chemical/Biological and Explosives projects in general.  The final 
project selection was by agreement with S&T.  The Chemical/Biological Division provided 
access to project files, and the review confirmed that the monitoring occurred and was 
appropriately documented.  However, the Explosives Division provided examples of monitoring 
documents, rather than the complete monitoring file.  This approach did not provide sufficient 
basis for comment on the thoroughness of monitoring activities in the Explosives Division. 
 
S&T’S USE OF MILESTONES TO MEASURE PROGRESS  
 
S&T uses milestones to measure progress on different levels.  At the most basic level, program 
managers set and monitor specific project milestones as part of oversight of individual projects.  
Milestones at a more macro level are used to gauge the performance of research programs that 
include multiple projects.  Milestones are intended to be measurable indicators of progress 
towards a goal.  Although they can be either qualitative or quantitative, they should be specific 
enough so that they allow an assessment of real progress.   
 
S&T has used milestones to track progress at least since February 2004, when, in Congressional 
testimony, the then U/S of S&T discussed S&T performance goals and laid out specific 
milestones for S&T programs in a number of subject areas.  For example, for the Chemical High 
Explosives project, the FY 2005 milestone was “pilot test of standoff detection technologies,” 
and for work on biological countermeasures an FY 2005 milestone was “establishment of a 
national capability in biodefense analysis and agro-terrorism countermeasures.”97 
 
In these early years, S&T milestones were criticized as inconsistent across portfolios, too output 
oriented, not appropriately tracked, and changed without consequence.  DHS management 
expressed concern about the need for S&T to make progress in aligning its portfolio with overall 
agency strategic goals and encouraged S&T to develop meaningful milestones as part of the 
effort to achieve that outcome.  After the 2006 reorganization that established a new division 
structure, additional emphasis was placed on developing and tracking milestones.   
 
Program managers received training on how to set appropriate milestones for projects, and S&T 
has made an effort to standardize project milestones to make them as consistent as feasible.  S&T 
is currently pilot testing a new project data collection and analysis data base, the Project 
Execution System, that is intended to make it easier for both program managers and division 
management to monitor milestones.98 
 
The box below outlines basic requirements for effective milestones that can both assist a project 
or program in achieving goals and provide the foundation for measuring progress over time. 
                                                 
97 These are only examples of milestones described in this testimony.  The entire context for these milestones, 
including the relevant long-term performance goals, performance measures, and the FY 2005 targets are provided in 
the February 25, 2004 testimony of U/S Charles McQueary before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and 
Research and Development, U.S. House of Representatives.   
98 The new system is intended to facilitate the collection and analysis of multiple workflow indicators.  Development 
of this data base was initiated in September 2008 and it is unlikely to be operational until FY 2010. 
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In more recent years, S&T has improved the 
clarity of its milestones.  A comparison of 
the milestones enumerated in U/S S&T’s 
2004 Congressional testimony with the 
milestones listed in the 2007 Five Year Plan 
shows improvement in developing 
milestones that measure progress towards 
goals.99  Examples of improved milestone 
formulation from the current Five Year Plan 
are: 
 
For the Explosives Standards Program 
 
• Milestone—Complete the 
development of trace explosive 
standards test materials for RDX and 
C4 explosives. 
 
For a Center of Excellence program for 
Border Security and Immigration 
 
• Milestone—Develop a framework to 
inform DHS policymakers with 
empirical immigration research to 
increase the efficiency of 
immigration enforcement. 
 
For the Infrastructure/Geophysical Standards 
Program 
 
• Develop protocols for the testing and evaluation of protective equipment. 
 
It is difficult to determine the extent to which S&T milestones are reasonable and stretch goals, 
either at the project or the program level, because necessary detailed data on milestone 
achievement has not yet been collected.  Recently, more emphasis has been placed on diagnosing 
the reasons for missing milestones before setting new ones, and an S&T official also said that 
they are continuing to work on improving project milestones.  However, systematic information 
is not being collected to build a body of experience that could fine-tune milestone setting and 
assessment to understand underlying factors that prevent the meeting of milestones and to lay the 
groundwork for establishing appropriate consequences for meeting, or not meeting, milestones.  
S&T officials indicated that, to date, consequences for failing to meet milestones have been 
minimal.  In many cases milestones are pushed forward when it becomes evident they will not be 
met. 
                                                 
99 Hundreds of milestones are listed in the Five Year Plan.  Some are more specific and measurable than others.   
Requirements 
For Effective Milestones 
 
Valid: Milestones, whether for measuring 
progress on a project or higher level program of 
work, must be valid measures of progress.   To 
be valid, a milestone must state a single 
objective to be achieved in clear, concise 
language.  A milestone need not be completion 
of a project, but should be an unambiguous 
indicator of progress.  Milestones that are 
vague, such as “start to develop,” “improve 
capability,” or “make progress on planning…” do 
not allow for a clear determination of whether 
they are met because “start,” “improve,” and 
“make progress” are in the eyes of the beholder 
and can have multiple interpretations.  
Milestones that involve completion of more than 
one task can be improved if they are divided to 
focus on completion of a single task.   
 
Reasonable:  Milestones must represent 
reasonable, but stretch goals, for achievement 
of objectives.    “Easy” milestones that everyone 
meets or “hard” milestones that are almost never 
met are both problematic.  Tracking milestones 
over time, and analysis of that information, can 
provide the basis for setting milestones at 
reasonable levels.  
 
Consequences:  Milestones must have 
consequences.  If missing a milestone merely 
results in setting a new milestone, then there is 
no incentive to take them seriously. 
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PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION 
 
DHS has been less attentive to issues of overall performance assessment and evaluation—
assessment of outputs and impacts—for both for S&T as a whole and for individual divisions 
and programs, than to issues of progress and expenditures.  With few exceptions, S&T does not 
involve outside scientific experts to help assess and evaluate the overall performance of its work, 
either at an individual project level or more comprehensively.  S&T is working, however, to 
improve its performance assessment metrics and has enlisted the help of outside experts. 
 
S&T-wide and Program Reviews 
 
The Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee (HSSTAC) provides 
advice to S&T, including identifying potential research projects, and conducting an annual 
review of S&T performance.  The Annual Performance Report to the Office of Management and 
Budget under the Government Performance and Results Act also reports the status of efforts 
against articulated metrics and targets for key S&T divisions and offices.  
  
Advisory Committee Performance Review 
 
HSSTAC’s size and membership is congressionally mandated.  It has 20 members who are 
appointed by the U/S for S&T.  Membership includes scientists, engineers, and medical 
researchers as well as first responders and representatives of organizations that represent first 
responders and citizen groups. The members serve three-year terms.  The Advisory Committee 
meets quarterly as a whole, and its three panels, meet as often as monthly.  The three existing 
panels address the following topics: 
 
• Annual assessment of S&T programs (required by Congress); 
• S&T’s response to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 (Cyber Security); and 
• Maritime Counter-IED 
 
The deliberations of the panels are closed.  However, a portion of virtually every quarterly 
meeting is open to the public. 
 
According to an S&T official, the annual program assessment conducted by the Advisory 
Committee compares the composition of S&T’s portfolio of projects to the requirements 
submitted by the Capstones in order to identify gaps and projects that could fill them, as well as 
to identify duplicative efforts and “missed opportunities.”  In preparing the annual assessments, 
the Committee interviews the portfolio directors, technical division heads, IPT leads, and others 
with an interest and role in S&T.  The most recent annual assessment was completed in October 
2008, but is still undergoing internal S&T review as of May 2009.100   
 
An S&T official said that S&T management considers the Committee’s advice when making 
various decisions, although the impact is not always evident.  One exception is the creation of the 
                                                 
100 A program official said that, in the future, the Program Assessment Panel will assess two to three Capstone IPTs 
per year.   
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Counter-IED Program Executive Office, which S&T created in response to a Committee report 
indicating the need for S&T to look at counter-IEDs from a domestic perspective.  
 
Annual Performance Report 
 
As required under the Government Performance and Results Act, S&T establishes high-level 
metrics and reports progress against targets as part of an annual reporting process.  Major 
programs establish and report on metrics that are combined into an S&T-wide report.   
 
In its 2008 Annual Performance Report, S&T reported on 21 metrics.  At least one metric was 
reported for each of 11 S&T divisions, offices, or programs.101  Of the 18 metrics for which 
progress against targets was reported, S&T met targets for 15.  
 
About half of the metrics reported were output-related, such as:  
 
• Number of new technologies available for transition to customers at TRL 6 or 
above(Explosives Division); 
• Number of proof-of-concept technologies demonstrated (Command, Control, and 
Interoperability Division); and 
• Percent of high priority chemical and biological agents detectable in target operations 
scenarios (Chemical and Biological Division). 
 
Milestones are also a cornerstone of this annual performance report. About half (11) of the 
metrics reported in 2008 were composites of the project milestones set in the annual spending 
plan.  The project level milestones used for monitoring are combined across projects to gauge the 
overall performance of research programs.  The metric is stated as the percent of those 
milestones met for a given reporting unit (division/office/program).  S&T has added two percent-
of-milestones met metrics for 2009 and beyond.   
 
Each year, targets are set for the percent of milestones that will be met. In 2008, S&T met the 
targets for nine of eleven “milestone” metrics, as shown in Table 9-1.   
                                                 
101 Metrics are reported for each of the six S&T technical divisions.  
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Table 9-1:  S&T Milestones Results in 2008 
 
Reporting Unit Target (percent) Actual 
Met 
Y or N
Action/New 2009 
Target 
(percent) 
Border and Maritime 
Security 
95 99 Y Target raised  
to 96 
Human Factors/Behavioral 
Sciences 
90 100 Y Target remained 
At 90 
Chemical and Biological 90 93 Y Target raised 
 to 93 
Laboratory Facilities 100 93 N 
 
Target lowered to 90 
Explosives 85 77 N 
 
Target lowered to 80 
Infrastructure and 
Geophysical  
90 90 Y Target remained 
At 90  
Innovation Performance 
Goal 
50 88 Y Target raised  
to 60 
Testing Evaluation and 
Standards 
70 70 Y Target raised 
 to 80 
Transition 85 100 Y Target raised  
to 86 
University Programs 85 100 Y Target remained at 85 
Command, Control and 
Interoperability 
90 94 Y Target raised  
to 95 
*A percent-of-milestones met measure was added for Infrastructure/Geophysical and Laboratories for 2009 
and beyond. 
 
A composite measure of milestones met can be a valid indicator of performance, especially 
when, as with S&T, it is combined with other more specific output measures. S&T officials 
recognize that not all milestones are created equal and, as discussed above, they hope to further 
improve the milestones set.  Currently, meeting a targeted percent of milestones may mask 
significant issues if, for example, one or more of the milestones not met is critical to program 
performance and success.  
 
Also, as with individual milestones, the composite target for the portion of milestones met should 
be reachable, but a “stretch.” It is not clear that S&T’s targets meet that standard.  As shown 
above, S&T raised the 2009 target for 6 units and lowered it for 2. Overall, the 2009 targets for 6 
of 11 of the milestone measures were below the 2008 actual.  In one case (Laboratory Facilities), 
the explanation for not meeting the target related to an unexpected level of comments on a 
specific draft Environmental Impact Statement.  Even though this explanation appears to indicate 
that this was a unique occurrence that prevented the unit from meeting its’ target, the target for 
the next year was reduced, below even the actual level for 2008.  S&T indicated that the 2008 
target was 100 percent and that targets of 100 percent are “widely regarded in the field of 
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performance” as unrealistic.  While this generally may be true, absent changed program 
expectations, targets set below actual levels do not constitute stretch goals.  Additionally, goals 
set where actual results are already at 100 or 99 percent are questionable.  
 
PROGRAM ASSESSMENT RATING TOOL (PART) 
 
PART is a diagnostic tool created by the Office of Management and Budget to conduct periodic 
reviews of an agency’s program performance in selected areas in order to achieve better results.  
The Office of Management and Budget selects the programs to be examined each year.  Program 
examiners, in conjunction with S&T staff, rate the programs in four areas:  1.) Program Purpose 
and Design; 2.) Strategic Planning; 3.) Program Management; and 4.) Program 
Results/Accountability.  The program results area accounts for 50 percent of the total score.  
 
Overall, programs can be rated:   
 
• Effective  
• Moderately Effective 
• Adequate  
• Ineffective  
• Results Not Demonstrated. 
 
Programs can be rated “Adequate” with a PART score of 50 percent. 
  
Nine S&T programs have been reviewed since S&T was formed.  S&T’s more recent scores 
have improved, though it is difficult to conclude this constitutes an overall trend.  There are no 
ongoing PART reviews; the next PART review is expected after the 2009 transition. 
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Table 9-2:  PART Results for S&T Programs 
 
Reporting Unit Year Rating 
Threat and Vulnerability, 
Testing and Assessment 
2004 Results Not 
Demonstrated 
Standards Development for 
Homeland Security 
Technology 
2004 Adequate 
Emerging Homeland Security 
Threat Detection 
2005 Moderately 
Effective 
Rapid Prototyping of 
Countermeasures 
2005 Moderately 
Effective 
Homeland Security University 
Fellowships 
2005 Moderately 
Effective 
Command, Control and 
Interoperability 
2006 Results Not 
Demonstrated 
Chemical and Explosive 
Countermeasures 
2006 Results Not 
Demonstrated. 
SAFETY ACT 2008 Effective 
Chemical and Biological 2008 Effective 
 
The 2006 PART review of the Chemical and Explosives Countermeasures Program identified the 
need for an external review of the program.  In response, the Division initiated such a review, 
first for the Countermeasures Program alone, and, more recently, for the Chemical/Biological 
Program as a whole.  The 2008 PART review of the entire Chemical/Biological Program 
identified this review as a positive step, noting that the annual review process will ensure 
continued technical performance and maintain its alignment with prevailing guidance and 
national strategies.102   
 
The 2008 PART review of the SAFETY ACT Office measured, among other things, whether the 
program had specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully 
reflect its purpose; whether independent evaluations are conducted to support program 
improvements; and whether the program had taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic 
planning deficiencies.  One of the several follow up actions taken by the Office was to develop a 
five-year plan that lays out planned activities and milestones that feed into the larger S&T 
strategic planning document.103  
 
The 2008 PART scores of “Effective” for the SAFETY ACT Office and the Chemical and 
Biological Program are better than past S&T PART scores.  Though the PART reviews assess 
key program attributes, they cover different programs at different times, which does not allow for 
a general assessment of a trend in S&T performance.  
                                                 
102 PART Review: S&T Chemical and Biological 2008 Assessment, www.ExpectMore.gov, accessed April 2009. 
103 PART Review: S&T SAFETY Act 2008 Assessment, www.ExpectMore.gov, accessed April 2009. 
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Difficulties in Assessing and Evaluating R&D Programs 
 
Retrospective process evaluations of program efficiency, as well as evaluations of overall quality 
and impact are important to ensure maximum return on investment and the fulfillment of agency 
missions.  Although all agencies face significant obstacles in conducting evaluations of research 
and development, some agencies have found ways to obtain meaningful assessments of the 
quality of their work.  
  
Process Evaluations  
 
Process evaluations are in-depth reviews of program operations to assess whether they are 
working as intended, and whether improvements can be made to make them more efficient.  
Unlike monitoring, which is ongoing, process evaluations are generally a special effort.  For 
example, S&T could design and conduct a process evaluation of how IPTs function to fine-tune 
the process, ensure consistency across divisions, and promote customer satisfaction.  S&T has 
not conducted any formal process evaluations during the lifetime of the new organizational 
structure and processes—the last two years.  Process evaluation may, in fact, not have been very 
helpful during this time because the new structure and functions were in a start-up period that 
would not be representative of the mature state of these processes.  But now that the new 
structure has matured, such evaluations could provide essential knowledge to help fine tune it 
and maximize its effectiveness and efficiency in supporting S&T’s research and development 
mission. 
 
 Impact Evaluations 
 
Ideally impact, or outcome, evaluations would assess the effectiveness of new S&T-developed 
technology once it is deployed by customers, and compare that effectiveness with levels of 
effectiveness without the technology.  Any unintended effects would be considered as well.  This 
is extremely difficult in most settings, but is particularly so in the science and technology arena.  
The five year life of S&T, and in particular the two year life of S&T in its current configuration, 
is too short to afford the opportunity for impact analysis related to the use and value of products 
that have been transitioned to components and first responders through the new customer-
focused process.  S&T has not undertaken any impact evaluations to date.  But alternatives to 
this sophisticated impact evaluation exist and could be used.  
 
Many factors complicate impact evaluations of scientific research programs.  These include lag 
times of many years between the conceptualization of projects and eventual development and use 
of products, taking outcomes far into the future.  Some meaningful outcomes may differ from the 
initially intended outcome but still be significant.  Myriad factors during the life of the project 
can affect outcomes.  These can include everything from environmental changes that could 
render a potential discovery or product obsolete, to instability in funding that can disrupt or 
curtail progress.  A recent edition of the American Evaluation Association publication, New 
Directions for Evaluation, was devoted to the discussion of problems and strategies for 
evaluations in these settings.104 
                                                 
104 American Evaluation Association, New Directions for Evaluation, Reforming the Evaluation Process. Chris L.S. 
Coryn and Michael Scriven, Editors, No. 118, Summer 2008.  
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The Office of Management and Budget has 
recognized the unique nature of research and 
development programs.  (See, for example, the box 
at right.) The guidance for PART reviews specifies 
unique requirements and approaches for these 
programs.  It speaks, for example, to the difficulties 
in establishing meaningful annual outcome 
performance measures, and sets unique criteria for 
relevance, quality, and performance for research 
and development programs.105  
 
Research programs throughout the government face 
the same difficulties in assessing the quality and 
value of program efforts.  In spite of these issues, 
agencies have developed several approaches to 
program evaluation.  The most important is external 
scientific peer review. Another is measuring quantitative indicators of quality, such as 
publications and awards. 
 
Scientific Peer Review 
 
Independent scientific peer review is widely used by research and development agencies to 
ensure the soundness of their programs and portfolios, the quality of their work, and, in some 
cases, the impact of their research and development results.  Independent scientific peer review 
lies at the core of performance assessment of basic research and is essential to applied research 
as well.  With only a few exceptions, S&T has not involved outside experts in either 
development of its projects and programs or assessment of their quality and impact.  
 
The Role of Peer Review 
 
Given the recognized difficulty in formal analysis and evaluation of the impacts of research and 
development, peer review is seen by many as the best way to ensure quality research is done and 
return on investment is maximized.  The value of peer review in assessing research quality has 
been documented in multiple studies.106 
 
The Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy of the National Academies of 
Science has recommended that programs of basic and applied research be evaluated regularly 
through expert review, using the performance indicators of quality, relevance, and, where 
                                                 
105 Program Assessment Rating Tool Guidance No. 2008-01, from Deputy Director for Performance and Personnel 
Management, January 29, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/part/fy2008/part_2008.pdf.  
106 For example see, National Research Council. (1999) “Peer Review in Environmental Technology Development 
Programs.” Committee on the Department of Energy, Office of Science and Technology’s Peer Review Program, 
Board on Radioactive Waste. Washington, D.C.; National Academy Press. 
 
“While the criteria are intended to apply to all 
types of R&D…predicting and assessing the 
outcomes of basic research in particular is 
never easy. Serendipitous results are often 
the most interesting and ultimately may have 
the most value.  Taking risks and working 
toward difficult-to-attain goals are important 
aspects of good research management, and 
innovation and breakthroughs are among 
the results. However, there is no inherent 
conflict between these facts and a call for 
clearer information about program goals and 
performance toward achieving those goals.” 
(Guidance for Completing 2008 PARTs; OMB 
January 29, 2008; p. 72) 
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appropriate, leadership.  The definition of experts include more than scholars in the field, but 
also users of the research, such as industry and non-governmental organizations.107  
 
In evaluating research efficiency at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, A committee of 
the National Academies of Science emphasized the need for external peer review, stating that 
“the best mechanism for measuring investment efficiency is the expert-review panel.”  The 
report defined research program investment efficiency as “doing the right research and doing it 
well,” that is, gauging portfolio management in terms of whether the investment is relevant to the 
agency’s mission and long-term plans and is being performed at a high level of quality.108 
 
In line with these findings, the Office of Management and Budget also emphasizes the need for 
external review of research and development programs. Its guidance states that retrospective 
review—to determine whether research investments are well-directed, efficient, and 
productive—is essential for validating program design and instilling confidence that future 
investments will be wisely made.   The guidance includes requirements that: 
 
• Program relevance to the needs of the nation, of fields of science and technology, and of 
program “customers” be assessed periodically through retrospective review; and 
• Program quality be assessed periodically through retrospective expert review. 
 
One specific question asked during the PART review in 2008 was:  Do independent evaluations 
of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results? 
 
Other Agencies’ Use of Peer Review 
 
Many federal and other research organizations use peer review to help guide and assess their 
programs and to ensure credibility of their work in the research community.  The following 
discussion describes how the National Science Foundation and the National Institute of Justice 
use peer review to assess the quality of their programs. 
 
National Science Foundation 
 
The National Science Foundation uses both prospective and retrospective peer review to ensure 
the soundness of its programs.  Over 90 percent of its awards are based upon merit review of 
proposals by expert peer reviewers.  Peer review also is performed at the end of projects, and it 
also uses retrospective peer review at the program and agency level as a cornerstone in its quality 
assurance efforts. 
 
                                                 
107 Implementing The Government Performance and Results Act for Research: A Status Report; Committee on 
Science, Engineering, and Public Policy, National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, 
Institute of Medicine; National Academies Press (2001); http://books.nap.edu/catalog/10106.html (accessed April 
20, 2009). 
108 Evaluating Research Efficiency in the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; Committee on Evaluating the 
Efficiency of Research and Development Programs at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National 
Research Council; National Academies Press (2008), http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12150 (accessed 
April 9, 2009). 
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The annual performance review required under the Government Performance and Results Act 
has, for many years, been done at the Foundation by a committee of outside reviewers (the 
Advisory Committee for GPRA Performance Assessment).  In 2008, according to the 
Foundation’s Annual Performance Report, the committee was composed of 20 members, each of 
whom had strong academic credentials and substantial experience in academia, government, 
and/or industry.  The Committee meets once a year and assesses the Foundation’s 
accomplishments under its three broad mission areas (Discovery, Learning, and Research 
Infrastructure).  The Foundation does not set specific objectives, goals, or targets in these areas.  
An official said that the Foundation has such a broad mission that setting goals and targets, 
especially quantitative goals and targets, is very difficult.    
 
To make its assessment, the Committee receives “highlights” prepared by program officers each 
year in April.  There are about 900 of these highlights; 300 for each of the three mission areas.  
The highlights are designed to show what progress has been made and do not include discussion 
of problems or failures.  The Committee does not review individual divisions or programs.   
 
Individual program areas, and some cross-cutting areas, are reviewed, however, every three years 
by an outside Committee of Visitors.  These reviews are a full critique of the program, including 
management, balance of research portfolio, and overall impact of the work.109  Divisions can add 
specific issues as well.  The reviews include a random sample of individual projects.  The 
Committee of Visitors is composed of individuals selected by the program officers.  Usually 
these are individuals who have knowledge of the Foundation, are willing to spend the necessary 
time, and do not have any conflicts of interest.  
 
National Institute of Justice 
 
The two major operating components of the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Science 
and Technology and the Office of Research and Evaluation, both use external scientific peer 
review to ensure the quality of their efforts, though in different ways.  The Institute maintains an 
extensive, on-line list of potential peer reviewers. 
 
The Office of Science and Technology primarily performs applied, transitional research and 
development. It awards funds through a competitive external peer review process that includes 
practitioners as well as researchers, both from within and outside the Institute.  Also, the Office 
of Science works with 19 Technology Working Groups, which are focused on key subject areas 
(such as aviation and biometrics) and are composed of both mid-level practitioners 
knowledgeable of technology needs in the area as well as scientists from the Institute’s science 
centers.  These working groups participate throughout the program life cycle, including 
determining technology needs, developing solutions, and building capacity in the criminal justice 
community.  Final research products are also peer reviewed.  The reviews include an assessment 
of how well the final product fills the identified requirements. 
 
                                                 
109 The 2008 Government Performance and Results Act review found that these reviews by Committees of Visitors 
were not effectively covering program impact, and suggested that the Committees either cease or enhance their 
efforts in this area.   See Report of the Advisory Committee for GPRA Performance Assessment FY 2008, July 31, 
2008, p. 4.  http://www.nsf.gov/publications/pub_summ.jsp?ods_key=nsf08064 
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The Institute’s Office of Evaluation and Research also uses competitive peer review to review 
proposals before awards are made.  Grantee final reports are also peer reviewed.  This Office 
does not have peer review at the program level, but noted that the Institute’s work is generally 
presumed to be of high quality because of the extensive peer review at the project level.   
Quantitative Measures 
 
In addition to peer review, quantitative measures are recognized as being indicators of research 
quality.  Use of these output measures could add to assurances that future outcome evaluations 
will find positive outcomes.  For example, measures such as the number of conference 
presentations and professional publications can be indicators of scientific value.  Although by no 
means perfect indicators, they do denote recognition of work by others in the field.  These 
indicators can be put in use fairly quickly. 
 
The National Institute of Justice uses these kinds of measures in its Annual Performance Reports.  
In 2008 the Institute reported the following output or outcome metrics: 
 
• Number of fielded technologies; 
• Number of citations or Institute products in peer reviewed journals; 
• Total number of Institute electronic and hard copy documents/publications/other 
requested; 
• Percent reduction in the DNA backlog (Casework/offender); 
• CODIS (the FBI’s Combined DNA Index System)  hits resulting from convicted 
offender funds; and  
• Number of new Institute final grant reports, Institute research documents, and grantee 
research documents published. 
 
Institute officials explained that the first metric—number of technologies fielded—speaks to 
successful completion of research and development, but recognizes that there could be 
significant lag time before a completed technology is actually employed.  They also considered 
this metric to be appropriate because the Institute does not have responsibility for, or control 
over, what its criminal justice community customers do with the technology the Institute 
delivers.   
 
Another quantitative measure related to quality is customer satisfaction.  S&T’s mission is 
directly related to serving the needs of DHS component customers and first responders.  In its 
2007 Strategic Plan, S&T indicated that it would undertake customer surveys to assess 
satisfaction.  Such surveys have not yet been conducted. 
 
S&T’s Use of External Scientific Peer Review 
 
S&T does not routinely use peer review and other quality metrics to assess its research efforts. 
However, S&T does have some experience with peer review and several program managers said 
that they hoped to institute such a review in the future.  External peer review is used for initial 
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selection and periodic review of DHS Centers of Excellence.  In addition, the Chemical and 
Biological Division has implemented an annual external scientific peer review of its Chemical 
and Biological Program.  Also, S&T has recently looked outside S&T for help in developing, 
among other things, better assessment criteria and processes.  
 
Centers of Excellence 
 
S&T uses external scientific peer review in the process for selecting Centers of Excellence.110  
Centers are re-competed every five to six years and also are reviewed every two to three years.  
This interim review is conducted by outside reviewers against specified criteria.  There are 33 
separate criteria, covering six broad areas: 
 
• Research quality and influence; 
• Relevance; 
• Management and administration; 
• Education (e.g. number of students and theses supported, degrees awarded); 
• Results communication and transitioning; and 
• Integration (e.g. multi-institutional projects, collaborations with industry). 
 
The external panels that conduct the reviews include academics, DHS and other federal and state 
agency officials, and end users.  Reviewers’ comments are discussed with Center officials and 
S&T’s decision about whether to extend the Center is based in part on their response and, if 
needed, the extent to which they agree to redirect their research efforts.  As of April 2009, five of 
the Centers had been evaluated against these criteria. 
 
Chemical and Biological Division 
 
The Chemical and Biological Division has also implemented an annual peer review. Though 
reviews began in 2006, 2008 was the first year that the entire Chemical and Biological Program 
was reviewed.  According to program officials, the independent panel is comprised of current or 
former upper level managers from other agencies, or independent experts, for example, from 
academia.  During the review, program managers present information on each project.  The panel 
provides feedback at the program and project level on two key issues: 
 
• Strategy:  How is funding allocated to meet program goals? 
• Technical quality: Is the research of high quality and how does it compare to that of other 
agencies? 
 
Division officials use the peer review results to demonstrate and provide credible evidence of the 
quality of their work. 
 
 
                                                 
110 See Chapter VII for information on how peer review is used in selecting Centers of Excellence. 
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S&T-Wide Efforts 
 
Finally, S&T has looked outside DHS to help it develop assessment criteria.  On April 1, 2009, 
at the request of the Director of Research, DHS signed a contract with the National Academies of 
Science to develop a framework of metrics for S&T.  This study is to address metrics for all six 
divisions and all three portfolios and is expected to last two years.   
 
In its interim report to S&T, the Panel suggested that more immediate steps be taken to establish 
and use performance criteria, rather than waiting for the two-year long National Academies 
study.  The S&T Director of Research reports that he is pursuing other, more-rapid options to 
help refine metrics and approaches to prioritization, selection, and performance assessment.  The 
Director of Research has commissioned a shorter-term, less-expansive study by the National 
Defense University in related areas, with panel members including prior directors of research 
organizations within the federal government.  The kickoff meeting for that study was scheduled 
for early April 2009.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
S&T has made progress in developing clear and measurable milestones and monitoring project 
progress.  But the use of milestones can be improved.  S&T can learn from its own experience to 
set more appropriate milestones and targets, and can make their use more effective by holding 
performers and program managers accountable for meeting them.  
 
Current program assessments are useful, but do not offer the scientific credibility that other 
federal research agencies gain—and that policymakers, customers, and appropriators expect—
through external scientific peer review.  S&T has taken steps to improve its ability to evaluate its 
programs. But the insular nature of S&T’s work is of great concern.  Although the membership 
of the Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee includes researchers, its 
primary role is to provide an end user perspective.  Additionally, it is not independent, since 
members are appointed by the U/S, and it cannot have sufficient scientific expertise to assess the 
wide range of subjects addressed by S&T’s research.  Likewise, though the Annual Performance 
Report and PART reviews do address quality and impact of research to some degree, they are not 
sufficiently independent or scientific.  The annual performance report is very high level and, 
while it may point to areas where goals are not met, it does not provide independent scientific 
feedback with regard to issues that should be addressed.  The PART reviews, though somewhat 
independent—given the Office of Management and Budget’s  lead—are intermittent and do not 
get to the scientific quality of the research.     
 
Quantitative indicators of quality can also be used to supplement peer review.  Such output 
indicators are widely recognized in the research field and can be fairly easily documented.  
Given concerns about the limited extent of products coming out of S&T, measures of output at 
the S&T and program levels seem appropriate.  A metric such as the “number of fielded 
technologies” used by the National Institute of Justice’s Office of Science and Technology could 
also be a meaningful metric for S&T programs.  S&T’s Annual Performance Report includes 
some output measures.  For example, for the Explosives Program, the number of new 
technologies available for transition to customers at a specified transition readiness level.  Also, 
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given the important role of S&T customers in actually using the products of S&T’s research, a 
measure of customer satisfaction could be very valuable in assessing the quality and usefulness 
of S&T’s work 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
9-1.   S&T should ensure that milestones are valid measures of progress, represent 
reasonable but stretch goals, and are tied to appropriate consequences when they 
are not met.   
A review of all milestones to ensure that they meet that standard would be useful.  
Further, S&T should systematically collect information concerning milestones—both met 
and unmet—to develop the type of information necessary to set milestones at appropriate 
levels.  Failure to meet milestones should have consequences appropriate to the situation 
and should not result only in setting a new milestone.  Information from milestone 
failures should be collected and analyzed to fine-tune the milestone setting process, and 
also to determine whether there are patterns of problems that could be corrected. 
 
9-2. S&T should conduct process evaluations of selected critical functions to maximize 
S&T’s efficiency and effectiveness.  
Now that the new structure has matured, such evaluations can be an important tool to 
improve S&T’s ability to accomplish its mission.  As processes and procedures continue 
to evolve, such evaluations should also continue.  The assessment of IPT customers using 
logic models, recommended earlier in this report, should provide an important basis for 
analysis of the IPT process.  But many other financial and operational processes should 
be reviewed.  
 
9-3.   S&T should use independent external scientific peer review to ensure S&T’s 
research is well managed, is appropriately balanced among the three portfolios, and 
is of high quality.   
This review would be most useful initially at the division level or, where divisions 
conduct multiple programs focused on significantly different subjects, at the program 
level.  This review should include, as appropriate, both scientists and practitioners.  
Ongoing work with the National Defense University to develop metrics and approaches 
to performance assessment and with the National Academy of Sciences to develop 
performance metrics should make it easier for S&T to implement external scientific peer 
review.  S&T should ensure that these agencies consider in their work with S&T how the 
results would support peer review.  
 
It also will be especially important for S&T to improve its strategic plan, as 
recommended earlier in this report, to articulate clear goals and objectives that can then 
be used by the peer reviewers in assessing S&T’s overall research effort. Conversely, 
feedback from peer review will help in establishing meaningful milestones to measure 
progress, as recommended above.  Finally, as S&T matures—and completes more 
research projects and fields more technologies—it will need to move beyond measures of 
quality to develop ways to assess the impact of its work.  
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9-4.   S&T should use quantitative indicators of quality—as an adjunct to peer review—to 
help assess the overall quality of S&T’s research.   
Indicators that might be appropriate for S&T include, for example, the number of peer 
reviewed journal articles that report on S&T efforts, the number of scientific awards 
given to S&T researchers, and the number of S&T conference presentations and citations 
in peer reviewed journals.  A measure of “technologies ready for transfer” would also 
relate directly to S&T’s mission.  Such metrics stop short, however, of assessing the 
usefulness of the technologies.  An assessment of customer satisfaction could help.  
Measuring satisfaction of internal DHS customers should be fairly easy, while obtaining 
a valid assessment of first responder satisfaction presents more challenges.   
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CHAPTER X:  OPPORTUNITY COSTS111 
 
 
Concern has been expressed by Congress that the increasing prominence of homeland security 
priorities in federal research portfolios may have resulted in reductions of funding for other 
significant research programs.112  In theory, the selection of a particular array of research projects 
and proposals in a resource-constrained environment necessarily requires the rejection or delay 
of other projects and proposals that are ongoing or have been proposed.  Thus, the question is 
whether there has been such an emphasis across the federal government on funding homeland 
security-related research proposals that funding for research in energy, criminal justice, 
environmental, non-biodefense medical research, and other important areas has suffered and 
resulted in lost opportunities to pursue research that might have proven to be very important.   
 
To explore whether there have been such opportunity costs in federal funding of research, the 
relationship between funding in homeland security-related research and funding of other research 
areas over time must be examined to determine whether there has been a pattern of increases in 
funding of homeland security-related research and a decrease in funding for other research areas.  
Even if such a pattern exists, however, there are other potential causes that must be considered: 
 
• A decreasing level of interest in a research area for reasons not related to an increased 
interest in homeland security-related research;   
• Reclassification of research from non-homeland security to homeland security-related 
with no change in the actual projects themselves.  For example, earthquake research and 
border-control related research may now be included as homeland security-related 
research, whereas they previously were included in other categories; and 
• Reclassification of research from non-homeland security to homeland security-related 
with modifications in the project to provide benefits in both research arenas.  For 
example, some money laundering research can have the dual benefit of finding ways to 
curtail funds for terrorist organizations and also for drug cartels. 
 
It is also important to note that all research spending competes for funds with all other 
government spending priorities.  Thus, a decrease in spending for research might not result in an 
increase in another, but may instead benefit a non-research federal spending priority.  Likewise, 
an increase in a research spending area could result in a decrease in another area unrelated to 
other types of research.  One documented instance of a controversy related to changes in research 
priorities at NIH has been identified and is discussed in this chapter. 
 
 
                                                 
111 Opportunity costs are traditionally understood to be the difference between the actual value of using resources for 
one purpose and the value that would have resulted from an alternative use.  In the context of the question the 
Academy was asked to explore, we understood the use of the term opportunity costs to mean the extent to which 
funding for homeland security-related research is crowding out funding for other important research areas. 
112 House Appropriations Committee Report H.R.110-181. 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
Budget data, written material related to the issue, internet searches, and interviews provide 
insights into this issue.  Budget data available from 10 federal agencies that fund R&D research 
was available to track patterns of research spending over time.  At every interview with federal 
agency staff (excluding DHS) and outside experts, individual perspectives and opinions 
concerning this issue were collected.  In addition, individuals conducting research and experts in 
a variety of science policy fields were identified and responded to questions concerning the 
opportunity cost issue.   
 
BUDGET TRENDS 
 
It is difficult to compare budget information for homeland security-related research and other 
types of research because of inconsistency in budget categories across agencies.  However, the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science has categorized and tracked homeland 
security-related R&D spending for 10 federal agency R&D funders (including DHS) since FY 
2004.  These data were used to compare homeland security R&D spending with non-homeland 
security R&D spending for each agency over time.  (Graphs of R&D spending for the nine 
agencies other than DHS are provided in Appendix G.)  This analysis covers the five-year period 
FY 2004 to FY 2008.113   
 
In our analysis of these data, we identified three instances in which homeland security-related 
R&D increased while non-homeland security R&D spending dropped or remained the same at a 
federal agency.  However, it is very difficult to draw conclusions from this for two reasons.  
First, the analysis is based on data for total R&D spending by departments and independent 
agencies (e.g., DOD, HHS, EPA, and NSF) with large R&D budgets that are often spread across 
multiple sub-agencies.114  HHS, for example, includes several agencies that fund R&D, including 
the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development 
Agency, and the Centers for Disease Control.  This level of aggregation makes it very difficult to 
know where in the agency budget a shift may have occurred.   
 
Second, even if a shift could be located, there would be no way to establish a causal linkage to 
the increase in homeland security-related research.  The congressional appropriations committees 
and Office of Management and Budget divisions making budget decisions do so in relative 
isolation from each other.  Therefore, it is unlikely that increases in homeland security-related 
research would have a direct effect on funding for other research areas. 
 
The overall growth in homeland security-related research funding in recent years means that if 
there is an across-the-board cut in federal funding for research, homeland security research may 
fair better than other areas, just because it will have grown more in prior years.  However, a 
uniform cut across research areas seems most unlikely.  It is far more likely that there would be 
                                                 
113 AAAS estimates of the homeland security portion of FY 2009 agency R&D spending await the release of a 
detailed version of the FY 2010 Budget Request containing updated FY 2009 agency spending data.  
114 AAAS analyses are based on data issued by OMB, which does not report R&D budget data at the sub-agency 
level consistently across agencies. 
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variable changes in funding across research areas as perceived national needs change over time.  
Thus, predicting the impact on other research areas of any possible growth in homeland security-
related research in the future is not feasible. 
 
NIH CONTROVERSY 
 
In March 2005, more than 750 researchers who had previously been members of NIH’s 
Microbial Physiology and Genetics and Bacterial and Mycology Initial Review Groups, or had 
received grants from these groups, signed a letter to NIH which was published in Science.115  In 
the letter, the researchers charged that an unintended consequence of a 2001 agency decision to 
focus on biodefense had been the siphoning of funds from research concerning non-biodefense 
agents.  The scientists argued that the decision by the NIH National Institute for Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases (NIAID) to make biodefense research its priority emphasized an area of low 
risk to public health and put non-biodefense research in “crisis.”   
 
To back up their assertions, the researchers presented data showing a large jump in the number 
of projects on bioweapons agents when comparing the time period of 2001-2005 to 1996-2000.  
Comparing these two time periods, the number of grants for studies of both non-biodefense 
microorganisms and non-biodefense pathogenic microorganisms dropped significantly.   
 
NIAID responded that the grant data used by the researchers was neither accurate nor complete 
and that the researchers were not taking into account several factors, including:  the increase in 
biodefense funding was largely paid for with an influx of $1.5 billion to NIAID’s budget, not 
through the diversion of funds from other research; basic research in biodefense has applications 
to all microbiology and immunology research; and non-biodefense research has benefitted from 
the influx of new biodefense funds because it freed up more resources for non-biodefense 
research.116   
 
In May 2005, under the leadership of the American Society of Microbiology, a meeting was held 
with NIH and NIAID officials and researchers involved in the controversy.  NIH staff and 
researchers at the American Society of Microbiology meeting asserted that the primary cause of 
the controversy was the researchers’ lack of understanding that NIH’s biodefense spending was 
funded through a new influx of money specifically dedicated to biodefense research.  NIH 
funding of certain other kinds of research did go down, but that is because NIH’s non-biodefense 
budget had remained relatively flat for several years and there were changes in the focus of the 
non-biodefense research driven by the research community.  Therefore, it did not appear that 
homeland security-related research at NIH caused a reduction in funding for other important 
research.  For the most part, the NIH researchers attributed the decline in research funding 
overall to factors other than an increased focus on homeland security. 
 
                                                 
115 “An Open Letter to Elias Zerhouni,” Science, v. 307, no. 1409, March 4, 2005. 
116 NIAID, NIH, “Open Letter in Science Regarding NIH Biodefense Funding:  Questions and Answers,” March 17, 
2005, http://www3.niaid.nih.gov/news/newsreleases/2005/scienceletter.htm.  
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The result was an agreement between NIH and the researchers to stop focusing on grant data and 
explore research opportunities being missed.117  Most researchers in the field were satisfied with 
the meeting outcomes and concern over this issue dissipated considerably.  As agreed at the 
meeting, a follow-up workshop was convened by the American Society for Microbiology and the 
National Institutes of Health in November 2005 to explore gaps and opportunities in basic 
bacterial research.118 
 
INTERVIEW RESULTS 
 
A total of 53 individuals, including federal agency staff, university researchers, science policy 
experts, and research association staff, were asked if they had observed shifts in funding toward 
homeland security-related research and away from other important research fields.  Of these, 13 
declined to comment, saying they had no opinion or information to contribute.  Researchers who 
were interviewed conducted either:  research in homeland security; research that was not 
previously considered to be homeland security-related, but now is (e.g., earthquakes, emergency 
preparedness); non-homeland security-related research; or research in fields that fall into both 
homeland security and non-homeland security-related research categories. 
 
All researchers interviewed who are working on homeland security said that their field is well-
funded.  Researchers in all categories said that there has been a shift in emphasis in research 
proposals to make research eligible for homeland security research grants or that research has 
been expanded to include homeland security concerns (e.g., research on protecting drinking 
water systems may expand its focus to include a terrorist attack on drinking water).  However, 
these shifts were viewed as marginal, resulting in small changes in findings and outcomes, but 
with the underlying research remaining largely unchanged.   
 
In addition, many researchers had observed re-categorization of research that had not previously 
been considered homeland security-related as homeland security-related.  None of the 
researchers interviewed, however, were aware of funding decreases that had occurred in other 
areas as a result of increased funding in homeland security-related research.   
 
Federal researchers in homeland security did not report being aware of evidence or complaints 
about shifts in funding from non-homeland security-related research to homeland security-related 
research.  NIH staff reported that their agency has successfully focused homeland security-
related research on activities that benefit homeland security and traditional public health.  
Outside observers agreed that NIH has been successful in doing this.  Similarly, DOD 
researchers report that homeland defense research focuses on broadening the applicability of 
traditional defense research to address both the needs of the warfighter and homeland defense.  
 
One exception appears to be in the area of criminal justice research.  When National Institute of 
Justice terrorism funds were shifted to DHS, the objectives changed and research objectives NIJ 
would have pursued were no longer funded.  In addition, some researchers have complained that 
                                                 
117 “Détente Declared on NIH Biodefense Funding,” Jocelyn Kaiser, Science, v. 308, no. 5724, p. 938. 
118 ASM, NIH, Basic Research on Bacteria:  The Essential Frontier, February 2007, 
http://www.asm.org/ASM/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000002932/NIHASMBacteriaReport.pdf.  
 105
some traditional criminal justice research is now terrorism research and, in general, funding for 
social science research on criminal justice issues has diminished.  This is noteworthy because 
this research was largely focused on meeting the needs of first responders.  Researchers also 
noted that a shift in funding to homeland security has occurred not only in the research area, but 
across the federal justice community.  For example, the FBI has shifted its priorities from more 
traditional crime areas to preventing terrorism.  This indicates a possibility that shifts toward 
homeland security-related research and away from other research areas may be happening within 
agencies. 
 
Researchers do not say that funding currently devoted to homeland security-related research 
would otherwise go to funding other types of research.  Researchers also made the following 
related observations: 
 
• Some researchers noted that funding for environmental and social science research had 
declined in recent years.  However, this decline was attributed to lack of interest in these 
areas by the previous Administration, not to the increased emphasis on homeland 
security. 
• Some interviewees noted a shift away from basic research following 9/11, due to a sense 
of urgency to get technologies out as soon as possible.  However, these researchers noted 
that the situation is gradually changing and believe that the balance of funding between 
basic and other types of research will return to its “natural state” in the near future. 
• Some researchers believe the question of opportunity costs is now moot because of the 
large increase in research funding resulting from the stimulus package.  However, 
stimulus funding is a one-time infusion and does not necessarily predict future funding 
trends.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
With the possible exception of research in the field of criminal justice, interviews with experts, 
internet searches, and analyses of budget trends uncovered very little evidence of opportunity 
costs.  Specifically:  
 
• There is no evidence of a shift in funding toward homeland security-related research at 
the expense of other important research areas.  Although funding for criminal justice 
research seems to have diminished, causal linkage to increases in homeland security-
related research funding cannot be established. 
• In a few instances, homeland security-related research increased while non-homeland 
security research spending dropped or remained the same at federal agencies.  However, 
available information does not provide sufficient basis for identifying and explaining 
these funding shifts. 
• Apart from the 2005 controversy at NIH, federal agencies contacted report that they have 
not received complaints from researchers that their field of research is not being 
adequately funded because of a shift in funding to homeland security-related research. 
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• Some researchers have been shifting and expanding their research focus to make it 
eligible for homeland security-related research funding.  However, the underlying science 
is largely unchanged. 
• There has been some re-categorization of research that was not previously considered 
homeland security-related research.  This research has not changed; it has merely moved 
to a different budget category. 
• Researchers in those fields that have experienced decreased funding levels in recent years 
attribute the drop in funding to other factors, such as lack of interest on the part of the 
previous Administration, rather than an increased focus on homeland security-related 
research. Criminal Justice researchers are the exception and feel that, in part, the 
increases in homeland security-related research have reduced support for their work. 
• The majority of researchers interviewed do not believe that current funding for homeland 
security-related research would be shifted to other research areas if funding for homeland 
security-related research declined. 
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APPENDIX A:  R&D SPENDING BY S&T 
 
 
This Appendix reviews S&T’s R&D funding119 during the period FY 2006-FY 2009,120 in the 
context of other federal funders of homeland security-related R&D and DHS R&D funding.  The 
composition of S&T’s Research and Transition portfolio spending is reviewed, including its 
distribution by performer type. 
 
FUNDING OF FEDERAL HOMELAND SECURITY-RELATED RESEARCH 
 
Three agencies—HHS, DOD, and DHS—account for 85 percent of all federal homeland 
security-related R&D funding ($4.969 billion total in FY 2008): 
• HHS accounts for 39 percent ($1.94 billion); 121   
• DOD accounts for 26 percent ($1.294 billion); and  
• DHS accounts for 20 percent ($992 million). 
 
Since FY 2006, DHS’s share of total federal homeland security-related R&D has decreased in 
absolute terms and relative to HHS and DOD, falling to third place in FY 2007.  Changes over 
time in the respective agency shares of total homeland security-related R&D funding are 
depicted in Figure B-1.  Absolute funding figures are presented in Table B-1.122  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
119 R&D funding data presented in Figures B-1 and B-2 and Tables B-1, B-2, and B-3 are drawn from analyses 
issued by the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). However, R&D funding data for FY 
2007 have been adjusted to reflect a significant transfer of funds: $84.1 million in funding for operational activities 
was transferred from S&T’s Chemical and Biological Division to the DHS Office of Health Affairs. 
120 A new budget structure for S&T was introduced in the President’s FY 2008 request for DHS, reflecting the 
reorganization undertaken at the end of 2006.   
121 Almost all homeland security related R&D at HHS is conducted or funded by the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH).  However, the newly created Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) may 
account for as much as 13 percent of total HHS funding for homeland security-related research if the 
Administration’s FY 2009 request ($275 million) is fully funded. BARDA is charged with facilitating the research, 
development, and acquisition of medical countermeasures for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents 
and emerging infectious diseases, including pandemic influenza. 
122 Final appropriations for DOD and HHS have been signed into law, but updated figures for the homeland security 
share of DOD and HHS R&D funding cannot be updated until the detailed version of the President’s FY 2010 
budget is released.   
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Figure A-1:  Largest Federal Funders of Homeland Security-Related R&D 
FY 2006 – FY 2009 
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Source: Based on data from American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) and the President’s 
FY 2008 Budget Request. 
 
Table A-1:  Federal Funding of Homeland Security-Related R&D 
FY 2006 – FY 2009 
($millions in budget authority) 
FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 
Actual Actual Estimate Requests/Approps Agency 
Amt 
% of 
Total Amt 
% of 
Total Amt 
% of 
Total Amt 
% of 
Total 
HHS 1,827 36% 1,932 40% 1,940 39% 2,106 38%
Nat’l Institutes 
of Health 1,827  1,828 1,837 1,856 
DOD 1,270 25% 1,175 24% 1,294 26% 1,505 27%
DHS 1,300 25% 912 19% 992 20% 1,085 20%
All Other 741 14% 764 16% 743 15% 831 15%
Total Federal  5,138 100% 4,783 100% 4,969 100% 5,527 100%
Source: Based on data from AAAS and the President’s FY 2008 Budget Request. 
Note: Figures may not sum exactly due to rounding. 
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DHS R&D FUNDING 
 
In FY 2006, S&T accounted for over 98 percent of all DHS R&D, excluding only R&D by the 
U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Secret Service.  In FY 2007, funding for nuclear/radiological 
R&D was transferred from S&T to the newly created Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 
(DNDO).  In FY 2008, 98.5 percent of the DHS R&D budget resided in two organizations 
primarily devoted to R&D—S&T (73.7 percent) and the DNDO (24.8 percent).  The U.S. Coast 
Guard accounts for most of the remainder (1.5 percent). 
 
DHS’s R&D portfolio has shifted significantly in the period FY 2006-FY 2008:   
 
• Chemical/biological R&D decreased as a share of DHS R&D by almost one third (from 
30 to 21 percent) in FY 2008.  The large decline reflects in large part the transfer of 
operational activities from the S&T division to the newly created DHS Office of Health 
Affairs in FY 2007. 
• Nuclear/radiological R&D increased as a share of DHS R&D by over two thirds (from 16 
percent to 28 percent) in FY 2007 and surpassed chemical and biological R&D as a 
percentage of total DHS R&D to become the biggest DHS R&D program. 
Nuclear/radiological R&D is performed by DNDO within DHS. 
• Explosives R&D dropped by more than half to eight percent of total DHS R&D.  The 
decline in funding for Explosives reflects a sharp drop in funding for the Man Portable 
Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) project following the completion of its development 
phase.123  MANPADS had been the major focus of S&T’s explosives R&D. 
 
Funding for chemical/biological R&D continued to decline as a share of DHS R&D in FY 2009, 
dropping from 21 to 18 percent.  The share of DHS funding for nuclear radiological R&D 
declined from 28 to 25 percent in FY 2009, while explosives R&D increased its share of DHS 
R&D by 1 percentage point.  This information is depicted in Figure B-2 and Table B-2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
123 AAAS R&D Funding Update on DHS FY 2007 Conference Appropriations 
(http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/dhs07c.htm).  MANPADS are shoulder-mounted portable surface to air missiles that 
have been used against passenger aircraft. 
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Figure A-2:  Largest DHS R&D Focus Areas 
FY 2006 - FY 2009 
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Source: Based on data from AAAS and the President’s FY 2008 Budget Request. 
 
 
Table A-2:  DHS R&D Funding 
FY 2006 – FY 2009 
($ millions in budget authority) 
 
FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 
Actual Actual Estimate Estimate R&D Account 
Amt 
% of 
Total Amt 
% of 
Total Amt 
% of 
Total Amt 
% of 
Total 
Nuclear/Rad. 
(DNDO) 209 16% 265 29% 274 28% 269 25%
Chemical and 
Biological 387 30% 230 25% 208 21% 200 18%
Explosives 262 20% 105 12% 78 8% 96 9%
All Other 442 34% 312 34% 432 44% 520 48%
Total DHS 1,300 100% 912 100% 992 100% 1,085 100%
Source: Based on data from AAAS and the President’s FY 2008 Budget Request. 
Note: Figures may not sum exactly due to rounding. 
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S&T R&D FUNDING 
 
S&T’s R&D budget dropped in absolute terms by more than 31.3 percent from $1.281 billion in 
FY 2006 to $750 million in FY 2007.  It dropped again by 7.7 percent in FY 2008.  The decline 
in FY 2007 included the rescission of $126 million of unobligated funds, the transfer of 
operational activities to the Office of Health Affairs, and the transfer of responsibility for 
nuclear/radiological R&D to the DNDO. 
 
The two year decline in S&T R&D funding was reversed in FY 2009 when it rose by 15.8 
percent.  The largest part of this increase (over 39 percent) is due to the large increase in funding 
for the construction and startup of new S&T laboratory facilities.124  Significant increases in 
support for the S&T divisions funding explosives and command, control, and interoperability 
R&D account for another 33 percent of the increase. 
 
Despite the sharp decline in funding for chemical and biological R&D as a share of DHS and 
S&T R&D in FY 2008, it remains S&T’s largest R&D program, accounting for 25 percent of 
total S&T R&D.  It also represents almost 41 percent of R&D funding administered through 
S&T’s six technical divisions.  (See Table B-3.) 
 
 
Table A-3:  S&T R&D Funding 
FY 2006 - FY 2009 
($ millions in budget authority) 
 
FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 
Actual Actual Estimate Estimate Budget 
Account 
Amt 
% of 
Total Amt 
% of 
Total Amt 
% of 
Total Amt 
% of 
Total 
Six Technical Division Accounts 
Borders and 
Maritime 43 4% 33 4% 25 4% 33 4%
Chemical and 
Biological 387 35% 230 31% 208 30% 200 25%
Command, 
Control, Interop 108 10% 58 8% 57 8% 75 9%
Explosives 262 24% 105 14% 78 11% 96 12%
Human Factors/ 
Behavioral Sci 6 1% 7 1% 14 2% 12 2%
Infrastructure/ 
Geophysical 86 8% 75 10% 65 9% 76 10%
                                                 
124 Funding is provided for the startup of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC), 
part of a biodefense complex of DHS, NIH, and DOD facilities at Fort Detrick, Maryland and for detailed design of 
the National Bio and Agrodefense Facility, for which construction is planned to begin in 2010 (AAAS R&D Funding 
Update on R&D in DHS in the FY 2009 DHS Budget, http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/dhs09p.htm).  Also, funding for 
R&D staff of S&T laboratories was shifted to the Laboratory Facilities account in FY 2009. 
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FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 
Actual Actual Estimate Estimate Budget 
Account 
Amt 
% of 
Total Amt 
% of 
Total Amt 
% of 
Total Amt 
% of 
Total 
Portfolio Office and Specialized Functional Office Accounts 
University 
Programs* 62 6% 49 7% 49 7% 50 6%
Innovation 0 0% 38 5% 33 5% 33 4%
Transition 19 2% 24 3% 25 4% 29 4%
T&E and 
Standards 35 3% 25 3% 29 4% 29 4%
Laboratory 
Facilities* 83 8% 106 14% 104 15% 162 20%
Homeland 
Security Inst. -- -- -- -- 5 1% 5 1%
Total S&T 1,091 100% 750 100% 692 100% 800 100%
Source: Based on data from AAAS and the President’s FY 2008 Budget Request. 
Note: Figures may not sum exactly due to rounding. 
* The University Programs and Laboratory Facilities accounts correspond to two offices within the Office 
of Research—University Programs and the Office of National Laboratories, which administers the budget 
for the construction and operation of laboratory facilities. 
 
S&T R&D Spending125 by Portfolio 
 
S&T places its R&D activities into four categories—Research, Transition, Innovation, and 
Other, a catch-all category that includes laboratory operations and construction, testing and 
evaluation, and standards.  
 
S&T definitions of Research and Transition appear to correspond with OMB and NSF 
definitions of basic research and development, respectively.  The S&T category of Innovation 
does not correspond to standard federal R&D reporting categories, but describes the projects in 
its portfolio in terms of their relatively high-risk/high-reward profile.126  Data on the Innovation 
portfolio’s share of S&T R&D presented in Congressional testimony include Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR) program R&D funding.127  However, the SBIR program, while 
located in the Office of Innovation, is not linked programmatically to the Innovation portfolio.  
 
A comparison of FY 2008 and FY 2009 indicates shifts in the shares of the S&T R&D spending 
accounted for by the Transition, Research, and Innovation portfolios: 
 
                                                 
125 Discussion of R&D spending is based on S&T spend plan data, which may not coincide exactly with funding 
amounts appropriated by Congress for individual budget accounts. 
126 Innovation funding is provided through two programs: High Impact Technology Solutions (HITS) and Homeland 
Innovative Prototypical Solutions (HIPS).  HITS and HIPS are described as funding proof of concept and prototype 
demonstrations, respectively. See Chapter V for further discussion of these programs. 
127 Under Secretary for DHS S&T testimony before the House Science and Technology Subcommittee on 
Technology and Innovation, DHS R&D Budget Priorities for FY 2009, March 8, 2008. 
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• Transition decreased from 53 to 48 percent; 
• Research increased from 20 to 23 percent;  and 
• Innovation decreased from 5 to 4 percent.  
 
The increase in Research funding as a share of S&T R&D is in keeping with S&T’s goal of 
moving toward a greater commitment to basic research and exceeds the original target of 20 
percent. Funding for Innovation R&D, however, falls short of the target of 10 percent.  
 
Transition Portfolio Spending 
 
Transition projects funded by the six technical divisions account for the vast majority of 
Transition portfolio spending (91 percent). Office of Transition programs account for 7 percent. 
The Office of Transition spending includes TechShare projects, which account for between one 
and two percent of total Transition portfolio spending. The remaining two percent of Transition 
portfolio spending is split roughly between spending on Special Programs projects and programs, 
and spending on DHS’ Federally Funded R&D Center, the Homeland Security Institute. 
 
Table A-4: Distribution of Transition Portfolio Spending 
FY 2009 
 
Components of Transition 
Spending 
% of  
Total 
Six Technical Divisions 91
Office of Transition  7
Homeland Security Institute 1
Special Programs Division 1
         Source: Based on data from S&T’s FY 2009 spend plan. 
 
Transition R&D funding for the six technical S&T divisions is allocated across twelve Integrated 
Product Teams organized around high priority technology needs that have been identified by 
S&T in consultation with internal DHS customers and other stakeholders.128  Each IPT is funded 
by one division, but four of the six divisions administer more than one IPT. 129 
 
The allocation of funding to IPTs varies widely, ranging from less than $3 million for Maritime 
Security, a new IPT created in FY 2008, to over $150 million for Chemical/Biological, which 
accounts for over 47 percent of total funding for IPTs.  (See Table B-5.) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
128 See DHS, S&T, High Priority Technology Needs, June 2008. 
129 The Counter-IED IPT is funded through the Explosives Division, but three divisions – Explosives, Infrastructure 
Protection, and Human Factors, participate in decision-making regarding the development and funding of projects. 
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Table A-5:  Spending by IPT 
FY 2009 
 
Parent Division Capstone IPT Amount % of  total IPT $ 
Border security 11,925,000 3.7%
Cargo Security 13,198,000 4.1%Borders/Maritime 
Maritime security 2,585,000 0.8%
Chemical/ Biological Chemical/ Biological 150,620,959 47.3%
Info sharing 20,434,556 6.4%
Interoperability 10,876,575 3.4%Command, Control & Interoperability Cyber security 21,701,719 6.8%
Transportation Security 34,069,360 10.7%Explosives Counter-IED 14,055,820 4.4%
Human 
Factors/Behavioral 
Sciences 
People Screening 
6,919,400 2.2%
Infrastructure Protection 16,098,608 5.1%Infrastructure/ 
Geophysical Incident management 15,633,939 4.9%
Source: Based on data from S&T’s FY 2009 spend plan. 
 
Research Portfolio Spending 
 
In FY 2009, most S&T Research spending (over 73 percent) is accounted for by projects funded 
and managed by the six technical divisions. The remaining 26-27 percent is administered 
separately by University Programs in the Office of Research. (See Table B-6.)  Over three 
quarters of University Programs funding goes to multi-year awards to university-based Centers 
of Excellence. 
 
Two technical divisions–Infrastructure and Geophysical and Chemical and Biological—account 
for 40 percent of total S&T Research spending. Another 19 percent is accounted for by an 
“internal” research IPT created by S&T in FY 2008 to govern Research programs carried out by 
three technical divisions in support of the Counter-IED IPT.  The funding administered by this 
internal IPT is allocated to a separate spending account, to which the three divisions contribute. 
(See Table B-6.)  Counter-IED Research spending accounts for over a quarter of Research 
spending by all six technical divisions. 
 
Research spending as a share of R&D spending varies widely across the six technical divisions, 
ranging from 2.2 percent (Borders/Maritime) to 52.9 percent (Infrastructure/Geophysical).  The 
large Research share of Infrastructure/Geophysical R&D reflects Congressionally-directed 
funding for two programs totaling $34.8 million.130  This funding constitutes 75.7 percent of the 
division’s entire R&D budget. 
 
                                                 
130 See section on S&T Research, Development, Acquisition, and Operations in explanatory statement 
accompanying FY 2009 Continuing Resolution funding for DHS, DOD, and VA. 
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Table A-6:  Research Spending by Component 
FY 2009 
 
Component Amount Research as % of Div R&D 
% of S&T 
Research 
Borders/ Maritime 650,000 2.2% 0.4% 
Chemical/ 
Biological 
33,052,760 16.8% 19.1% 
Command, Control, 
& Interoperability 
10,441,936 15.7% 6.0% 
Counter-IED 32,900,000 100% 19.0% 
Explosives 7,917,620 13.8% 4.6% 
Human Factors 4,499,690 38.4% 2.6% 
Infrastructure/ 
Geophysical 
37,753,287 52.9% 21.8% 
Total Research by 
Six Divisions 
127,215,293 N/A 73.4% 
University 
Programs 
45,997,050 N/A 26.6% 
Total Research 173,212,343 N/A 100.0% 
Source: Based on data from S&T’s FY 2009 spend plan. 
 
Distribution of Research and Transition Portfolio Spending by Performer Type 
 
Industry is the largest recipient of Transition spending (43 percent), which would be expected 
given that industry is the predominant performer of development-oriented work. DOE National 
Laboratories and Federal performers (mostly federal agency laboratories) both are significant 
recipients of Transition spending, 20 and 17 percent respectively.  Universities are one of the 
largest recipients of Research spending (31 percent), which is consistent with their role as the 
predominant performer of basic research.  However, it is surprising that industry accounts for an 
equal share of Research spending (31 percent). Moreover, industry’s share of Research spending 
in FY 2009 is more than double that in FY 2008 (13 percent).131  The DOE National Laboratories 
also are a major recipient of Research spending (26 percent).  The National Laboratories are the 
largest performer of Research spending by the six technical divisions (34 percent).132  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
131 S&T officials say the industry share of FY 2009 Research spending is inaccurate, but have not yet provided 
revised figures. At the same time, industry’s share of Transition spending dropped by 23 percent from 56 percent in 
FY 2008 to 43 percent in FY 2009. 
132 This share is calculated based on Research spending, excluding University Programs spending, which is devoted 
to university-based research (primarily Centers of Excellence) and is administratively separate from the technical 
divisions R&D project budgets. 
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Table A-7:  S&T Research and Transition Spending by Performer Type 
FY 2009 
 
Performer Type 
% of  
Transition 
Spending 
% of 
Research 
Spending 
Federal  17 10 
FFRDC* 15 1 
Industry 43 31 
National Laboratory** 20 26 
Non-Profit 2 1 
University 3 31 
      Source: Based on share data provided by S&T. 
      * Federally-funded R&D Center (e.g., DHS’ Homeland Security Institute) 
      **DOE National Laboratories are also FFRDCs, but are accounted for separately by S&T. 
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APPENDIX B:  S&T WORKFORCE 
 
 
This Appendix provides a summary analysis of the S&T workforce with a focus on S&T 
headquarters divisions.  This analysis includes the composition of the workforce by personnel 
type and grade structure, in the case of federal employees; staffing of authorized FTE positions 
and turnover; and distribution of the workforce by division.  The workforce analysis is based on 
data obtained from the S&T personnel database at the end of FY 2008. Figures for the staffing of 
authorized FTE positions and turnover at S&T are based on March 2009 data provided by S&T’s 
Human Capital Officer. These data show a net change of one federal employee.133   
 
COMPOSITION OF THE S&T WORKFORCE  
 
S&T’s total workforce numbers 1,087, including employees and contractors134 in S&T 
headquarters divisions as well as S&T laboratories.  Employees include federal employees of 
S&T, “DHS Matrix” (other DHS employees working in S&T), Public Health Service Officers, 
detailees from other federal agencies, IPAs, and “Scholars/Fellows/Interns.”135 
 
S&T Headquarters 
Headquarters (HQ) divisions account for 71 percent of the S&T workforce.  Contractors account 
for the majority of the S&T HQ workforce (56 percent).  A breakdown of the HQ workforce is 
provided in Table A-1. 
                                                 
133 Due to small size of this change, the Academy team decided that updating the workforce analysis was 
unwarranted. 
134 The count of contractors excludes all those identified as “FFRDC” (Federally Funded Research and Development 
Center) and “surge.”  “FFRDC” indicates contractors employed through the Department’s FFRDC, Homeland 
Security Institute. Approximately 100 Homeland Security Institute contractors are included in the S&T personnel 
database, but the database does not indicate which of these contractors work in S&T components.  “Surge” 
contractors are not included in the tally of contractors because they do not work at S&T on a regular basis. 
135 Students and professors working at S&T under Interagency Agreements with DOE’s Oak Ridge Institute for 
Science and Education program. 
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Table B-1:  HQ Workforce by Personnel Type 
Personnel Type Number % of Total HQ Workforce 
Contractors 429 56% 
SETA* support 277 36.1% 
Other contract support 152 19.8% 
Employees 338 43% 
Federal Employees (of S&T) 226 29.5% 
DHS Matrix 69 9.0% 
Public Health Service Officers 3 0.4% 
Detailees 19 2.5% 
IPAs 12 1.6% 
Scholar/Fellow/Intern 9 1.2% 
HQ Workforce Total 767 100.0% 
Source: Based on data from S&T Personnel Database                       
* Systems Engineering and Technical Assistance 
 
Over 13 percent of federal employees at S&T headquarters are designated as either Senior 
Executive Service (SES) (5.8 percent) or Senior Technical (ST) personnel (7.5 percent).  The 
Director and Deputy Director of Innovation and the federal employee program managers that 
report to them were hired under 1101 authority, the authority under which DARPA hires its 
program managers.  These federal employees have pay plans designated Administratively 
Determined (AD).  They account for over 5 percent of S&T headquarters federal employees. 
 
Table B-2: HQ Federal Employees by Pay Plan 
Pay Plan Type Number % of Total HQ Federal Employees 
Executive Service (SES) 13 5.8% 
Senior Technical (ST) 17 7.5% 
Administratively 
Determined (AD) 
12 5.3% 
General Schedule (GS) 181 80.1% 
Other* 3 1.3% 
All Federal Employees 226 100.0% 
Source: Based on data from S&T Personnel Database                       
*”Other” includes employees with pay plans designated SL, WG, and N/A. 
 
Eighty-two percent of S&T headquarters federal employees on the General Schedule are either 
GS-14 or GS-15.  Of these, 79 percent are GS-15s. 
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ON-BOARD STAFFING RATIO AND TURNOVER RATE FOR FEDERAL 
EMPLOYEES AT S&T (Headquarters and Labs) 
 
In a June 2007 report, the GAO found that S&T was inadequately staffed—35 percent of total 
authorized FTE positions (383) were vacant.  S&T has made progress in addressing this staffing 
shortfall.  Over 90 percent of its authorized FTE positions were filled as of March 2009.  
 
Turnover rates among federal employees at S&T were relatively high around the time of the 
S&T headquarters reorganization, 11 percent in FY 2006 and 13 percent in FY 2007.  Turnover 
declined to 7.9 percent in FY 2008 and stands at just 2.9 percent as of March 2009. 
 
DISTRIBUTION OF S&T HEADQUARTERS WORKFORCE BY DIVISION  
 
This section presents the distribution of S&T headquarters workforce among the twenty divisions 
identified in the S&T personnel database.  These include the Office of the Under Secretary and 
the divisions identified in the official S&T organization chart as direct reports to the Under 
Secretary. Workforce data for each division is summarized in three categories: (1) Contractors 
(includes both SETA support and other contract support); (2) Federal Employees (federal 
employees of S&T only); and (3) Other Employees (includes all categories of employees except 
for federal employees of S&T). See Table A-1 for a full breakdown of contractor and employee 
categories. 
 
The twenty S&T divisions are presented below in three groups: (1) The Office of the 
Undersecretary and management support offices (Table A-3); (2) portfolio and specialized 
functional offices related directly to S&Ts’ support for R&D (Table A-4); and (3) the six 
technical divisions (Table B-5). 
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Table B-3:  Under Secretary and Management Support Offices 
 
Division 
Personnel 
Type Under Secretary 
Strategy, 
Policy, 
Budget 
Corporate 
Communications 
Associate 
General 
Counsel 
Business 
Operations 
Contractors 3 49 9 14 90
Federal 
Employees 
5 29 8 0 20
Other 
Employees 
0 29 2 6 26
Total 8 107 19 20 136
Source: Based on data from S&T Personnel Database                       
 
Table B-4:  Portfolio and Specialized Functional Offices 
 
Division 
Personnel Type 
R
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ea
rc
h 
Tr
an
si
tio
n 
In
no
va
tio
n 
T&
E/
 
St
an
da
rd
s 
Sp
ec
ia
l 
Pr
og
ra
m
s 
In
te
r-
A
ge
nc
y 
Pr
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ra
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na
l 
Pr
og
ra
m
s 
Contractors 17 38 8 6 3 2 2
Federal 
Employees 
19 9 17 8 3 6 10
Other Employees 11 0 1 3 5 3 1
Total 47 47 26 17 11 11 13
Source: Based on data from S&T Personnel Database                       
 
Table B-5:  Six Technical Divisions 
 
Division 
Personnel 
Type Borders/ Maritime 
Chemical/ 
Biological
Command, 
Control, and 
Interoperability 
Explosives Infrastructure/ Geophysical 
Human 
Factors 
Contractors 12 50 47 45 14 5
Federal 
Employees 
12 24 20 11 8 14
Other 
Employees 
7 8 5 5 2 0
Total 35 82 73 61 24 19
Source: Based on data from S&T Personnel Database                       
APPENDIX C 
 121
APPENDIX C:  INTEGRATED PRODUCT TEAM EXAMPLES 
 
 
In the generic IPT model (described in detail in Chapter V), the Capstone IPTs collect and 
prioritize capability gaps, S&T develops an R&D plan, and the Capstone decides which projects 
will move forward based on cost and other factors.  Most of the IPTs have a structure and 
process that differ to varying degrees from the generic model.  Below are two examples of how 
IPTs have been adapted to meet the needs of customers. 
 
 
EXAMPLE 1:  STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF THE CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL 
DEFENSE IPT 
 
The Chemical/Biological Division is the S&T lead for the Chem/Bio IPT, while the Office of 
Infrastructure Protection and the Office of Health Affairs are the customer leads.  The IPT has 
added layers to the standard structure, including a Committee on Requirements (CoRE) between 
the Sub-IPTs and the Capstone IPT, and Working Groups under the Sub-IPTs.136  (See Figure D-
1.)  
                                                 
136 As of March, 2009, the Chem/Bio Division was considering disbanding the Sub-IPTs due to lack of customer 
participation.  
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Figure C-1:  The Chemical and Biological Division IPT Structure 
 
 
Source:  DHS S&T 
 
Members of the CoRE are a subset of the Sub-IPT membership; Sub-IPT members are drawn 
from the Working Group members. 
 
The Chem/Bio IPT process for identifying, refining, and prioritizing capability gaps requires 
approximately six months.  The following is a rough description of the process:   
 
• A kick-off Capstone IPT meeting. 
• Components submit capability gaps to the CoRE. 
• The CoRE submits capability gaps to the appropriate Working Group for review, edit, 
and refinement. 
• The Working Group submits edits to capability gaps and a Summary Chart to the 
Bio/Chem transition manager, which are then reviewed by the CoRE with input from the 
Working Groups. 
• Working Groups prioritize capability gaps. 
• The capability gaps are consolidated by the Bio/Chem transition manager. 
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• The consolidated capability gaps are submitted to the Sub-IPTs. 
• The Sub-IPTs prioritize all of the capability gaps submitted by the Working Groups. 
• The prioritized capability gaps are submitted to the Capstone IPT. 
 
The CoRE meets once a month, but members are in regular contact with each other via phone 
and e-mail.  The purposes of the CoRE are to:  monitor and support the development and signing 
of TTAs; provide guidance to the Capstone on the development, validation, and prioritization of 
capability gaps; serve as a conduit for information to and from the Capstone IPT and Working 
Group meetings; ensure that customers/components are engaged in the IPT process; and define 
working relationships and clarify procedures (for example, the transition manager worked with 
the CoRE to finalize a process for prioritizing capability gaps).   
 
The Working Groups have 20-25 members, including agencies outside of DHS (e.g., US 
Department of Agriculture and the Federal Bureau of Investigation), and have primary 
responsibility for collecting information on capability gaps.  The Office of Health Affairs and the 
Office of Infrastructure Protection receive capability gaps from many sources, including the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan process (see Example 2, below).  The Office of Health 
Affairs may also collect gaps from state and local health departments or work with the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention to identify gaps.  A broad range of agencies, both within and 
external to DHS, submit capability gaps.137  The Chem/Bio transition manager estimates that the 
number of organizations providing gaps to the Chem/Bio IPT through IPT participants could 
easily be 100.  Approximately 85 capability gaps were submitted during the FY 2008 Chem/Bio 
IPT round.   
 
Working Groups also are responsible for the initial review and validation of capability gaps, with 
a particular focus on whether:  
 
• the gap is in Chem/Bio’s mission;  
• the capability gap template is filled in completely and is easily understood;  
• it is a “need” or a “want”;  
• the solution has been prematurely specified; and  
• it is in conformance with HSPD requirements.   
 
Gaps judged suitable for consideration as an S&T project, but outside Chem/Bio’s mission, are 
referred to other IPTs. 
 
The capability gaps that are validated as a result of the initial Working Group review process are 
prioritized based on the following criteria: operational impact; threat assessment; level of 
complexity; criticality of need; and probability of success.  To support Working Groups in 
prioritizing capability gaps, the Chem/Bio transition manager provides them with a Capability 
                                                 
137 Chem/Bio also receives capability gaps from both TechSolutions and the IAD.  These are assigned to program 
managers who determine whether or not research relating to the gap is already being conducted.  If not, and if the 
gap does not meet the TechSolutions criteria, it may be included in the Chem/Bio IPT capability gap process. 
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Gap Prioritization Process template that includes instructions to the Working Group chairs on the 
prioritization process, a scoring/weighting sheet, and a ballot for reviewers to assess the 
capability gaps based on the criteria listed above.  In response to concerns by customers that 
some voices were not being heard, Chem/Bio instituted a policy that each agency gets an equal 
vote.  The ballots are available electronically, so they can easily be submitted even if a member 
cannot attend a meeting. 
 
The process is all but complete by the time the Capstone IPT meets; capability gaps are vetted, 
discussed, and confirmed before they are submitted to the Capstone.  Final decisions are made by 
the Capstone IPT, which can overrule priorities set by the Working Groups and Sub-IPTs. 
 
 
EXAMPLE 2:  INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PRIORITIZATION PROCESS 
 
The Office of Infrastructure Protection is the customer lead for the Infrastructure Protection IPT, 
and the Infrastructure and Geophysical Division is the S&T lead.  The Office of Infrastructure 
Protection’s requirements are driven by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, Critical 
Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection.  This Directive requires the 
development of a National Infrastructure Protection Plan that addresses the 18 sectors that the 
federal government has designated as critical infrastructure.  Under the Plan, the Office of 
Infrastructure Protection is responsible for leading six of the sectors (emergency services, 
chemical, commercial facilities, dams, nuclear, and critical manufacturing) and S&T is 
responsible for the Critical Infrastructure Protection R&D Plan.  As part of the R&D Plan’s 
development, S&T and the Office of Infrastructure Protection created a matrix populated with 
data concerning research that has been done and progress that has been made across the 24 
agencies and 18 sectors in nine theme areas.  This effort made it possible to identify research 
gaps.   
 
As a result of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, the process for identifying priorities 
for the Infrastructure Protection IPT is very formalized.  The critical infrastructure sectors are 
required by Congress to publish Sector Specific Plans and Sector Annual Reports.  As part of the 
process for developing the Reports and Plans, the Office of Infrastructure Protection and S&T 
help the sectors identify and articulate their capability gaps.  The Office of Infrastructure 
Protection then reviews and prioritizes the gaps using a variety of criteria, including risk 
assessment.  The Homeland Infrastructure and Threat and Risk Analysis Center conducts annual 
risk assessments for all sectors.  The Office of Infrastructure Protection and S&T align the 
prioritized capability gaps with the IPT process and S&T submits the gaps to the appropriate 
IPT.  By having S&T involved from the beginning of the process, sectors now have a better 
understanding of what a capability gap is and S&T can cull inappropriate gaps (e.g., acquisitions 
gaps v. technology gaps) from the list earlier in the process.  As a result, the number of capability 
gaps submitted by the sectors has dropped by about two-thirds, but the quality has improved 
significantly.   
 
For all the IPTs that the Office of Infrastructure Protection leads or co-leads, a similar method is 
used to prioritize all of the capability gaps submitted by IPT members within each IPT.  S&T 
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adds several criteria, including whether:  S&T is able to perform the work; the technology is 
already available; and any other organization is already working on it.   
 
The Infrastructure and Geophysical Division and the Office of Infrastructure Protection work 
closely enough together that the Infrastructure and Geophysical Division is not required to 
evaluate the requirements identified through the IPT very closely.  The Office of Infrastructure 
Protection recognizes that many gaps do not require technology solutions and will cull those 
from the list.  If there are gaps that do not belong in an IPT, S&T provides advice on what to do 
with them.  For example, it may be an acquisition issue or fall within DOD’s mission areas.  If 
the requirement deserves basic research, S&T may refer the project to a Center of Excellence or 
National Laboratory.  These back-and-forth discussions regarding the requirements take place in 
the Capstone IPT or in face-to-face meetings that include S&T, the Office of Infrastructure 
Protection, and sector representatives.  
  126
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APPENDIX D:  LOGIC MODELS  
 
Chapters V and VI of this report discusses the value of using logic models to identify IPT 
customers.  Each IPT may have different sets of customers depending on the nature of the effort.  
A logic modeling exercise can ensure that the customer base is appropriately identified in each 
case, so that meaningful input can be obtained from the most relevant customers, work can be 
focused on meeting customer needs, and the impact on customer’s ability to perform their tasks 
can be measured.   
 
In fact, logic models can serve a broader purpose in ensuring that work is focused on the goals of 
the organization, that all involved have a clear understanding of how the program is supposed to 
or does operate, and that the program can be explained to all interested parties.  This can include 
S&T staff, DHS staff from component agencies, state, local and tribal governments, first 
responders, Congress, and other federal agencies.  
 
A logic model is simply a structured way of describing the work of an organization.138  It 
sequentially maps the program with the intention of ensuring that the logic of the program will 
be clear.  Programs are broken into five model component categories.  These components are 
shown below with S&T-relevant examples of their potential content. 
 
 
 
                        
• Inputs (Resources) 
S&T staff, appropriated funds, equipment, facilities, etc. 
• Activities (What the Program Does) 
determine research priorities, fund and monitor research, promote research by others, etc. 
• Outputs (Products or Services) 
technologies, models, risk assessments, etc. 
• Outcomes (Immediate Benefits) 
adoption of outputs by customers, etc. 
• Impacts (Changes or Long-Term Outcomes) 
Improvements in preventing terrorism and/or natural disasters, and improving recovery 
efforts, etc. 
 
Logic models are useful for both planning programs and evaluating them.  For planning, the 
starting point is to determine the desired impact (starting at the far right of the model and 
working towards the left), and work backward through the model to identify the outcomes, 
outputs, activities, and inputs will be needed achieve the impact.  It is this planning application 
                                                 
138 For additional information concerning logic models see “Using Logic Models to Bring Together Planning, 
Evaluation, and Action: Logic Model Development Guide,” W.K. Kellogg Foundation, January 2004.  This guide is 
available at www.wkkf.org.  See also Bozeman, B. (2007) “Public Values and Public Interest: Counter-balancing 
Economic Individualism.  Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, and Bozeman, B. “Public Value 
Mapping of Science Outcomes: Theory and Method.” In D. Sarewitz, et. al. “Knowledge Flows and Knowledge 
Collectives: Understanding the Role of Science and Technology Policies in Development.” 2(1). 
  Inputs  Æ  Activities  Æ  Outputs  Æ  Outcomes  Æ  Impacts 
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that can be used by S&T to ensure that appropriate customers are identified for each IPT.139  
Starting with impact, it would be difficult or impossible to consider impact without considering 
the customer.  Whose hands does the technology have to be in to have an impact on homeland 
security?  For example, if the technology is intended to ensure that weapons of mass destruction 
are detected if hidden in a cargo container, then the technology would have to be in the hands of 
Customs and Border Protection personnel at foreign or domestic ports.  If the intended impact of 
the technology is to ensure that individuals with mal-intent are prevented from taking action, 
then the technology may need to be in the hands of Customs and Border Protection and also 
federal, state and local law enforcement personnel.  When desired impacts have been identified, 
the process requires working back to outcomes, outputs, activities, and finally inputs that would 
be needed to achieve the impact.   
 
These two examples are simplified versions of the process of identifying the customer in relation 
to the intended impact.  They also show that different IPTs may have different intended 
customers, and thus would benefit from different sets of customers in considering capability gaps 
and setting priorities.   
 
In addition to the benefit of customizing the consideration of customers, the development of a 
logic model can ensure that the processes planned to achieve results is logical.  That is, that 
inputs, activities, outputs, etc. are reasonable for achieving results.  The process of building a 
logic model ensures that all involved fully understand the reasoning behind the organization of 
work, that all have had the opportunity to propose and consider alternatives, and that there is 
agreement on goals. 
 
                                                 
139 To use the logic model for evaluation purposes, the process generally starts with inputs, on the left side of the 
model, and proceeds to the right to assess, among other things, whether the program is organized to work in a way 
that is likely to produce desired outcomes, what outcomes are likely to be produced, and what measures are 
appropriate to measure outcomes. 
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 APPENDIX E:  PARTICIPATION IN INTERAGENCY COORDINATION 
ENTITIES BY SELECTED S&T COMPONENTS 
 
This table provides a snapshot of participation by S&T components in formal interagency 
coordination entities. It is based on information provided by S&T in August 2008, with the 
exception of information on the Human Factors Division provided in comments by S&T on a 
previous version of this table in the Academy’s interim report. 
 
S&T Participation by Division/Office 
Chemical/Biological Division 
Federal 
BioShield Biological Working Group 
BioShield Enterprise Executive Committee 
BioShield Executive Governance Board 
Chemical Security Analysis Center Interagency Steering Committee 
Diagnostics Working Group 
Environmental Anthratics Validated Sampling Plan Technology Working Group 
Environmental Chemical Laboratory Response Technical Working Group 
First Responder-Anthrax Vaccine Policy Group 
Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks 
Joint Biological Point Detection System Working Group 
Joint Science and Technology Office Proposal Review Panel 
Non-Proliferation Arms Control Technical Working Group 
Response and Restoration Sub Policy Coordination Committee 
Other 
Laboratory Response Network-American Public Health Laboratories Advisory Group 
 
Command, Control & Interoperability Division 
 
Federal 
Comprehensive National Cyber Initiative Senior Steering Group 
Communications and Outreach Committee 
Cyber Security and Information Assurance Working Group 
Cyber Security Principal Investigators 
Cyber Security Quarterly Agency Review 
Domain Name System Security Working Group 
Emergency Communications Preparedness Center Clearinghouse Working Group 
Emergency Response Council  
Health Information Technology Standards Panel Technical Committee 
Information Security Research Council 
Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization and Interoperability 
Policy and Plans Steering Group 
Project 25 Compliance Assessment Governing Board 
Secure Protocols Working Group 
Spectrum Working Group  
Technical Support Working Group (project coordination) 
Technology Policy Council 
Wireless Working Group 
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State and Local 
All Hazards Consortium  
Practitioner Steering Group 
  
Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division 
 
NSTC Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management (Co-chair) 
NSTC Subcommittee on Human Factors (Co-chair) 
DOD Human Factors Engineering Technical Advisory Group (Executive Board) 
NSTC Subcommittee on Domestic Improvised Explosive Devices 
Strategic Multilayer Assessment Group, Joint Integration and Preparation of the 
Operational Environment 
Socio-cultural and Behavioral Science Research Group 
Radicalization and Violent Extremism Working Group 
Biometrics and Identity Management Working Group 
 
Inter-Agency and First Responder Programs Division (IAD) 
 
Federal 
Army Counter-IED Task Force 
Capabilities Development Working Group 
Capabilities Development Working Group Senior Steering Committee 
Transportation Sector R&D Working Group 
State and Local 
FEMA Region I Regional Advisory Committee 
FEMA Region I Regional Interagency Steering Committee 
FEMA Region II Managers' Meeting 
FEMA Region II Regional Advisory Committee 
FEMA Region II Regional Interagency Steering Committee 
FEMA Region III Regional Advisory Committee 
FEMA Region III Regional Interagency Steering Committee 
FEMA Region IV Regional Interagency Steering Committee 
FEMA Region V Regional Advisory Committee 
FEMA Region V Regional Interagency Steering Committee 
FEMA Region VI Regional Interagency Steering Committee 
FEMA Region VII Radiological Assistance Meeting 
FEMA Region VII Regional Interagency Steering Committee 
New Jersey Center for Public Health Preparedness Advisory Council 
New Jersey Regional Homeland Security Technology Committee 
Urban Area Security Initiative Working Group (New York City metropolitan area) 
Urban Area Security Initiative Working Group (Northern New Jersey) 
Other 
Adjutants General Association of the United States Homeland Security Committee 
National Guard Association 
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APPENDIX F: FINANCIAL MONITORING WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT 
OF HOMELAND SECURITY’S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
DIRECTORATE 
 
 
Financial monitoring assists in planning, maintaining efficiencies, and fulfilling project 
requirements.  In order to properly plan for upcoming years, financial monitoring helps S&T 
management track the status of obligated funds.  As projects are executed, it helps managers 
reestablish priorities and redirect available funds.  Moreover, financial monitoring helps ensure 
that transactions are properly made, not double-counted, and that the right level of decision-
making is used to execute them.  Finally, because S&T funds can be carried over to subsequent 
years, strict financial monitoring helps S&T with the performers’ tendency to lag in spending 
when executing S&T funding if they also have funding from additional sources. 
Prior to Under Secretary Cohen joining S&T, there were congressional complaints about lack of 
fiscal accountability.  Currently, there are no such criticisms.  In fact, the 2008 Senate 
Appropriations Report expressed the Senate’s pleasure with the rapid progress S&T appears to 
be making in resolving past deficiencies. 
S&T has established a multi-tier system of financial monitoring which is coordinated through the 
Chief Financial Officer (CFO): Weekly Status of Funds Reports and weekly Execution Reports; 
Quarterly Resources Reports (QRR); and division Spend Plans.  Divisions themselves have also 
developed internal informal weekly and monthly execution tracking mechanisms. 
 
The Execution Report of actual expenditures is provided to all of the divisions so that they can 
track finances themselves.  The Report provides data by division and goes down to the project 
level, including how projects are executing their budgets, commitments, obligations, 
expenditures, and balance. 
 
The Status of Funds Report demonstrates the current status of S&T in executing its appropriated 
funds.  It shows the commitments, obligations, and expenditures against the Spend Plan to ensure 
that spending is on schedule.  It is distributed to all fund holders, helping everyone track the 
funds and informing them if there are problems with executing the funds, such as a lag in 
contract awards, or invoices paid.  Lags between commitments and obligations, and even worse, 
between obligations and expenditures, often occur. 
 
The Spend Plan is a planning and execution tool for the divisions, CFO, and the Acquisitions 
Office to track progression of division spending and procurement for the upcoming year.  The 
Spend Plan is developed before an appropriation is received in order to plan procurements 
through the fiscal year.  However, after an acquisition is received, procurement requests are 
tracked against the Spend Plan.  Along with the Status of Funds reports, Spend Plans inform the 
S&T staff when it is not on target for committing and obligating funds. 
 
The Quarterly Resources Report is an internal review to check the status of spending toward the 
identified project milestones.  The CFO tries to match the milestones against the funding 
execution to ensure that everyone is satisfied with the progress towards the goal for each project.  
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The QRR is reviewed by the CFO with the division directors who provide explanations and 
justifications if milestones were not met as scheduled.  CFO is currently reviewing the QRR 
process to focus on the project progression and potentially identify any funding changes that 
need to be taken if projects are changed or eliminated.  To do so, the CFO needs to analyze the 
specifics in the contracts—deliverables, invoices, and matching execution against initial spend 
plans.  Then, if the CFO detects an “anomaly,” it can meet with the respective division to clarify 
the situation. 
 
S&T undergoes an annual internal controls review and a financial audit directed by the DHS 
CFO.  The former is a self-assessed review of S&T’s internal controls over financial reporting.  
The results are summarized in an assurance statement to the DHS Secretary from the S&T Under 
Secretary.  The annual financial statement audit includes an audit of the internal controls over 
financial reporting.  The 2008 audit is currently active and the audit findings are due November 
15, 2008. (We have requested the 08 findings and will add these results when they are received.)  
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APPENDIX G:  FEDERAL AGENCY HOMELAND SECURITY R&D 
SPENDING 
FY 2004 – FY 2008 
 
 
The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) has categorized and tracked 
homeland security-related R&D spending for 10 federal agency R&D funders (including DHS) 
since FY 2004.  These data are used to compare homeland security (HS) R&D spending with 
non-homeland security (non-HS) R&D spending over time for each the nine agencies other than 
DHS.140 This appendix presents graphs for each of these agencies during the time period FY 2004 
– FY 2008.141 
 
For each of the nine agencies, two graphs are presented.  The first shows absolute amounts of 
funding for homeland security and non-homeland security related R&D along with total agency 
R&D funding.  The second shows funding for homeland security-related and non-homeland 
security-related R&D as percentages of total agency R&D funding.  The order in which agency 
R&D funding data is presented follows the ranking of these agencies by total funding of 
homeland security-related R&D in FY 2008.  This ranking is presented in Table G-1 below. 
 
 
Table G-1 
Top Ten Agency Funders 
 of Homeland Security-Related R&D  
FY 2008 
Rank 
($Amt of 
HS-related 
R&D) 
Agency HS-related 
R&D 
Funding 
($Millions) 
1 Dept of Health & Human Services 1,940 
2 Dept of Defense 1,294 
3 Dept of Homeland Security 992 
4 National Science Foundation 356 
5 Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Adm. 102 
6 Dept of Energy 70 
7 Dept of Commerce 65 
8 Environmental Protection Agency 54 
9 Dept of Agriculture 51 
10 Dept of Transportation 2 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
140 AAAS categorizes all DHS R&D as homeland security. 
141 FY 2008 is the most recent year for which AAAS has categorized the homeland security portion of agency R&D 
spending.  Agency R&D spending figures for FY 2008 are estimates. 
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (HHS) 
 
Absolute Levels of HHS R&D Funding:
Total; Homeland Security; and Non-Homeland Security
($Millions)
29,81629,62128,97729,16128,521
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD)142 
 
Absolute Levels of DOD R&D Funding:
Total; Homeland Security; and Non-Homeland Security
($Millions)
65,948
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Shares of Total DOD R&D Funding:
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142 DOD expanded its reporting of homeland security spending beginning in FY 2005. 
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NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION (NSF) 
 
Absolute Levels of NSF R&D Funding:
Total; Homeland Security; and Non-Homeland Security
($Millions)
321 326 329 370 356
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Shares of Total NSF R&D Funding:
Homeland Security and Non-Homeland Security
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA) 
 
Absolute Levels of NASA R&D Funding:
Total; Homeland Security; and Non-Homeland Security
($Millions)
11,295 11,582
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE) 
 
Abolute Levels of DOE R&D Funding:
Total; Homeland Security; and Non-Homeland Security
($Millions)
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE (DOC) 
 
Absolute Levels of DOC R&D Funding:
Total; Homeland Security; and Non-Homeland Security
($Millions)
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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA) 
 
Absolute Levels of EPA R&D Funding: 
Total; Homeland Security; and Non-Homeland Security
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DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (USDA) 
 
Absolute Levels of USDA R&D Funding:
Total; Homeland Security; and Non-Homeland Security
($Millions)
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (DOT) 
 
Absolute Levels of DOT R&D Funding:
 Total; Homeland Security; and Non-Homeland Security 
($Millions)
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APPENDIX H:  PANEL AND STAFF 
 
PANEL 
 
Cindy L. Williams, Chair∗—Principal Research Scientist, Security Studies Program, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Former Assistant Director, National Security Division, 
Congressional Budget Office. Former positions with The MITRE Corporation: Director, C2 
Integration Environment; Associate Technical Director, Continental Command, Control, and 
Communications Division; Department Head, Strategic Air Command Systems Department; 
Associate Department Head, Strategic Defense Initiative. Former positions with U.S. Department 
of Defense: Director, Strategic Offensive Forces Division, Program Analysis and Evaluation, 
Office of the Secretary; Operations Analyst. Former positions with RAND Corporation: 
Mathematician, Strategic Forces Project; Project Leader, Force Operations Team, Automated 
Wargaming Center. 
 
Barry Bozeman*—Ander Crenshaw Chair, Department of Public Administration and Policy, 
University of Georgia. Former Regents' Professor of Public Policy, School of Public Policy and 
Director, Research Value Mapping Research Program, Georgia Institute of Technology; 
Director, Center for Technology and Information Policy, Maxwell School of Citizenship and 
Public Affairs and L.C. Smith College of Engineering, Syracuse University; Director, Doctoral 
Program in Public Administration, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse 
University. 
 
Louise K. Comfort*—Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, and 
Director, Center for Disaster Management, University of Pittsburgh. Visiting Professor, 
Department of Geography, Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan; Visiting Professor, Center for 
Urban Safety and Security, School of Engineering, Kobe University, Japan; Associate Professor, 
School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh; Visiting Professor, 
Department of Public Administration, Leiden University, Netherlands. 
 
David F. Garrison*—Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Brookings. Deputy Director, Greater 
Washington Research, Metropolitan Policy Program, Brookings.  Former Vice President, 
National Academy of Public Administration. Former positions with U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services: Counselor to the Deputy Secretary; Acting Director, Office for Civil 
Rights; Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation; Deputy Director and 
Senior Advisor, Intergovernmental Affairs. Former Director, The Urban Center, Levin College 
of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University. Former positions with the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development: General Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of Policy 
Development and Research; Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of Policy Development and 
Research. Former Budget Analyst, Committee on the Budget, U.S. House of Representatives; 
Legislative Counsel, National League of Cities/U.S. Conference of Mayors. 
 
Sally T. Hillsman*—Executive Officer, American Sociological Association. Former Deputy 
Director, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice; 
                                                 
∗ Academy Fellow 
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Vice President for Research & Technology National Center for State Courts. Former positions 
with the Vera Institute of Justice (New York City): Project Director; Assistant Director of 
Research; Director of Research; Associate Director. 
 
Caroline Purdy—Principal Deputy Assistant Director for Systems Engineering and Evaluation 
Directorate, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office in Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 
Former positions in the DHS Science and Technology Directorate: Director of 
Infrastructure/Geophysical Division, Acting Deputy Director for Office of Research and 
Development, and Director of Office of National Laboratories. Positions held at the Department 
of Energy in the Office of Environmental Management: program manager in the Office of 
Science and Technology for the Characterization, Monitoring and Sensor Technology program 
and Accelerated Site Technology Deployment Program. 
 
 
STAFF STUDY TEAM 
 
Lena E. Trudeau, Vice President—Ms. Trudeau leads the National Academy’s service delivery 
organization, supervises the conception and execution of strategic initiatives, opens new lines of 
business and drives organizational change. In addition, Ms. Trudeau is a founder of the 
Collaboration Project, an independent forum of leaders committed to leveraging web 2.0 and the 
benefits of collaborative technology to solve government's complex problems. Ms. Trudeau’s 
previous roles include: Program Area Director, National Academy of Public Administration, 
Vice President, The Ambit Group; Marketing Manager, Nokia Enterprise Solutions; Principal 
Consultant, Touchstone Consulting Group; Consultant, Adventis Inc.; and Associate, Mitchell 
Madison Group. 
 
Rick Cinquegrana, Program Area Director—Former legal Counsel and Special Counsel to the 
Inspector General, Office of Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency; Deputy Staff 
Director/Chief Investigative Counsel, Joint Senate Select Committee on Intelligence-House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Inquiry into September 11, United States Congress; 
Special Counsel for Policy, Intelligence Community Management Staff; Chief Counsel, National 
Commission to Review the Performance of the National Reconnaissance Office; Chief 
Investigative Counsel, House Select Committee on U.S. National Security and 
Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, United States House of 
Representatives; Deputy Inspector General for Investigations, Office of Inspector General, 
Central Intelligence Agency; Deputy Counsel for Intelligence Policy, Office of Intelligence 
Policy, U.S. Department of Justice; Assistant General Counsel, CIA Office of General Counsel; 
Associate Attorney, Day, Berry & Howard.  
 
Laurie E. Ekstrand, Project Director—Former Director of Justice Issues and of Health Care at 
the United States Government Accountability Office.  Former positions with the Government 
Accountability Office include: Chief Social Scientist, General Government Division; Group 
Director, Human Resources Division; and Statistician, Program Evaluation and Methodology 
Division.  Dr. Ekstrand also served as Senior Evaluation Officer at The World Bank’s Operations 
Evaluation Division, and as Senior Analyst at Westat Inc. Dr. Ekstrand received her Ph.D. from 
Florida State University in Political Science, Research Methods and Statistics and a BA from the 
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University of Maryland in Political Science and Philosophy.  Dr. Ekstrand received a 
Distinguished Service Award for excellence from the Government Accountability Office, 
Results Through Teamwork awards and Special Commendation Awards. 
 
Ruth Ann Heck, Senior Advisor—National Academy of Public Administration.  Private 
consultant.  Has participated in Academy studies in areas such as DoD’s Joint Land Use Study, 
Small Business Administration, the Corps of Engineers, federal transportation and wildfire 
mitigation programs.  Former Assistant Director, Health, Education and Human Services 
Division of the U.S. General Accounting Office. Oversaw studies in a wide range of government 
programs, including elementary and secondary education grant programs and veterans benefits. 
Served in staff capacities as co-director of GAO's entry-level training program and as report 
review assistant to HEHS Division Director. 
 
Zlatko B. Kovach, Senior Advisor143—Evaluation specialist and senior researcher and analyst 
with experience in conducting program evaluations for impact and developing and managing 
programs at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, International Republican Institute, Center for the 
Study of the Presidency.  Former positions included at the World Bank and International Crisis 
Group.  Mr. Kovach holds an M.A. in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School of Law and 
Diplomacy, B.A. in Economics, Politics, and Philosophy, Pomona College, and International 
Baccalaureate, United World College. 
 
Maria Rapuano, Senior Advisor—Former Project Director, Alliance for Healthy Homes. 
Former positions with the Overseas Development Council and State Services Organization.  
Rapuano serves on the Board of Directors for the Trust for Lead Poisoning Prevention. Rapuano 
received her M.A. from The American University in International Affairs, with concentrations in 
International Development and International Economic Policy, and a B.A. in Government from 
the College of William and Mary. 
 
Jonathan C. Tucker, Senior Research Analyst—National Academy for Public Administration.  
Former positions include: Analyst, Technology Partnership Practice, Battelle Memorial Institute; 
Intern, Committee on Science, Engineering and Public Policy, National Academies; Program 
Analyst, Advanced Technology Program, National Institute of Standards and Technology; 
Analyst, Office of Policy and Research, New York State Department of Economic Development. 
 
Caroline M. Epley, Research Associate—Former positions include Intern at the Department of 
Veterans Affairs in the Office of Congressional and Legislative Affairs. Bachelor of Arts, 
Communication and Political Science, Virginia Tech. 
 
Anna V. Tkachenko, Research Associate144—Former positions include Research Assistant, 
Public and International Affairs, George Mason University; Graduate Intern, Human Resources, 
Development Alternatives, Inc.; Resource Coordinator, The Nature Conservancy; Intern, U.S. 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary; Intern, Speaker of the House Office, Pennsylvania House of 
Representatives. Master of Public Administration, George Mason University; Bachelors of Arts 
                                                 
143 Zlatko Kovach was a member of the team until January 2009. 
144 Anna Tkachenko was a member of the team until October 2008. 
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in Political Science, Mansfield University of Pennsylvania; Bachelors of Arts in Jurisprudence, 
Volgograd State University, Russia.  
 
Martha S. Ditmeyer—Senior Administrative Specialist.  Staff member providing technical 
support for a wide range of Academy studies. Former staff positions at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA and the Communications Satellite Corporation, 
Washington D. C. and Geneva, Switzerland. 
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APPENDIX I:  INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED 
 
Science and Technology Directorate Personnel at the  
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
 
Lawrence Ash, Deputy Director, Transition Office 
 
Donald Bansleben, Program Manager, Research & Development, Chemical and Biological 
Division 
 
Douglas Bauer, Research Lead, Explosives Division 
 
Tanya Buttress, Support Contractor, Research and Development Section, Chemical and 
Biological Division 
 
R. Glenn Bell, Transition Branch Lead, Command, Control and Interoperability Division 
 
David Boyd, Director, Command, Control and Interoperability Division 
 
Brad Buswell, Under Secretary (Acting); Deputy Under Secretary 
 
Gary Carter, Deputy Director, Test & Evaluation and Infrastructure, Test & Evaluation and 
Standards Division 
 
Thomas Cellucci, Chief Commercialization Officer 
 
Matthew Clark, Director, University Programs, Office of Research 
 
Bert Coursey, Director, Office of Standards, Test & Evaluation and Standards Division  
 
Adam Cox, Chief of Staff, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Budget 
 
Debbie Cox, Deputy Director, Test & Evaluation Policy and Procedures, Test & Evaluation and 
Standards Division 
 
Nancy Crawford, Human Capital Officer 
 
Stan Cunningham, Transition Manager, Borders and Maritime Security Division 
 
Trent DePersia, Deputy Director, Command, Control and Interoperability Division 
 
Rolf Dietrich, Deputy Director, Office of Research 
 
Ruth Doherty, Program Executive Office—Counter-Improvised Explosive Device 
 
Christopher Doyle, Director, Infrastructure and Geophysical Division 
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Douglas Drabkowski, Transition Manager, Chemical and Biological Division 
 
Anh Duong, Director, Borders and Maritime Security Division 
 
Mitchell Erickson, Northeast Operations Interagency and First Responders, Interagency and First 
Responder Programs Division 
 
Frank Filipkowski, Branch Head, Strategy, Planning and Integration Branch  
 
S. Elizabeth George, Division Head, Chemical and Biological Division 
 
Anne Hultgren, Program Manager, Research and Development Section, Chemical and Biological 
Division 
 
Mary Ellen Hynes, Research Lead, Infrastructure and Geophysical Division 
 
Jamie Johnson, Director, Office of National Labs, Office of Research 
 
Ervin Kapos, Director, Operations Analysis Division 
 
Joe Keilman, Research Lead, Command Control and Interoperability Division 
 
Richard Kikla, Deputy Director, Office of Transition 
 
Quintin Krueger, Program Staff for Research, Explosives Division 
 
Susan Law, Central US Region Interagency Coordination, Interagency and First Responder 
Programs Division 
 
Jeanne Lin, Research Lead, Borders and Maritime Security Division 
 
Richard Lempert, Deputy for Research, Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division 
 
David Masters, Deputy Director, Office of Innovation 
 
Jonathan McEntee, Research and Development Business Specialist, Borders and Maritime 
Security Division  
 
Rebecca Medina, Senior Policy Advisor, Explosives Division 
 
Milton Nenneman, Director, First Responder Coordination West, Interagency and First 
Responder Programs Division 
 
David Newton, Deputy Director, Borders and Maritime Security Division 
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Marlene Owens, Program Manager, Technology Transfer Office, Office of Transition, Science 
and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
 
Brandt Pasco, Assistant General Counsel for Science and Technology 
 
Terry Pierce, Liaison to U.S. Northern Command, Special Advisor for Disruptive Innovations, 
and HSARPA for the Western United States, Director, U.S. Air Force Academy Center for 
Innovation. 
 
Segaran Pillai, Chief Medical and Science Advisor, Chemical and Biological Division 
 
Kevin Prestwich, Chief Information Officer, Business Operations, Services, and Human Capital 
Division 
 
Greg Price, Director of Tech Solutions, First Responder Technologies (R-Tech), Office of 
Transition 
 
Paul Ragsdale, Science Advisor, International Programs Division 
 
Lilia Ramirez, Director, International Programs Division 
 
Sharla Rausch, Director, Human Factors Division 
 
Karen Ray, Director, Program Analysis & Evaluation 
 
Sherry Reichow, Analyst, Science and Systems Division, Homeland Security Institute 
 
Donald Roberts, Deputy Program Manager, Aircraft Protection Program, Explosives Division 
 
Kenneth D. Rogers, Chief Information Officer 
 
George Ryan, Jr., Director, Test and Evaluation and Standards Division 
 
Vincent Schaper, Director, Small Business Innovation Research Program 
 
Gregory Simmons, Senior Project Manager, Analytical Research, LLC, Office of Innovation, 
Homeworks  
 
Michael Smith, Senior Advisor to the Undersecretary, Interagency and First Responder Programs 
Division 
 
Christopher Turner, Deputy Director, Human Factors Division 
 
Jim Tuttle, Director, Explosives Division 
 
Stephen Vargas, Associate, Booz Allen Hamilton Inc., Infrastructure and Geophysical Division 
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Jose Vazquez, Director, First Responder Technologies (R-Tech), Office of Transition 
 
Starnes Walker, Director, Office of Research 
 
Keith Ward, Leader, Research and Development Section, Chemical and Biological Division,  
 
Phil Waters, Director, Tech Clearinghouse, First Responder Technologies (R-Tech), Office of 
Transition 
 
Richard Williams, Director, Strategy, Policy and Budget 
 
David Winters, Director, Office of Procurement Operations, Acquisition Division 
 
Randel Zeller, Director, Interagency and First Responder Programs Division 
 
Department of Homeland Security Component Agency Personnel 
 
R. Tim Baden, Program Specialist, Federal Emergency Management Agency 
 
Diane Berry, Director of Threat Characterization and Countermeasures, Office of Health 
Analysis 
 
Pat Burt, Technologies and Future Requirements Section Chief, Office of Bombing Prevention 
 
Glen Cannon, Assistant Administrator, Disaster Operations Directorate, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency 
 
Patty Cogswell, Executive Director, Office of Policy (Screening Coordination and Operations) 
 
Steve Evans, Chief, Enforcement and Information Technology Division, Customs and Border 
Protection 
 
Bob Farmer, Director of Program Analysis, Federal Emergency Management Agency 
 
Peter Fonash, Chief Technology Officer, Office of Cyber Security and Communications, 
National Protection and Programs Directorate 
 
Gordon Fullerton, Katrina Core, Federal Emergency Management Agency 
 
Chuck Galloway, Deputy Director (Acting), Domestic Nuclear Detection Office,  
 
Patricia Hawes, Science Officer, Laboratories and Scientific Services, U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection 
 
Taylor Heard, Chief of Staff and Acting Deputy Director, Office of Emergency Communications  
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Ted Kim, Chief, Growth Management Oversight Unit, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services 
 
Kimberly Koeppel, Program Analyst, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office  
 
Robert King, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Office of Protective Research, U.S. Secret 
Service 
 
Dave Kountney, Deputy Director, Office of Bombing Prevention 
 
Merrick Krause, Director, Infrastructure Analysis and Strategy Division, National Protection and 
Programs Directorate 
 
John Macaluso, Research and Development Program Manager, U.S. Coast Guard 
 
Jack McCready, Chief, Command, Control, Communications, and Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, Research and Development Center, U.S. Coast Guard 
 
Ron Molway, Lead, Requirements Management, Office of Security Technology, Transportation 
Security Administration 
 
Carter Morris, Director, Informational Sharing and Knowledge Management, Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis Office of Intelligence and Analysis 
 
Mark Mullen, Lead Systems Architect, Systems Engineering and Architecture, Domestic 
Nuclear Detection Office 
 
Charlie Payne, Chief, Office of Bombing Prevention 
 
Robert Pryor, Program Manager, Surface Protection, Transportation Security Administration 
 
Ira Reese, Executive Director, Laboratories and Scientific Services, U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection 
 
Patricia Stahlschmidt, Director, Strategic Planning and Evaluation, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency 
 
Bob Stephan, Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, Office of Infrastructure Protection 
 
Department of Defense Personnel 
 
Bob Baker, Deputy Director, Defense Research and Engineering 
 
Susan Brandon, Defense Counter-Intelligence and Human Center, Defense Intelligence Agency 
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Stephen Bury, Camber Corporation, Army 
 
Joel Carter, Program Analyst, Improvised Device Defeat, Technical Support Working Group, 
Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities  
 
Bob Campbell, Principal, Touchstone Consulting, 1401 Technology Transfer Program, Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 
 
Patricia Daniel, Explosives Detection, Technical Support Working Group, Combating Terrorism 
Technical Support Office, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities 
 
Dan Dickson, Military Technology Assistant, Plans and Programs, Defense Research and 
Engineering Office of the Undersecretary for Defense Research and Engineering 
 
Jeff David, Co-chair, Technical Support Working Group, Combating Terrorism Technical 
Support Office, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities 
 
Ed Doray, Chief, Concepts and Capabilities Division, U.S. Northern Command 
 
Paul Gido, Assistant Vice Chief, Office of Naval Research, Department of the Navy 
 
Jeffrey Hupy, Chief, Air and Missile Defense Future Concepts and Capabilities Division,  U.S. 
Northern Command  
 
Thomas H. Killion, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology/Chief Scientist, 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, (Acquisition, Logistics & Technology)  
 
Dan Kowalski, Senior Consultant, Touchstone Consulting, 1401 Technology Transfer Program, 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 
 
Don Lapham, Director, 1401 Technology Transfer Program, Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Homeland Defense 
 
Joseph Lawrence, Director of Transition, Office of Naval Research, Department of the Navy 
 
Susan Levine, Principal Deputy for Policy & Strategy, Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, 
US Marine Corps 
 
Stephen Mangino, Deputy Division Chief, Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
Interagency Coordination Division, U.S. Strategic Command 
 
Berndt McConnell, Director, Interagency Coordination Directorate, U.S. Northern Command 
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Barbara McQuiston, Director, Strategic Technology Office, Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency  
 
Jim McDonald, Director, Defense Technology Analysis Office, Office of the Director of Defense 
Research and Engineering 
 
Mindy Montgomery, Deputy Director for Investment, Plans and Programs Division, Office of 
the Director of Defense Research and Engineering 
 
Christopher K. Murphy, Joint IED Defeat Organization, Technology & Requirements Integration 
Division Initiatives & Technology Branch 
 
Adam Nucci, Deputy Director for Technical Intelligence, Office of the Director, Defense 
Research and Engineering, Plans & Programs Office 
 
Hannah Pack, Program Manager, Improvised Device Defeat, Technical Support Working Group, 
Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities 
 
Philip J. Palmer, InterAgency Coordinator, Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction  
InterAgency Coordination Division, U.S. Strategic Command, 
 
Gabriel Ramos, Program Manager, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, & Nuclear 
Countermeasures, Technical Support Working Group, Combating Terrorism Technical 
Support Office, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities 
 
Michael Reaves, Senior Engineer, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 
 
William Rees, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Laboratories & Basic Science, U.S. Department of 
Defense 
 
Ben Riley, Director, Rapid Reaction Technology Office, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense 
for Advanced Systems and Concepts 
 
Alan Shaffer, Principal Deputy Director, Defense Research and Engineering Director (Acting), 
Plans and Programs, Defense Research and Engineering Office of the Undersecretary for 
Defense Research and Engineering 
 
Steven Smolinski, Division Director, Technology Transition Initiatives, Office of Naval 
Research, Department of the Navy 
 
Thomas Troyano, Homeland Defense Coordinator, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics  
 
Peter Vandenbosch, Chief, Analysis Division, U.S. Northern Command 
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Bill Waugaman,  National Laboratories Liaison (Sandia National Labs) to U.S. Northern 
Command  
 
Lou Wassersug, Program Manager, Explosives Detection, Technical Support Working Group, 
Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities 
 
Ngai Wong, Detection Senior S&T Manager, Joint Science and Technology Office for Chemical 
and Biological Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
 
Other Federal Agency Personnel 
 
Nancy Adams, Director, Decontamination and Consequences Management Division, National 
Homeland Security Research Center, Office of Research and Development, U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency.  
 
David Balshaw, Program Administrator, Emerging Technologies, Sensors, Systems Biology, 
National Institute for Environmental Science, National Institutes of Health, U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services 
 
Duane Blackburn, Policy Analyst, Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and 
Technology Policy 
 
Teresa Fryberger, Director, Applied Sciences, Earth Sciences Division, National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 
 
Cathy Girouard, Social Science Analyst, National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice 
 
Adrianne Gould, Deputy Director of Transition, Office of Naval Research, U.S. Department of 
the Navy 
 
Jay Greer, Communication Liaison, Public Affairs Office, U.S. Department of State 
 
Jonathan Herrmann, Director, National Homeland Security Research Center, U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency 
 
David A. Jett, Program Director, CounterACT Research, National Institute for Neurological 
Disorders and Stroke, National Institutes of Health. 
 
Peter Jutro, Deputy Director, Science and Policy, National Homeland Security Research Center, 
Environmental Protection Agency  
 
Steve Kappes, Deputy Administrator, Animal Programs, Agricultural Research Service, U.S. 
Department of Agriculture 
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Richard B. Kellogg, Coordinator and Interagency Liaison, Laboratory Response Network, 
Division of Bioterrorism Preparedness & Response, National Center for Preparedness, 
Detection and Control of Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
 
Robert Kovac, Managing Director, Defense Trade and Controls Division, U.S. Department of 
State  
 
Michael G Kurilla, Director, Office of BioDefense Research Affairs, Associate Director for 
BioDefense Product Development, Division of Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, 
National Institute of Allergies and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health, U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services.  
 
Carol Linden, Principal Deputy Director, Biomedical Advanced Research and Development 
Authority, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services 
 
Jennifer Law Marshall, Analyst, U.S. Department of Commerce 
 
John McGowan, Deputy Director for Science Management, National Institute of Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
Kim Mickus, Director, Office of Counterterrorism, National Nuclear Security Administration, 
U.S. Department of Energy 
 
Daniel Morgan, Specialist in Science and Technology Policy Resources, Science and Industry 
Division, Congressional Research Service 
 
John Morgan, Deputy Director for Science and Technology, National Institute of Justice, U.S. 
Department of Justice 
 
Derek Orr, Program Manager, Public Safety Communication Systems, Office of Law 
Enforcement Standards, National Institute of Standards and Technology 
 
Winnie Reed, Chief, Crime Control and Prevention Research Division, Office of Research and 
Evaluation, National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice 
 
Lawrence Rosenblum, Program Director, Graphics and Visualization Division of Computing and 
Communication Foundation, National Science Foundation 
 
David Schatzer, Explosives Enforcement Officer, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 
Explosives, Department of Justice 
 
Daniel T. Shaughnessy, Program Administrator, Susceptibility and Population Health Branch, 
Division of Extramural Research and Training, National Institute for Environmental Health 
Science, National Institutes of Health.  
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Dana Shea, Specialist in Science and Technology Policy Resources, Science and Industry 
Division, Congressional Research Service  
 
Chuck Shotwell, Policy Director, Defense Trade and Controls Division, U.S. Department of 
State  
 
Devon Streit, Associate Director, Laboratory Policy and Evaluation, Office of Science, U.S. 
Department of Energy 
 
Jerry D. Thomas, Medical Officer Emergency Response and Air Toxicants Branch, Division of 
Laboratory Sciences, Coordinating Center for Environmental Health and Injury 
Prevention/National Center for Environmental Health, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
 
Chris Tillery, Associate Deputy Director for Science and Technology, National Institute of 
Justice, U.S. Department of Justice 
 
Pat Tsuchitani, Senior Advisor for Performance Assessment, Budget Division, Office of Budget, 
Finance, and Award Management, National Science Foundation 
 
Ed Watkins, Director, Non-proliferation Research and Development, National Nuclear Security 
Administration, U.S. Department of Energy 
 
Samuel Williamson, Federal Coordinator for Meteorology, Office of the Federal Coordinator for 
Meteorological Services and Supporting Research. 
 
George Wilson, Legislative Specialist, Office of Legislative and Public Affairs, National Science 
Foundation. 
 
Margaret Zahn, Acting Director, Office of Research and Evaluation, National Institute of Justice, 
U.S. Department of Justice 
 
Lisa-Joy Zgorski, Office of Legislative and Public Affairs, Office of the Director, National 
Science Foundation 
 
First Responders 
 
Russ Decker, President, United States Council of the International Association of Emergency 
Managers; Emergency Manager, Allen County, Ohio 
 
Edward A. Flynn, Chief, Milwaukee Police Department, Wisconsin 
 
John Gustoffson, Interoperability Telecommunications Manager, State of Connecticut 
 
Jim Hansen, Chair, National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board  
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David Heaven, TSWG/NIJ/DHS Support to National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board  
 
Will May, Jr., Director of Public Safety, Alucha County, Florida. 
 
Ernest Mitchell, Past President, International Association of Fire Chiefs; Member, Homeland 
Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee  
 
Eddie Reyes, Sector Two Commander, Alexandria Police Department, Virginia; Member 
SAFECOM Emergency Responder Council  
 
James Schwartz, Fire Chief, Arlington County, Virginia 
 
Trina Sheets, Executive Director, National Emergency Management Association  
 
Ellis Stanley, Emergency Management Consultant; Former General Manager, Emergency 
Preparedness Department, Los Angeles California 
 
Science and Policy Experts 
 
Peri Arnold, Professor of Political Science, Department of Government, University of Notre 
Dame 
 
Stuart Bretschneider, Associate Dean and Chair, the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public 
Affairs, Syracuse 
 
Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Keller-Ruden Professor of Public Service, School of Public and 
Environmental Affairs, Indiana University 
 
Seth Carus, Deputy Director, Center for Counter-proliferation Research, National Defense 
University 
 
John Carroll, Morris A. Adelman Professor of Management, Professor of Behavioral and 
Policy Sciences and Engineering Systems and Co-Director, Lean Advancement Initiative, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
 
Beverly Cigler, Professor of Public Policy and Administration, School of Public Affairs, Penn 
State University 
 
Amr Elnashai, Professor, School of Engineering, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign and 
Director of the Mid-America Earthquake Center 
 
Gerald Epstein, Senior Fellow for Science and Security, Homeland Security Program, Center for 
Strategic and International Studies  
 
Irwin Feller, Professor Emeritus, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania 
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Julie Fisher, Senior Associate, The Henry L. Stimson Center 
 
Robert Greenberg, President, G&H International Services, Inc. 
 
Dewitt John, Director, Environmental Studies Program, Browndoin College  
 
Kei Koizumi, Director, R&D Budget and Policy Program, American Academy for the 
Advancement of Science 
 
Gary LaFree, Director, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism, University of Maryland  
 
Richard Larson, Mitsui Professor of Engineering Systems and Civil and Environmental 
Engineering, Director, Center for Engineering Systems Fundamentals, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology 
 
Alan Leshner, Chief Executive Officer, American Association for the Advancement of Science 
 
Bruce McConnell, President, McConnell International and Government Futures 
 
Kenneth Meier, Charles Puryear Professor of Liberal Arts and Professor of Political Science, 
Texas A&M University 
 
Michael Moodie, President, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute and Consultant, 
Science Applications International Corporation 
 
Jonathan Morell, Senior Policy Analyst, NewVectors LLC  
 
Norman Polmar, Chairman, Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee 
(HSSTAC) 
 
Karlene Roberts, Professor in the Graduate School, Haas Organizational Behavior and Industrial 
Relations Group, University of California Berkeley  
 
Ellen Schall, Dean and Martin Cherkasky Professor, Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, 
New York University 
 
Howard Silver, Executive Director, Consortium of Social Science Associations 
 
Kathleen Smarick, Executive Director, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland  
 
Brad Smith, Senior Associate, Center for Biosecurity, University of Pittsburgh Medical Center 
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Jim Tiedje, University Distinguished Professor and Director, Center for Microbial Ecology, 
Michigan State University; former President of the American Microbiological Society 
 
Kathleen Tierney, Director, Natural Hazards Center, University of Colorado at Boulder 
 
William Wallace, Engineering Management, Center for Infrastructure and Transportation 
Studies, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 
 
Greg Wilson, Legislative Specialist, Office of Legislative and Public Affairs, National Science 
Foundation 
 
Charles Wise, Director, The John Glenn School of Public Affairs, Ohio State University 
  160
 
This Page Left Intentionally Blank. 
 
 
 
APPENDIX J 
 161
APPENDIX J:  ACRONYMS 
 
Acronym Description 
AAAS American Association for the Advancement of Science 
Academy National Academy of Public Administration 
BAA Broad Agency Announcement 
BARDA Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority 
CID Command, Control, and Interoperability Division 
IED Improvised Explosive Device 
CoRE Committee on Requirements 
CRS Congressional Research Service 
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
DNDO Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 
DOD Department of Defense 
DOE Department of Energy 
DOJ Department of Justice 
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 
FFRDC Federally Funded Research and Development Center 
FTE Full Time Equivalent 
FY Fiscal Year 
GAO Government Accountability Office 
HHS Department of Health and Human Services 
HIPS Homeland Innovative Prototypical Solutions 
HITS High Impact Technology Solutions 
HSARPA Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency  
HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
HSSTAC Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee 
IAB Inter Agency Board for Equipment Standardization and Interoperability 
IAD Interagency and First Responder Programs Division 
IND International Cooperative Programs Office 
IPA Intergovernmental Personnel Act 
IPT Integrated Product Team 
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Acronym Description 
LDRD Lab-Directed Research and Development 
MANPAD MAN-Portable Air Defense System 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NBACC National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center 
NIAID National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases 
NIH National Institutes of Health 
NIJ National Institute of Justice 
NIPP National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
NSF National Science Foundation 
NSTC National Science and Technology Council 
OIG Office of Inspector General 
OMB Office of Management and Budget 
ONL Office of National Laboratories 
ONR Office of Naval Research 
OPO Office of Procurement Operations 
OSTP Office of Science and Technology Policy 
PART Program Assessment Rating Tool 
QHSR Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 
R-Tech First Responder Technologies Program 
S&T Directorate of Science and Technology 
SAR Sector Annual Report 
SBIR Small Business Innovation Research 
SES Senior Executive Service 
SME Subject Matter Expert 
ST Senior Technical 
START National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism 
STORM Science and Technology Organizational Regulation Manual 
T&E Testing and Evaluation 
TOG Technical Oversight Group 
TOGWG Technical Oversight Group Working Group 
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Acronym Description 
TSWG Technical Support Working Group 
TTA Technology Transition Agreement 
U/S Under Secretary 
USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture 
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